"Progressing with Arizona": A History of Valley National Bank in the Immediate Post-War Period, 1944 to 1953 by Southard, John Larsen (Author) et al.
"Progressing with Arizona": A History of Valley National Bank  








A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment  
of the Requirements for the Degree  











Approved November 2011 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee:  
 
Jannelle Warren-Findley, Chair 
Philip VanderMeer 
































©2011 John Larsen Southard 




   
This thesis examines the immediate post-World War II operational 
strategy of Valley National Bank of Arizona, a Phoenix-based institution in 
operation from 1899 until its 1992 acquisition by Ohio-based Banc One 
Corporation (now JPMorgan Chase). For the purposes of this study, the 
immediate post-war period is defined as 1944 to January 20, 1953, a span 
that opens with the bank's wartime planning efforts for the post-war period 
and ends with the 1953 retirement of bank president Walter Bimson.  
By the end of World War II, Valley National ranked as the largest 
financial institution in the eight-state Rocky Mountain region, as measured 
by total deposits. However, post-war regulatory issues, competitor 
expansion, and an inability to generate deposit volume sufficient to meet 
subject period loan demands challenged bank leaders seeking to maintain 
market share and grow company profitability and stock value. In response 
to these difficulties, the bank focused on a three-pronged operational 
strategy emphasizing advertising, market-appropriate deposit and loan 
product offerings, and an aggressive branching and acquisition campaign. 
This strategy did not result in unmitigated success as the bank did 
experience a decrease in average deposit account balances, lost 
mortgage market share, and undertook acquisition activity that later 
resulted in federal antitrust action. However, by the end of the subject 
period, the three-pronged strategy employed by the bank did result in an 
increase in deposit dollar market share, as measured by deposits 
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controlled directly and indirectly by the institution, rising annual net profits, 
and substantial share price appreciation.  
The findings related to bank strategy and results presented in this 
thesis are based primarily upon information found in the 169-box Valley 
National Bank Collection housed at the Arizona Historical Society. 
Extensive newspaper research conducted using targeted date range and 
keyword searches and careful consideration of secondary source 
materials relating to the bank, the banking industry, and state, regional, 
and national politics, economics, and culture during the subject period 
provided additional information used in this study, and corroborated much 
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 Banks play a vital role in modern society. They serve as secure 
repositories for the savings of individuals and businesses, and often 
provide a comprehensive suite of financial services such as securities 
brokerage, insurance offerings, and retirement planning.  Loans issued by 
banks help consumers to finance homes, cars, and college educations, 
and allow businesses to build retail stores, erect office buildings, purchase 
inventory, and meet payroll. Though many people view banks in the 
context of their personal relationship with the institution, banks can also 
have a profound macro-level impact on society.  
As evidenced by the surge in home and automobile purchases 
following the early twentieth century development of extended term 
mortgages and installment lending programs, bank products and services 
can exert tremendous positive influence on an economy.1 Conversely, 
Depression-era bank closures, the 1980s savings and loan debacle, and 
the 2008 credit crisis serve as valuable reminders of the catastrophic 
                                            
1 In his book entitled Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of 
Consumer Credit, historian Lendol Calder writes that by 1924, nearly seventy-five percent 
of automobiles purchased were financed with installment credit. This figure represents 
more than fifty percent of the total volume of installment lending at that time. Thus, Calder 
argues, “the installment plan sold most Americans their automobile.” Calder also 
contends that the transition from five year mortgage terms to extended repayment 
periods (twenty years, initially) brought about as a result of the Home Owners’ 
Refinancing Act of 1933 and the subsequent creation of the Federal Housing 
Administration in 1934 revitalized the then stagnant housing market. Calder cites the 
sharp increase in housing starts between 1933 and 1940 as evidence of the impact of 
longer term, readily available mortgage offerings. Lendol Calder, Financing the American 
Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1999), 184, 280-282. 
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damage brought upon the national economy and psyche as a result of ill-
advised industry practices. However, despite the significance and societal 
impact of the banking industry, relatively few people understand the 
complex field or the history of the firm at which they bank. Historical 
knowledge of once-important local banking concerns since acquired by 
large out-of-state firms proves especially rare. Bank of America, Citicorp, 
JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo, the “Big Four” banks that now 
dominate the retail banking sector, are the product of scores of such 
acquisitions and mergers over several decades.2  
JPMorgan Chase and Company is the assemblage of over one 
thousand predecessor institutions, while Bank of America is the merged 
product of “several thousand banks.”3 Once incorporated into the 
                                            
2 The term “Big Four” is widely used in the financial press and blogosphere to 
refer collectively to Bank of America, Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. Wells 
Fargo captured the number four ranking after its acquisition of troubled Wachovia Bank in 
the fourth quarter of 2008. Stephen Grocer, “Ranking the 50 Biggest U.S. Banks: From 
BofA to Commerce Bancshares,” Wall Street Journal, http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/ 
2011/03/24/ranking-the-50-biggest-u-s-banks-from-bofa-to-commerce-bancshares/ 
(accessed May 19, 2011); “Wells Fargo to Buy Wachovia in $15.1 Billion Deal,” New York 
Times, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/03/wells-fargo-to-merge-with-wachovia/ 
(accessed April 1, 2011); “Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets on 
September 30, 2008,” American Banker, http://www.americanbanker.com/rankings/-
901334.html (accessed May15, 2011); “Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most 
Assets on December 31, 2008,” American Banker, http://www.americanbanker. 
com/rankings/-901362.html (accessed May 15, 2011); Bill Luby, “The Big Four U.S. 
Banks,” Daily Markets, http://www.dailymarkets.com/ stock/2008/11/18/the-big-four-us-
banks/ (accessed May 15, 2011); Rolfe Winkler, “Break Up the Big Banks,” Reuters, 
www.blogs.reuters.com/rolfe-winkler/2009/09/15/break-up-the-big-banks/ (accessed May 
15, 2011).  
 
3 JPMorgan Chase and Company, “The History of JPMorgan Chase & Co.: 200 
Years of Leadership in Banking,” JPMorgan Chase and Company, http://www.jpmorgan. 
com/cm/BlobServer?blobtable=Document &blobcol=urlblob&blob key=name &blob 
header=application/pdf&blobwhere=jpmc/about/ history/shorthistory.pdf (accessed May 
10, 2011), 23; Bank of America, “Our Heritage,” Bank of America, http://message. 
bankofamerica.com/heritage/#/ourheritage (accessed May 10, 2011). 
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framework of an acquiring institution, the history of smaller regional banks 
is often included in the story of the combined organization as a mere 
footnote. In most cases, the acquired bank adopts the name and 
corporate culture of the acquirer, relegating the heritage of the purchased 
entity to the memory of its former clients and employees and the archives 
of the purchaser. The Valley National Bank of Arizona is one such 
institution now erased from the landscape as a result of acquisition and 
absorption.   
Once ranked among the largest banks in the United States, Valley 
National was a leading force in the development of both the Phoenix 
metropolitan area and the state of Arizona.4 Nonetheless, relatively little 
work has been done to document the history of this important local bank. 
Consistent with other individual bank histories, much of the available work 
is dated and of questionable neutrality. Accordingly, this project has been 
undertaken to supplement the available research relating to the history of 
Valley National Bank. 
Historiography 
 The banking industry is the subject of innumerable works authored 
by economists and journalists. However, banking industry histories are 
relatively uncommon. The history of banking on a national level is 
                                            
4 By 1959, Valley National first ranked among the fifty largest banks in the United 
States when measured by deposits. Citing the impact of the bank on the city and state 
during the post-war years, one source referred to the institution as “the most dominating 
thing between the 1940s and the 1960s.” VNB Press Release, July 15, 1959, file 594, 
MS44: Valley National Bank Collection, 1898-1992, Arizona Historical Society, Tempe, 
AZ (hereafter cited as VNB Collection); Quoted in Lois Boyles, “Saw Valley’s Potential: 
Bimson Granted Loans When Others Wouldn’t,” Phoenix Gazette, March 2, 1978.  
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particularly underdeveloped. A History of Money and Banking in the 
United States: The Colonial Era to World War II (2005) provides a 
thorough history of domestic banking industry practices and key events, 
as well as valuable national historical context, through the end of World 
War II.5 American Commercial Banking: A History (1990) presents a 
comprehensive overview of the banking industry and its history, but lacks 
the broader national historical context found in A History of Money.6 The 
Encyclopedia of American Business History and Biography: Banking and 
Finance, 1913-1989 (1990) is a valuable reference work significant for its 
many entries relating to regional figures and institutions not found in other 
national banking histories.7 
Geographically themed works are more common than broader 
national histories. Banking in the American West: From Gold Rush to 
Deregulation (1991) and Banking in the West (1984) are examples of such 
works.8 Banking in the American West is comprehensive, well researched, 
and contextually grounded. As such, it serves as the definitive history of 
                                            
5 Murray N. Rothbard, A History of Money and Banking in the United States: The 
Colonial Era to World War II (Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2005). 
 
6 Benjamin J. Klebaner, American Commercial Banking: A History (Boston: 
Twayne Publishers, 1990). American Commercial Banking is an expanded and updated 
version of Klebaner’s earlier work entitled Commercial Banking in the United States: A 
History (Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1974). 
  
7 Larry Schweikart, ed. Encyclopedia of American Business History and 
Biography: Banking and Finance, 1913-1989 (New York: Bruccoli Clark Layman, Inc., 
1990). 
 
8 Lynne Pierson Doti and Larry Schweikart, Banking in the American West: From 
the Gold Rush to Deregulation (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Larry 
Schweikart, ed., Banking in the West (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1984). 
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banking in the Western United States. Banking in the West is an edited 
collection of essays covering selected topics in the history of banking in 
the American West. Relatively limited in coverage, the book presents 
valuable information on a narrow subset of history, including bank 
architecture and the use of alternative currencies in the frontier West.  
Arizona banking history is chronicled in A History of Banking in 
Arizona (1982).9 Commissioned by the Arizona Bankers Association, the 
book presents the state banking industry in a very favorable manner. 
While the work is now dated, the information contained in the text is 
accurate, well researched, and of benefit to readers seeking to gain an 
understanding of the state banking industry. Though not as 
comprehensive in scope, other works detailing the Arizona financial 
services industry include Investigation of Banking in Arizona (1956), 
“Commercial Banking in Arizona – Past and Present” (1958), Branch 
Banking and Economic Growth in Arizona and New Mexico (1960), 
Commercial Banking in Arizona: Structure and Performance Since World 
War II (1966), and Arizona Banking (1967).10  
                                            
9 Larry Schweikart, A History of Banking in Arizona (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Press, 1982).  
 
10 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation of Banking in Arizona: 
Report to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Prepared by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, November 23, 1956, Federal Reserve Bank 
(San Francisco, 1956), 8-16; Donald Bridenstine, “Commercial Banking in Arizona – Past 
and Present,” (PhD diss., University of Southern California, 1958); Paul D. Butt, Branch 
Banking and Economic Growth in Arizona and New Mexico (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Bureau of Business Research, 1960); Robert H. Marshall, Commercial 
Banking in Arizona: Structure and Performance Since World War II (Tucson: University of 
Arizona Division of Economic and Business Research, 1966); A. R. Gutowsky, Arizona 
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Originally undertaken as a confidential federal inquiry into alleged 
anticompetitive practices in the state banking market, Investigation of 
Banking in Arizona is a statistics laden two-volume report totaling nearly 
four-hundred pages. This document offers a vast compilation of 
information and analysis that extensively outlines the state banking 
industry in the post-World War II period and highlights the practices that 
prompted federal antitrust law enforcement actions in the 1960s. 
“Commercial Banking in Arizona – Past and Present” was prepared as an 
economics dissertation. As such, it provides detailed analysis of statistics 
and regulations, but lacks the broader historical framework found in A 
History of Banking in Arizona. Branch Banking and Economic Growth in 
Arizona and New Mexico, Commercial Banking in Arizona: Structure and 
Performance Since World War II, and Arizona Banking are monographs 
published by university business research bureaus. Collectively, the works 
focus on topics such as market saturation, banking laws, and institutional 
asset growth, thus supplying important data for this project. All of the 
aforementioned works serve as important contextual resources for a study 
of Valley National Bank.  
 Cited respectively as “the most dominant bank in Arizona” and the 
man likely wielding “more influence on Arizona banking” than any other 
individual during the Depression, World War II, and immediate post-war 
periods, Valley National Bank and its longtime leader Walter Bimson 
                                                                                                                       




receive widespread mention in texts documenting Arizona history.11 
However, aside from relatively brief passages chronicling the practices 
and significance of the institution and its leaders in broader works on state 
or local history, no independently produced historical study of Valley 
National Bank exists. This finding is consistent with the larger body of 
literature relating to the history of individual financial institutions, 
regardless of their economic significance or geographic market size.   
 Several texts documenting the history of Arizona-based banks have 
been published during the past six decades. Without exception, all were 
commissioned and distributed by the subject institutions or authored by 
key executives, prompting questions regarding the objectivity and intent of 
the publications. Included within this body of work are the First National 
Bank of Arizona-distributed history written by bank executive Sherman 
Hazeltine entitled 100 Years of Banking at First National Bank of Arizona 
(1977), the United Bank of Arizona-sponsored United Bank of Arizona: A 
Pacesetter for a Quarter Century (1985), the Continental Bank-
commissioned That Quality Image: The History of Continental Bank 
(1987), Frank Brophy’s The Story of the Bank of Douglas (1955) and The 
Arizona Bank: Arizona’s Story (1987), which was distributed by The 
                                            
11 Schweikart, Encyclopedia, 29; Larry Schweikart, “A Record of Revitalization: 
Financial Leadership in Phoenix,” in Phoenix in the Twentieth Century: Essays in 
Community History, ed. G. Wesley Johnson, Jr. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1993), 124.  
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Arizona Bank.12 Books profiling regional or nationwide banks with a current 
Arizona presence include the Bank of America-commissioned Biography 
of a Bank: Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 1904-1953 (1954), Stagecoach: 
Wells Fargo and the American West (2002), co-authored by Wells Fargo’s 
chief historian, and The Chase: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 1945-
1985 (1986), written by longtime Chase executive John Wilson.13 The 
early-to-mid-twentieth century history of Valley National Bank has also 
been documented primarily through bank-sponsored or insider authored 
accounts. The operations of the bank in the latter half of the twentieth 
century have received little inquiry, scholarly or otherwise.   
 The limited body of literature devoted exclusively to Valley National 
history includes just two works, Financing the Frontier: A Fifty Year History 
of the Valley National Bank (1950) and Transformation in the Desert: The 
Story of Arizona’s Valley National Bank (1962).14 Financing the Frontier is 
                                            
12 Sherman Hazeltine, 100 Years of Banking at First National Bank of Arizona 
(Phoenix: First National Bank of Arizona, 1977); Mark Nebgen, United Bank of Arizona: A 
Pacesetter for a Quarter Century: A History of United Bank of Arizona (Phoenix: s.n., 
1985); Larry Schweikart, That Quality Image: The History of Continental Bank (Taipan, 
N.Y.: Custombook, 1987); Frank Brophy, The Story of the Bank of Douglas (Phoenix: 
Bank of Douglas, 1955); Pam Hait, The Arizona Bank: Arizona’s Story (Phoenix: The 
Arizona Bank, 1987). 
 
13 Marquis and Bessie James, Biography of a Bank: The Story of Bank of 
America, N.T. & S.A., 1904-1953 (San Francisco: Bank of America, 1982); Philip Fradkin 
and Andy Anderson, Stagecoach: Wells Fargo and the American West: Wells Fargo and 
the Rise of the American Financial Services Industry (New York: Simon & Schuster 
Source, 2002); John David Wilson, The Chase: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 1945-
1985 (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986).  
 
14 Ernest J. Hopkins, Financing the Frontier: A Fifty Year History of the Valley 
National Bank (Phoenix: The Arizona Printers, Inc., 1950); Carl Bimson, Transformation 





a company-sponsored publication described by banking historian Larry 
Schweikart as “advertising” featuring “excessive admiration for Walter 
Bimson,” but otherwise regarded by Schweikart to be “fairly accurate” with 
respect to details such as dates and names.15 This publication was to be 
followed by a 1962 update, but that project was cancelled after Bimson 
found that the proposed text “overemphasized his achievements.”16 
Transformation in the Desert is a twenty-eight page transcript of a 
presentation on Valley National history given to a 1962 meeting of the 
Newcomen Society by Carl Bimson, Walter Bimson’s younger brother and 
successor.17 Though Valley National played a significant role in the cultural 
and economic development of its home city and state and ranked as the 
thirty-second largest bank in the nation by the mid-1980s, no work 
focusing solely on the institution has been published since the release of 
Transformation in the Desert.18 While Financing the Frontier and 
Transformation in the Desert contain valuable facts and statistics 
corroborated by archival materials, newspaper articles, and reports to 
regulatory agencies, questions of neutrality and intentional omissions 
necessarily arise. As such, a new, independently produced history of this 
important local institution is warranted.  
                                            
15 Schweikart, Encyclopedia, 28; Schweikart, A History, 240. 
 
16 Schweikart, Encyclopedia, 28. 
 
17 Bimson, Transformation, 4. 
 




Although a comprehensive history of the corporation from its 
nineteenth century founding to its 1992 acquisition by Banc One (now 
Chase) exceeds the scope of a traditional thesis project, an examination 
of one of the many distinct chronological chapters of Valley Bank history is 
appropriate in scope.19 During the one-hundred-nine year existence of the 
bank and its predecessor institutions, many such clearly definable 
operational chapters may be identified. 
 The first chapter of bank history includes the 1883 formation of the 
First National Bank of Phoenix, the 1899 incorporation of the Gila Valley 
Bank, the 1914 reorganization of Valley Bank (the 1884 successor to First 
National) by Gila Valley Bank board members, and the 1922 merger of 
these two Valley National predecessor institutions resulting from the need 
of both organizations to strengthen loan-to-deposit ratios.20 The late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth century history of both antecedent 
institutions receives attention in Financing the Frontier, Phoenix in the 
Twentieth Century: Essays in Community History (1993), A History of 
Banking in Arizona, From Charcoal to Banking: The I. E. Solomons of 
                                            
19 Banc One Corporation of Ohio acquired Valley National Bank in 1992. 
JPMorgan Chase and Company purchased Banc One in 2004. Catherine Reagor, “Say 
Goodbye to Last Large Arizona-based Bank: VNB Balance-sheet Cleanup Key to Sale,” 
The Business Journal, April 20, 1992, 1; JPMorgan Chase and Company, “The History of 
Our Firm,” JPMorgan Chase and Company, 
http://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/About-JPMC/jpmorgan-history.htm (accessed 
March 15, 2011). 
  




Arizona (1984), and Geoffrey Mawn’s 1979 dissertation entitled “Phoenix, 
Arizona: Central City of the Southwest, 1870-1920.”21  
The second chapter of Valley National history commences following 
the 1922 consolidation of Valley Bank and Gila Bank, and ends with the 
January 1, 1933 departure of bank president Herbert McClung.22 This 
period of institutional consolidation and fitful growth has been documented 
in Financing the Frontier and A History of Banking in Arizona, though few 
other works provide extensive coverage of this chapter. This paucity of 
literature is likely attributable to the absence of primary source material 
relating to the institution prior to the early 1930s. A review of bank archival 
records held at the Arizona Historical Society Papago Park campus 
reveals a limited number of internal records created prior to 1933. 
However, the amount of available documentation increases greatly for the 
period beginning in 1933, at which point Walter Bimson assumed the role 
of bank president.23 
                                            
21 Hopkins; G. Wesley Johnson, ed., Phoenix in the Twentieth Century: Essays in 
Community History (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); Schweikart, A 
History; Elizabeth Ramenofsky, From Charcoal to Banking: The I. E. Solomons of 
Arizona (Tucson: Westernlore Press, 1984); Geoffrey Mawn, “Phoenix, Arizona: Central 
City of the Southwest, 1870-1920,” (PhD diss., Arizona State University, 1979). 
 
22 “H. J. McClung, Phoenix Banker and Leader, Dies,” Los Angeles Times, April 
28, 1934. 
 
23 Interestingly, most available material cites January 1, 1933 as the date Bimson 
arrived in Arizona to assume management responsibilities. Sources such as Financing 
the Frontier, Transformation in the Desert, and numerous Valley National press releases 
spanning the course of several decades cite New Year’s Day 1933 as the date Bimson 
arrived at Valley Bank headquarters, assembled bank staff, and instructed them to lend 
aggressively despite the poor economy. While his term may have officially commenced 
on that day, contemporary newspaper articles indicate that Bimson arrived in Phoenix on 
the night of January 2nd, and began discharging his duties on January 3rd. The New 
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 Perhaps owing to the ample documentation accessible to 
researchers and the importance of the institution during the 1930s and 
1940s, scholarly coverage of the Depression and World War II periods 
dwarfs that relating to earlier chapters of bank history. Because of the 
significant role Valley National played in leading the local economic 
recovery during the Depression and its size and influence during the war 
years, many works address the topic of bank operations during this period. 
Books examining Valley National business practices during this period 
include Financing the Frontier, A History of Banking in Arizona, and The 
New Deal in Arizona (1999).24 However, bank operations during the 
immediate post-war period have received far less scholarly attention.  
The immediate post-war chapter of Valley National history begins 
with internal post-war planning measures undertaken in 1944 and 
concludes with Walter Bimson’s retirement from the bank presidency on 
January 20, 1953.25  Financing the Frontier was released in 1950, 
                                                                                                                       
Year’s date arouses additional suspicion as January 1, 1933 was a Sunday and a 
holiday. Thus, it seems likely that the date of arrival and initial meeting with bank 
associates was later changed to New Year’s Day for the sake of scripting and show. 
While available histories make no mention of earlier attempts to relocate to Arizona for 
purposes of managing Valley Bank and Trust, correspondence held in the VNB Collection 
provides evidence of Bimson’s desire to do so as early as the fourth quarter of 1929. 
Schweikart, Encyclopedia, 26. Hopkins, 215; Bimson, Transformation, 17; “Bank Leader 
Arrives Here,” Arizona Republic, January 3, 1933; “New Bank Executive Sees Arizona in 
Van of Prosperity,” Arizona Republic, January 4, 1933. Union Investment Company to 
Walter Bimson, January 7, 1930, folder 441, VNB Collection. 
 
24 William Collins, The New Deal in Arizona (Phoenix: Arizona State Parks Board, 
1999). 
 
25 Most internal correspondence related to Valley National post-war planning 
efforts may be found in file 507 of the VNB Collection, though some letters and memos 
are located in other files within the collection. Walter Bimson left the presidency to 
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precluding coverage of the final years of Bimson’s presidency and lacking 
historical perspective. Carl Bimson’s Transformation in the Desert includes 
discussion of this period, but the brief nature and questionable neutrality of 
the work limits its value. The institution and Walter and Carl Bimson 
receive attention for their community building efforts during the immediate 
post-war period in books such as The Emerging Metropolis: Phoenix, 
1944-1973 (2005), Phoenix in the Twentieth Century, Phoenix Rising: The 
Making of a Desert Metropolis (2002), and Desert Visions and the Making 
of Phoenix, 1860-2009 (2010).26 However, an independent study of Valley 
National business practices during the immediate post-war period has not 
yet been undertaken. Accordingly, an inquiry into the operations of the 
institution from 1944 to Walter Bimson’s January 20, 1953 transition from 
the bank presidency is in order. 
Research Question 
After more than a decade of impressive growth driven by federal 
programs and dollars, the bank faced a period of uncertainty following 
World War II. Though ranked as the largest bank in the Rocky Mountain 
region by the end of the war, the prospect of losing ground was not 
                                                                                                                       
assume the role of board chairman on January 20, 1953. On that same day, his brother 
Carl was appointed president. VNB Press Release, January 20, 1953, folder 201, VNB 
Collection. 
  
26 William Collins, The Emerging Metropolis: Phoenix, 1944-1973 (Phoenix: 
Arizona State Parks Board, 2005); Johnson; Philip VanderMeer, Phoenix Rising: The 
Making of a Desert Metropolis (Carlsbad, CA: Heritage Media Corporation, 2002); Philip 
VanderMeer, Desert Visions and the Making of Phoenix (Albuquerque: University of New 




inconceivable. Recognizing the possibility of a post-war reduction in 
Arizona population and industry resulting from a decrease in federal 
defense spending, and the associated impact on bank operations resulting 
from such an occurrence, bank leaders endeavored to craft a plan for 
peacetime growth and success.27  
In addition to looming economic uncertainty, new enterprises and 
longstanding competitors alike sought to best the local giant. Significant 
post-war era challenges included the innovative and successful A. B. 
Robbs Agencies, the early 1950s spread of savings and loan associations 
and, from 1945 onward, a Phoenix branch presence for the growing Bank 
of Douglas. However, by the end of the subject period, Valley National still 
dominated the local banking market, boasting thirty-six of the eighty-nine 
branch banks in Arizona and controlling nearly sixty percent of all 
deposits.28 This thesis explores the corporate strategy of Valley National 
during the immediate post-war period of 1944 to January 20, 1953, and 
identifies the successes, and occasional failures, resulting from the 
implementation of this strategy. As such, the primary research question is 
as follows: How did Valley National Bank maintain and build upon its 
Depression-era and wartime success during the subject period? 
In order to determine how bank leaders accomplished this feat, the 
question of corporate culture, direction, and policy must be answered. 
                                            
27 Collins, Emerging Metropolis, 216. 
 
28 Doti, Banking in the American West, 159; Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, Investigation, 8-16. 
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How did the business operate during this period, who led these efforts, 
and what results were achieved? Specifically, what products, services, 
business practices, or advertising efforts fueled the continued growth and 
profitability recorded by Valley National in the immediate post-war years? 
Understanding the individuals, policies and practices responsible for the 
success of the bank during the study period will supplement the body of 
literature relating to this important Arizona institution.  
This study, undertaken with the benefit of historical perspective and 
an extensive archival document collection, aims to supplement the post-
war period institutional history found in Financing the Frontier and 
Transformation in the Desert.  In doing so, the results of this project may 
be used as a foundational piece for further study of the bank, biographies 
of bank leaders such as Walter or Carl Bimson, or the post-war 
development of Arizona generally or Phoenix specifically, thus 
demonstrating clear value to the scholarly community.  
Methodology 
While many business histories may be classified as “self-serving 
celebrations or sensational exposés,” the scholarly model of corporate 
history requires extensive emphasis on “strategy, structure, and the 
decision-making process” of the subject institution.29 However, the existing 
body of literature focusing on the history of individual banks can be 
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grouped primarily within the first category. Two notable exceptions that 
have served as models for this project are Citibank, 1812-1970 (1985) and 
The Chase: The Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A., 1945-1985.30 Though 
longtime executives of each institution authored the aforementioned 
books, both texts feature a comprehensive approach that incorporates 
institutional challenges and triumphs with equal emphasis, and both 
establish national historic context and demonstrate a clear relationship of 
institutional actions or programs with national economic and political 
events. The thoroughness, clear organizational style, and neutrality of 
these texts set them apart as works that have guided the style and tone of 
this effort.  
As the scope of this project is limited to investigating the business 
practices of Valley National Bank during the immediate post-war period, 
this thesis is not intended to serve as a biography of Walter Bimson, a 
comparative study of Arizona financial institutions during the subject 
period, or an examination of the impact of the bank on Arizona or the 
Phoenix metropolitan area. However, research conducted for this project 
may be applicable to a future dissertation, journal article or book relating 
to one of the aforementioned topics.  
Rather, this thesis presents a history of bank strategy, leadership, 
operations, profitability, and growth during the subject period. Central to 
this work is an examination of the specific policies, products, promotional 
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efforts, and individuals responsible for the successes and failures 
experienced by the institution during the period of study. The key policies 
and practices, as well as their outcomes, will be presented in three 
strategic theme groupings: promotional efforts, deposit and lending 
products and services, and geographic expansion, which includes 
branching and competitor acquisition. In order to better frame the findings, 
this work includes pertinent state and national contextual history. When 
appropriate, common subject period banking industry practices are also 
discussed.  
Research efforts focused on the Valley National Bank Collection 
held at the Arizona Historical Society. The Valley National Bank Research 
Department Collection held at the Arizona Historical Foundation was also 
consulted, though its contents relating to bank operations during the 
period of study are more limited in nature.31 These resources were 
selected due to their size and scope, as well as their status as the only 
publicly accessible collections of internal documents relating to Valley 
National.  
Archival research entailed reviewing all collection materials relating 
to the subject period for information regarding Valley National Bank 
corporate culture, operational strategy, and results. While internally 
produced and distributed documents yielded the vast majority of project 
findings due to the volume of such documents within the collection, press 
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releases and external correspondence served as valuable corroborative 
pieces. Although the Valley National public relations staff produced press 
releases concerning all matter of topics, items of particular significance to 
the institution were often the subject of numerous releases, thus 
highlighting the potential importance of the announcement, event, or 
individual mentioned. Further indication of significance was ascertained 
through an examination of contemporary press coverage, as significant 
topics were likely to result in greater media attention. Bank initiatives 
deemed appropriate for study inclusion are grouped categorically and 
discussed with like efforts.  
Contextual information relating to local, state, and national history 
was obtained primarily through secondary source material, though 
contemporary media coverage was also used. Industry journals and 
assorted secondary source materials were consulted for contextual 
information relating to the banking industry during the subject period.  
Sources 
 Primary source materials held in the Valley National Bank 
Collection at the Arizona Historical Society served as the key information 
sources for this project. The Valley National Bank Collection consists of 
one hundred sixty-nine boxes of internal documents, correspondence, 
press releases, annual reports, publications, news clippings, and 
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photographs. Though the content ranges in date from 1898 to 1992, items 
dating from 1933 and beyond comprise the bulk of the collection.32  
 Archived oral history interviews, speech transcripts, and 
contemporary media coverage were also consulted as primary source 
research. Though relatively brief, the Walter Bimson oral history interview 
conducted by G. Wesley Johnson as part of the Phoenix History Project 
provided a rare and valuable first-hand account of bank operations and 
history, as told from the perspective of the top executive of the subject 
period. Additional Phoenix History Project interviewees relevant to this 
topic include bankers Carl Bimson, Frank Brophy, and Joseph Refsnes.33 
The Arizona Historical Foundation holds a bound collection of speeches 
given by Carl Bimson between 1935 and 1968. Though the majority of 
speeches relate to his role as president of the American Bankers 
Association, this collection did yield information relevant to the study topic 
and subject period.34 Media coverage research focused on the Arizona 
Republic, though the Phoenix Gazette and other state and national 
newspapers, magazines, and industry journals were also utilized. As 
articles published in the Republic prior to 1999 are not yet digitized, 
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targeted microfilm searches were conducted using date ranges 
determined by key bank events and dated news clippings found in the 
Valley National Bank Collection.35  
 Secondary source material used for context and corroboration 
includes texts on state and local history, works on bank operations and 
banking industry history, books focusing on the history of competitor 
institutions, journal articles, and theses and dissertations. 
Thesis 
 Following more than a decade of growth fueled by a reliance on 
federal programs and dollars, Valley National Bank claimed the title of 
“Largest Bank in the Rocky Mountain States” at the start of the post-war 
period.36 However, Valley National executives recognized the possibility of 
a drastically different business environment following the cessation of 
hostilities in Europe and Asia. In the post-war years, the large deposits of 
local defense-related businesses were likely to be withdrawn, while the 
growing wartime population was subject to relocation for employment 
purposes in a competitive peacetime labor market.  
Facing the prospect of questionable growth because of decreased 
federal spending and the closure of wartime industrial operations and 
defense facilities throughout the state, Valley National executives began 
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post-war strategic planning in 1944. Led by bank president Walter Bimson, 
vice-president Carl Bimson, and statistician Herbert Leggett, bank 
management envisioned a post-war strategy that would build upon the 
Depression-era and wartime momentum enjoyed by the institution. By the 
time Walter Bimson stepped down from the bank presidency on January 
20, 1953, results indicated that effective strategizing and an adaptive 
corporate culture had proven successful. 
As demonstrated by historian Philip VanderMeer’s characterization 
of Valley National as “the dominant financial force in the Valley and state” 
during the post-war period, the Depression-era and wartime success of 
the institution had been largely replicated.37 Although Valley National 
suffered setbacks related to deposit and mortgage lending market share 
during the subject period, by January 1953, the company retained its rank 
as the largest bank in the Rocky Mountain region, continued to house 
more deposits than any other Arizona bank, and claimed the largest 
geographic presence of all banks in the state.38 The three strategic 
elements central to this feat were strong promotion of the institution and its 
home state, continued innovation in product and service offerings, and an 
aggressive expansion of the Valley National geographic footprint through 
branching and competitor acquisition.  
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 Highly effective promotional efforts occupy a central role in the 
story of Valley National post-war expansion. The significance and impact 
of specific advertising and public relations initiatives such as clever print 
advertising, bank produced and distributed periodicals, and numerous 
press releases resulting in highly favorable articles printed in local, state, 
and national publications cannot be understated. During the subject 
period, bank leaders including Walter Bimson, statistician Herbert Leggett, 
and advertising executive Mert Reade teamed to craft unique and effective 
publicity campaigns.39 These efforts, in addition to the publicity and 
recognition resulting from the gradual incorporation of art and modern 
architecture within the branch network, contributed greatly to institutional 
success. Indeed, the familiarity and expanded customer base gained from 
through public relations activities and promotional efforts laid the 
groundwork for future growth by increasing brand recognition and 
promoting the latest in product offerings. 
 The deposit and lending volume increases allowed by the growing 
Arizona population and economy in the years following World War II were 
critical to the continued success Valley National. In an effort to capture 
new deposit and loan business, the bank both followed prevailing industry 
trends and led the market in offering innovative new products and 
                                            
39 Herbert Leggett joined Valley National in 1943. Mert Reade joined the bank as 
an employee in 1951, but was involved in Valley National promotional efforts prior to his 
employment with the bank as an employee of the firm’s outside advertising agency. 
“Herbert Leggett, Bank Executive Retiring June 30,” Casa Grande Dispatch, June 27, 
1962; VNB Press Release, October 13, 1951, file 678, VNB Collection; “Mert Reade of 
the Valley Bank: The Man Behind the Advertising,” April 2, 1971, file 678, VNB Collection; 
“Reade Retires from VNB,” The Arizona Publisher, May 1971, 9.  
 23 
 
services. Examples of such innovations include the Valley National GI 
banking department, a strong emphasis on installment lending, and a 
focus on increasing the institution’s mass-market appeal through the use 
of low-minimum-balance deposit accounts. The growth and profitability 
resulting from an innovative and expanding suite of product and service 
offerings set the stage for the continued geographical expansion of the 
institution, as was achieved through de novo branch expansion and 
competitor acquisition.40 
 The bank grew its size and footprint through an aggressive 
branching and acquisition campaign in the immediate post-war years. 
Branches were erected throughout the Valley and the state in an effort to 
capture the business of a rapidly growing population. The institution also 
acquired competitors in markets it already served, as well as in areas 
without a company presence, demonstrating that branching and 
acquisition demonstrated a clear value to bank executives and investors. 
However, the practice would lead to great difficulties and intense 
regulatory scrutiny in the years following this study period, thus partially 
negating the positive impact of this aspect of corporate strategy. 
Nonetheless, the operational decisions of the post-war period allowed 
Valley National to consolidate its control of the state banking market, 
increase its net profits, and build shareholder value. As such, the three-
pronged business strategy employed by the bank in the immediate post-
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war years helped to ensure that the institution would retain its ranking and 
clout for decades to come, thus building upon an already noteworthy 






As the product of two primary predecessor entities founded many 
years and miles apart from one another, Valley National Bank boasted a 
rich, albeit turbulent, history. The First National Bank of Phoenix was 
founded in 1883 to act as a funding source for developer W.J. Murphy as 
he carried out construction of the Arizona Canal.  However, just seven 
months after its initial organization, the institution exceeded the lending 
capacity guidelines allowed under the terms of its national banking 
charter. In an attempt to ward off an inevitable visit from federal bank 
examiners, shareholders reorganized the institution as the Valley Bank of 
Phoenix, a state chartered bank not subject to inspection by federal 
regulators.41 Prospering as the Salt River Valley flourished, the bank 
focused on dominating the Phoenix banking industry. 
Elsewhere in Arizona, a small-town shop owner recognized the 
need for a local banking operation. Stifled by the restrictive credit 
atmosphere that followed the Great Panic of 1893, Arizona merchant I. E. 
Solomon spearheaded the founding of the Gila Valley Bank in 1899.42 
Established with $25,000 in capital and operated out of Solomon’s small 
general store in the cattle town of Solomonville, the bank served as the 
financial hub of mining-oriented Graham County. Eyeing the potential 
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profits associated with the mining operations in the nearby towns of Clifton 
and Morenci, the Arizona Bulletin confidently proclaimed that the newly 
formed Gila Valley Bank would soon “take rank with the solid financial 
institutions of the country.” True to predictions, the institution declared a 
six percent dividend after less than one year of operation, netting its 
founders $1,500 on their initial $25,000 investment.43  
In 1902, the growing and profitable enterprise expanded to the 
mining boomtowns of Clifton and Morenci. Despite the rugged nature of 
these mining communities, the bank directors chose to name Mary 
Woodman manager of the Clifton branch, causing her to enter the history 
books as the first female bank officer in the territory.44  
Shortly after establishing branches in the prospering mining 
settlements, bank management recognized an unfulfilled product need 
within the markets it served. As miners were often young, single men who 
had traveled long distances to seek their fortune stripping precious 
minerals from below the ground in small towns throughout the West, few 
family members or trustworthy friends could be found to settle affairs and 
distribute assets when frontier miners met untimely deaths. In an effort to 
address the need for expedient and competent settlement of miners’ 
estates, the bank expanded its product offerings and began to offer trust 
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and estate services to depositors employed by the mining concerns.45 The 
innovative spirit represented by the decision to offer advanced financial 
services to largely uneducated consumers of modest means within upstart 
mining towns would guide the actions of the bank and its leadership as the 
institution continued to grow in size and prestige. 
As the bank expanded throughout the rural portions of the territory, 
its influence and importance increased significantly. When the territorial 
economy suffered the effects of a crippling decline in copper prices and a 
nationwide bank run in 1907, the leaders of the Gila Valley Bank stepped 
forward to avert a financial crisis in Arizona’s copper country. Already hit 
hard by the drastic drop in copper earnings, the region was ill prepared for 
the nationwide bank run and currency shortage that followed the collapse 
of New York’s Knickerbocker Trust Company. The national economic 
fallout surrounding the Knickerbocker closure had led several governors to 
declare state banking holidays during which banks could process checks, 
but were prohibited from engaging in currency transactions.46 However, 
Arizona Territorial Governor Joseph Kibbey refrained from enacting a 
banking moratorium, thus compounding the growing problem.  
Facing an already limited supply of hard currency due to the 
isolated location of the communities in which the enterprise operated, Gila 
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Valley management recognized the urgent need for a practical alternative 
to banknotes. As the majority of institutional reserves were stored in an El 
Paso vault, the bank was particularly vulnerable to a deposit run. During a 
late night brainstorming session, executives from several area banks hit 
upon the idea of issuing scrip to sate the cash requirements of depositors.  
The session participants quickly set about forming the Clifton-
Morenci Clearinghouse Organization, a multi-entity association 
established to serve as the official scrip issuer and redeemer.47 The 
planned certificates were to be printed after stakeholders fully 
collateralized their value. Given their relative wealth, Gila Valley Bank 
board members contributed the majority of needed funds to the escrow 
account backing the venture. While the scrip notes, or “skin plasters” as 
locals disapprovingly referred to them, were met with initial community 
opposition, residents soon learned to embrace the alternative currency.48  
The scrip effort ensured the survival of the bank, and led to it being 
widely credited with shielding the regional economy from the worst of the 
1907 currency crisis. Accordingly, the bank emerged from the crisis with 
an enhanced reputation and a solid deposit base, allowing it to continue 
on a trajectory of steady growth. Indeed, by 1914, the bank boasted over 
$2.5 million in deposits, ranking it as the largest financial institution in the 
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state.49 However, while the Gila Valley Bank had reached the pinnacle of 
the Arizona financial industry, the Phoenix-based Valley Bank and Trust 
had encountered a very different fate. Stung by large-scale lending on 
questionable agricultural endeavors, the Valley Bank faced a liquidity 
crisis in 1914. The shareholders of the struggling institution called upon 
the small-town operators of the Gila Valley Bank for assistance. 
Recognizing an opportunity to expand to the capital city, yet wary of 
mingling the balance sheets of the two entities, the primary shareholders 
of the Gila Valley Bank provided the capital necessary to save the 
foundering company, and gained ownership of the institution in the 
process. However, as the new entrants to the Phoenix banking market 
wished to shield their Graham County depositors from the financial 
vagaries of the bustling capital city, they opted to run the banks as two 
legally distinct businesses.50  
The new banking moguls succeeded in managing the banks as 
separate entities until economic catastrophe mandated a change in 
strategy. The Arizona economy had enjoyed tremendous success during 
the profitable war years. The materiel needs of the American military 
machine during World War I fueled a financial boom for Arizona farmers, 
miners, and ranchers. However, the sharp post-war decline in demand for 
copper, beef, and cotton sparked economic ruin throughout the state. The 
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post-war commodity demand plunge led to a precipitous drop in Arizona 
copper production. The signature metal of the state yielded $200 million in 
revenue during the war years, yet brought in just $20 million in 1921. 
Similarly, the cotton fields of the Salt River Valley produced a product that 
sold for $1.25 per pound in 1920, but demanded just twenty cents per 
pound in 1922. All told, revenue from Arizona’s three key industries- 
mining, agriculture, and cotton production- dropped from a $261 million in 
1917 to $68 million in 1921. Impacting every facet of life in the state, the 
economic slump of the post-war years wreaked havoc on the Arizona 
financial industry, resulting in the closure of forty-nine of the eighty-eight 
banks in the state between 1920 and 1925.51 
The Gila Valley Bank and Valley Bank and Trust were also severely 
impacted by the lack of demand for Arizona’s resources. By the summer 
of 1922, the balance sheets of both institutions demonstrated serious 
fiscal instability. The Gila Valley Bank recorded outstanding loans equal to 
sixty-three percent of its total deposits, while the Valley Bank and Trust 
reported an outstanding loan figure equal to sixty-eight percent of its total 
deposits.  
The reduction in deposit frequency and size brought about by the 
economic downturn caused concern that already unhealthy loan-to-
deposit ratios would continue to weaken, endangering the viability of both 
institutions. Valley Bank and Trust was further imperiled as many of its 
                                            




outstanding loans had been issued to other banks, thus increasing the risk 
of default as the local deposit base continued to shrink.52 Further 
complicating the situation, the Arizona Legislature passed a banking 
reform bill in 1922 that created more rigorous capitalization and reserve 
requirements for state-licensed banks. The new law specified a reserve 
requirement of “fifteen per cent of the aggregate amount of their deposit 
and demand liabilities,” thus calling into question the solvency of many 
hard-hit state chartered banks.53 In response to the multiple challenges of 
the day, the directors of the independent Gila Valley Bank and Valley 
Bank and Trust opted to merge the independent entities into one large 
Phoenix-based institution better suited to meet the reserve and 
capitalization requirements recently imposed by state solons.54 Thus, while 
competing institutions faded into oblivion, the then-unified Valley Bank and 
Trust weathered the immediate crisis and emerged as a larger and more 
stable financial institution because of the decisions made by management 
in response to external challenges.  
Nonetheless, adverse economic conditions resulting from lagging 
commodity prices plagued the state for the remainder of the decade, and 
the overall liquidity of the bank suffered as a result. By 1929, Valley Bank 
and Trust assumed the role of “largest farmer in Arizona” due to its 
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portfolio of foreclosed agricultural land. At the peak of its troubles, the 
bank owned thirty-seven ranches throughout the state, and spent over 
$100,000 per year managing its depressed holdings.55 The high number of 
foreclosures throughout the state and the resulting inability to sell real 
estate holdings for book value also forced the institution to manage 
numerous apartment complexes until buyers could be located.56 As the 
bank was then a major holder of real property, the rising tide of illiquidity 
related to devalued real estate holdings seriously jeopardized its financial 
well being.  
Former bank president Dr. Louis Ricketts perceived the institutional 
risk as dire enough to merit a campaign to raise $550,000 in capital, 
including $330,000 of his own funds, to purchase repossessed land from 
the corporation. This act of faith mitigated the loan losses incurred during 
the agricultural slump of the 1920s and assured future growth potential.57 
Boasting a newly strengthened balance sheet courtesy of Ricketts, the 
institution set out to construct the eleven-story Professional Building in 
downtown Phoenix. First occupied in 1932, this art-deco themed structure 
served as the headquarters of the bank until the thirty-eight story glass 
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and steel tower Valley Center was completed in 1973.58 However, the 
timing of this monumental construction project was ill considered as the 
early years of the Great Depression proved to be an extremely challenging 
period for Valley Bank and Trust.    
As a small town governed by the economics of agriculture, 1929 
Phoenix felt little initial impact related to the securities market nosedive 
that crippled many larger cities in short order. While the front page of the 
October 29, 1929 Washington Post described the stock exchange floor as 
a “scene of wild confusion” necessitating the barring of the general public 
as the market closed “practically at the bottom,” and page one of the 
October 30th New York Times declared stock prices to have “virtually 
collapsed” during “the most disastrous trading day in the market’s history,” 
The Arizona Republican quietly announced the market crash through two 
sub-headlines below the main stories of the day.59 Indeed, the widespread 
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economic slump only began to seriously impact Arizona when lagging 
demand for copper forced the shuttering of mines throughout the state.  
Precipitated by a drop in copper prices that reduced payment per 
pound from 18.1 cents in 1929 to 5.6 cents in 1931, most Arizona copper 
mines ceased operations by 1933.60 When paired with the sharp decline in 
the agricultural and cattle industries, the total value of Arizona mining, 
farming, and livestock production dropped from $223 million to $43.2 
million between 1929 and 1932.61 While real wages dropped ten to twelve 
percent nationwide during the early years of the Depression, the 
purchasing power of Arizona consumers declined by fifty-one percent.62 As 
the economy of the Salt River Valley was still heavily dependent upon 
agricultural production, this slump also greatly impacted the health of local 
institutions. 
Claiming just 48,118 residents living within the municipal 
boundaries that reached out a total of 6.4 square miles, 1929 Phoenix was 
a very different city than the sprawling, heavily-populated twenty-first 
century metropolis it has become.63 As the town played host to just six 
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banks in 1929, the local economy was particularly susceptible to the 
interconnectedness of the banking industry and the dangers of institutional 
weakness. The resiliency of this tight-knit system was challenged during 
the early years of the 1930s as two of six Phoenix based banks and two of 
five locally organized building and loan associations failed. Statewide, 
fourteen financial institutions failed between the years 1930 and 1932, 
causing great concern that a lack of deposits would imperil the entire 
Arizona banking industry.64  
Indeed, the situation was both dire and unpredictable. Fully one-
third of all banks in existence nationwide in 1929 had failed by 1933.65 
Further confusing the planning efforts of bankers and policymakers was 
the fact that over sixty percent of institutional failures during the years 
1930 to 1932 occurred in months free of banking panics or deposit runs.66 
Consistent with national difficulties, Arizona bank deposits dropped from 
$72,833,828 to $41,035,840 between the years 1929 and 1932.67 The 
Phoenix metropolitan area, which accounted for the majority of banking 
business in the state at the time, witnessed a similarly staggering drop in 
deposits. From 1930 to 1933, the local deposit base plunged from $33 
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million to $19.5 million.68 The lack of deposits and an overwhelming sense 
of hesitancy also negatively impacted lending abilities. By the close of 
1933, the value of outstanding commercial loans in Arizona dropped to an 
anemic $12,903,455, down thirty-seven percent from a pre-crash figure of 
$34,471,394.69 The grim circumstances endangered all institutions, and 
public fears were heightened when it was realized that even seemingly 
strong institutions such as the Bank of Douglas had reached the verge of 
insolvency by the end of 1933.70 Despite a recent balance sheet bailout 
from Dr. Ricketts, the Valley Bank found itself among the numerous 
institutions teetering on the brink of collapse.  
Valley Bank and Trust acted as the central correspondent bank for 
the state, and was thus uniquely affected by the instability and failure of 
other institutions. In its capacity as a correspondent bank, Valley Bank 
received deposits from other institutions and acted as the banker to the 
state banking industry. As the company therefore served as the hub of the 
Arizona financial field, institutional failures and declining deposits system-
wide greatly impacted the health of the institution.71 Prior to the market 
crash of 1929, Valley Bank hosted $17.7 million in deposits and carried 
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$7.1 million in outstanding loans. However, the economic paralysis of the 
Depression reduced those figures to $6.7 million in deposits and $2.9 
million in loans by the end of 1932.72 Faced with the reality of a contracting 
deposit base and continually weakening economic conditions, Valley Bank 
lost its position as the largest bank in the state to the National Bank of 
Tucson in 1932. At that point, the bank was hemorrhaging $500,000 per 
month in operational losses, and was forced to layoff half of its 
employees.73 This high level of employee turnover decimated the 
institutional memory of the institution, and reached to the highest levels of 
management as Valley Bank vice-president Arthur Esgate left for a 
position with the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the spring 
of 1932 and bank president Herbert McClung retired at the end of the 
year.74 It was into this morass of declining deposits, dwindling loan 
volume, and employee turnover that Chicago banker Walter Bimson was 
recruited.  
A born Westerner, Colorado native Walter Bimson held a special 
affinity for the people and culture of Arizona. After leaving Berthoud 
National Bank in northern Colorado, Bimson found employment as a vice-
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president with Chicago-based Harris Trust and Savings Bank.75 As “one of 
the largest crop financing institutions in the country,” Harris Trust was 
“responsible for several hundred thousand dollars worth of loans to valley 
farmers and dairymen.”76 Specializing in agricultural commodities such as 
cotton, Bimson often traveled to the Phoenix area in order to inspect crop 
yields and speak with growers and brokers.  During his numerous trips to 
the area, Bimson worked closely with the leadership of Valley Bank, and 
gained the trust of company management. Thus, when McClung retired, 
the board asked the Chicagoan to relocate to warmer climes in order to 
attempt an institutional restructuring in an effort to save the once solid 
organization.  
Bimson approached his new role in a very uncharacteristic manner. 
In an interview with Los Angeles Times columnist Harry Carr, he 
pronounced his strong faith in the power of the biblical “Golden Rule” as 
the antidote to the economic woes gripping the nation.77 While many 
industry insiders of the day might have been tempted to wax 
pessimistically when quizzed about the prospects for short-term economic 
recovery, Bimson expressed a cautiously optimistic outlook when 
interviewed by an Arizona Republic writer shortly after his arrival in 
Phoenix in January of 1933. Citing a “sounder basis for hopefulness” 
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brought about by “a fuller recognition of the underlying causes of our 
troubles and a calmer and more determined facing of the facts,” Bimson 
trumpeted his belief that Arizona would be among the “first states to take 
full strides in the march of prosperity with the return of normal times.”78 
Bimson would maintain this optimistic outlook throughout his career at the 
helm of the bank.  
Although he ordered a company-wide ten percent payroll reduction 
on his first day as president, Bimson also defied conventional wisdom by 
ordering the bank to do the unthinkable.79 Despite the prevailing economic 
weakness, he exhorted his employees to “Make loans!”80 However 
surprising this may have been to bank employees and observers, Bimson 
argued that the “bank’s credit capacity isn’t what it will be, but we have 
some capacity, and I want it used.”81 However, before his command could 
be carried out, Bimson and his staff had to contend with the largest 
challenge to the health of the institution he would encounter during his 
thirty-seven year tenure with the bank.  
The first quarter of 1933 was plagued with a sense of unease for 
many Americans. Faced with a four-month interregnum period until the 
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March inauguration of President-elect Franklin Roosevelt, the American 
people reacted quickly and unpredictably to negative news during the 
lame-duck portion of Herbert Hoover’s administration.82 Since the election 
of 1932, several state governors had declared statewide banking holidays 
in an effort to safeguard the solvency of their local banking institutions. 
Although infrequently employed on a wide scale basis, the idea of a 
banking holiday found precedent in earlier American crises.  
Banks had suspended currency payments during the panics of 
1837, 1857, 1873, and 1893, and municipal leaders had declared local 
bank holidays following the 1871 Chicago fire, 1872 Boston fire, 1904 
Baltimore fire, and the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and fire. Several 
state governors had also contributed to precedent by limiting banking 
operations during the 1907 currency crisis. While this practice was 
codified as an option of last resort by the Oregon legislature in 1930, few 
other state statutes or constitutions allowed for government declared bank 
holidays.83 Nonetheless, despite the questionable legality of the practice, 
California Governor James Rolph followed the lead of numerous other 
chief executives by issuing a proclamation declaring a statewide banking 
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holiday during the late night hours of March 2, 1933.84 Quickly recognizing 
the implications of this action for the Arizona banking industry, Bimson set 
out to convince Arizona Governor Benjamin Moeur to follow suit. 
Despite having only recently assumed the leadership of Valley 
Bank and Trust, Bimson understood that failing to secure a statewide 
banking moratorium before the start of the following business day would 
spell disaster for Arizona banks. Banks in Arizona and California were 
extensively interconnected as a result of the need to store sizeable 
deposits in sister institutions to facilitate check processing and normal 
trade operations. This fact rendered Arizona institutions particularly 
vulnerable to insolvency resulting from a lack of access to deposits stored 
in inaccessible California banks.85  Fortuitously, Bimson was lodging at the 
Hotel Westward Ho, the very hotel used by Governor Moeur during the 
legislative session. After hastily dressing, Bimson proceeded to the 
Governor’s suite to discuss the looming crisis.86 The important task of 
convincing Moeur proved to be a frustrating challenge for Bimson. 
The newly inaugurated Moeur had recently informed legislators that 
the financial outlook of the state had “never been as deplorable as it [then 
was],” but contended that state banking statutes were among “the best 
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banking laws in the nation.”87 This proved troubling as no law permitting 
the declaration of a statewide banking holiday then existed. Further 
complicating the situation, Moeur was not “a financial man,” and initially 
failed to comprehend the severity of Rolph’s action. Nonetheless, Bimson 
secured an early morning meeting with the Governor and the state 
Attorney General to plead for the issuance of a proclamation temporarily 
closing banks throughout the state.88 After overcoming questions 
surrounding the legality of declaring such a holiday, Bimson triumphed in 
his attempt to temporarily shutter state banks, thereby averting a 
potentially disastrous episode in Arizona history in the process. Just prior 
to the scheduled opening time of banks throughout the state, Moeur 
issued an order decreeing “all banks, trust companies and financial 
institutions conducting a banking or trust business in the State of Arizona, 
shall be closed” due to the “considerable portion of their funds and credits 
tied up with California banking institutions.”89 This action, though declared 
to be “virtually illegal, and certainly without precedent in the state,” was 
legitimized by an act of the legislature that very afternoon.90 Shortly 
thereafter, the legislature passed House Bill 258, which granted the 
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Governor authority to declare future holidays “upon recommendation of 
the Superintendent of Banks.”91  
Bimson’s initial foray into state politics proved well considered and 
extremely valuable. By March 4th, just two days after Moeur’s 
proclamation, banks in all forty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
had been closed by executive order or were operating under heavy 
limitations.92 In response to the patchwork restrictions imposed throughout 
the nation, President Franklin Roosevelt addressed the issue of banking 
industry stability in his first “Fireside Chat” on March 12, 1933. In this talk, 
Roosevelt called upon the American people to “unite in banishing fear,” 
announced a nationwide banking holiday, and detailed his plans to 
stabilize the beleaguered banking industry.93 When the national banking 
holiday was lifted on March 13th, approved institutions in Federal Reserve 
branch cities were cleared to open immediately. Being located in a city 
with an officially recognized bank clearinghouse association, approved 
Phoenix banks were allowed to reopen their doors on March 14th.94 When 
local banks did reopen, the wisdom of Bimson’s call for a holiday 
immediately following Rolph’s California declaration was evident.  
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Local depositors flocked to the reopened banks bearing checks, 
gold certificates, and rolls of banknotes. Newly confident in the stability of 
the national banking system, Phoenicians made net deposits of over $1 
million in just one day. Statewide, banks took in net deposits of $1.5 
million as newspapers announced curious tales of hoarded gold being 
returned to banks and accounts opened by longtime “money toters.”95 
Clearly buoyed by the success of the action Bimson lobbied for, Valley 
Bank leadership set about embracing further governmental assistance. 
Depression-era banks impacted by the struggling economy could 
seek government assistance just as many present-day financial 
institutions sought federal loans through the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program of 2008. Within five months of its creation in early 1932, the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation lent approximately $600 million to 
banks challenged by toxic balance sheets. In recognition of the large bank 
ownership of railroad bonds, the agency also issued nearly $250 million in 
loans intended to stabilize railroads during this period.96 Valley Bank later 
took advantage of Reconstruction Finance Corporation loan offerings by 
means of a $1.24 million sale of preferred stock to the agency.97 The New 
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Deal legislative program initiated by President Franklin Roosevelt allowed 
institutions such as Valley Bank additional opportunities for federal 
assistance. 
 Valley Bank officials actively pursued governmental initiatives 
perceived to be beneficial to the bank and its customer base. The first 
such program embraced by bank management was the new deposit 
insurance coverage offered by the nascent Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Established by the Glass-Steagal Act of 1933, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation insured the deposits of participating 
institutions, thereby bolstering consumer confidence and shielding the 
banking system from the shock of bank runs and institutional failures.98 
While protecting banks from the financial contagion often resulting from 
the failure of competitors, the new insurance agency also provided 
confidence to depositors, each of whom received $2,500 of coverage for 
deposits held at participating banks.99  
Many experienced bankers considered the new program a risky 
endeavor, as several state run deposit schemes had failed in previous 
years. Between 1917 and 1930, state deposit insurance programs in 
Kansas, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, 
Texas, and Washington had all been bankrupted by large institutional 
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failures.100 Hesitant to repeat the mistakes of other states, the 1927 class 
of Arizona legislators required state chartered banks to maintain twenty-
five percent of their annual profits in reserve as an alternative to a deposit 
insurance program.101 However, Valley Bank executives expressed faith in 
the new federal program, and submitted an application to be among the 
first institutions accepted into the system. Following approval from 
program overseers, Valley Bank and Trust depositors gained federal 
deposit insurance on January 1, 1934, the first day of eligibility.102  
The public responded positively to the increasing stability of Valley 
Bank and the proactive steps taken by the institution to ensure its 
continued financial wellbeing. By the end of 1933, the bank posted a 
deposit base increase of $2.5 million, or thirty-five percent, thus 
demonstrating growing levels of consumer confidence.103 However, many 
Arizona consumers were unable to recognize the strides made by Valley 
Bank and Trust due to geographical limitations. While Arizona was one of 
nine states permitting statewide branch operations in 1930, federal 
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restrictions impeded the ability of bank management to establish new 
branches outside of its existing markets.104  
Numerous communities throughout the state were without banking 
facilities because of the multiple institutional closures that had occurred 
during the agricultural slump of the 1920s and the Depression of the 
1930s. Valley Bank executives sought to expand operations to these 
unbanked localities, but found that Federal Reserve prohibitions on new 
branches prevented their planned expansion. Specifically, the Federal 
Reserve barred member banks from operating branches not open prior to 
February 25, 1927.105 Despite the clear restriction on new branch banking 
activity, Valley Bank leadership carried forth with their geographic 
expansion efforts. Seeking to circumvent the law through clever 
interpretation, the company encouraged the formation of “currency 
exchanges” in Casa Grande, Kingman, and Coolidge. Legally distinct from 
Valley Bank and Trust, these exchanges operated in bank owned 
structures, accepted deposits for forwarding to Valley Bank facilities in 
Phoenix, and brokered loans from the coffers of the institution. However, 
the operators of the currency exchanges were functioning not as 
employees of the bank, but as middlemen facilitating banking business in 
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branchless communities.106 While the communities provided with basic 
banking services as a result of the exchange offices were delighted by the 
clever solution to the branch banking restrictions, federal regulators 
proved less enthusiastic. 
During a meeting with the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in 
early 1934, Bimson defended the practice of affiliating with unregulated 
currency exchanges, or “bootleg branch banks” in the eyes of federal 
regulators. Bimson argued that the communities served were in dire need 
of banking operations, and that the currency exchanges either clearly 
were bank branches, and therefore under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Reserve System, or alternatively, were not branches, and therefore not 
subject to Federal Reserve oversight. The presentation convinced the 
officials that approving branch permits for the offices in question provided 
the clearest path to jurisdiction, and all three currency exchanges were 
subsequently licensed.107 Having won federal regulatory approval for the 
expansion of banking operations to underserved areas of Arizona, the 
company then turned to upgrading from a state chartered banking 
institution to a nationally chartered bank. 
The American commercial banking system operates within a 
framework of shared state and federal regulations. Individual banking 
institutions are permitted to organize under one of four designations, 
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depending upon the nature of their operations. Small banks that operate 
solely within the boundaries of one state may form as state chartered 
institutions outside of the Federal Reserve System, while larger banks 
may wish to operate as state chartered institutions participating in the 
Federal Reserve System. Institutions handling large deposits or wishing to 
avoid state banking laws may apply to operate as a nationally chartered 
bank, while other institutions are permitted to operate as private banks.108 
Valley Bank leaders chose to apply for a national bank charter to replace 
the state charter under which the organization incorporated in order to 
gain approval to operate under the then more permissive federal banking 
code. The likely increase in share value associated with receipt of a 
national banking charter served as additional justification for the transition 
from state oversight to federal regulation.  
When word of the national bank charter approval reached the 
offices of Valley Bank and Trust on February 11, 1935, management 
promptly changed the company name from Valley Bank and Trust to 
Valley National Bank in recognition of their newly earned national status.109 
Having successfully forged a strong working relationship with multiple 
government agencies, Bimson turned his focus to the lending command 
he had issued at the start of his tenure at the bank. 
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Although the company struggled to maintain a healthy balance 
sheet prior to Walter Bimson’s 1933 arrival, Valley National gained a 
significant degree of stability by the end of 1934. After receiving a national 
banking charter, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation coverage, 
approval for conversion of the three independent “currency exchanges” to 
full bank branches, and benefitting from the deposit rush that followed the 
March 1933 bank holiday, the institution enjoyed an increasing deposit 
trend that allowed for a serious focus on expanded lending activities. The 
acquisition of Prescott-based First National Bank in 1933 and the 1934 
purchase of the Consolidated National Bank of Tucson propelled Valley 
National back to its previously held ranking as the largest banking 
institution in the state.110 Then boasting an increased deposit base with 
which loans could be funded, as well as additional capital borrowed from 
the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Valley National stood 
ready to meet the borrowing needs of Arizona consumers.111 
In choosing to address the issue of near-dormant mortgage lending 
as the first order of business, bank management again looked to the 
federal government as an ally in its quest to grow the bank while aiding 
Arizona’s economic recovery. After learning of the National Housing Act of 
1934, a bill authorizing the creation of a federal agency tasked with 
insuring mortgage loans in an effort to spur the paralyzed housing market, 
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Walter Bimson sent his younger brother Carl, who had joined the bank in 
1933, to Washington to give Congressional testimony in favor of the 
pending legislation.112 The legislation passed in both houses of a 
sympathetic Congress, and was signed into law by President Roosevelt, 
thereby establishing the Federal Housing Administration.113 Valley National 
leadership recognized that federal backing of mortgage loans made the 
enterprise far more appealing to banking institutions, and therefore set out 
to harness the full potential of the new federal program. 
Federal Housing Administration loan guarantees, popularly referred 
to as FHA loans, were versatile in nature. Though loan proceeds could be 
used for the purchase of new, qualifying residential properties, loan dollars 
could also be utilized for the purchase of any permanently attached fixture 
within a home. Carl Bimson and a team of Valley National employees 
used this flexibility as a selling point as they knocked on doors throughout 
the Phoenix area touting the benefits of the new federal loan guarantee 
program. This effort alone netted Valley National 700 FHA loan 
applications during the first week of availability.114 In addition to employing 
dynamic marketing practices such as sharing word of loan availability on a 
door-to-door basis in an attempt to build awareness of the FHA program, 
bank leadership worked closely with federal officials to promote the 
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program and derive maximum value for Valley National and the Arizona 
economy. 
In an effort to keep a finger on the pulse of the program, Walter 
Bimson lent out bank employees to serve as liaisons between the banking 
community and officials of the new federal endeavor. Valley National 
employee C.H. Tinker served in this capacity in 1934, while Carl Bimson 
served as Manager of Financial Relations for the Federal Housing 
Administration from early 1935 through March of 1936.115  Aggressive 
promotion of the new loan guarantees and the active involvement of bank 
officials in program administration resulted in Arizona FHA loan figures 
averaging far above the national average. Despite its relatively small size 
compared to other institutions across the nation, Valley National closed 
6,354 FHA loans totaling $2,244,000 within a period of one year. This 
level of loan activity ranked the bank as the fifth most productive FHA 
lender in the United States, while in March of 1936, Arizona became the 
first state in the nation to reach its FHA loan quota.116  
The Washington Post recognized the institution for a ninety-two 
percent loan approval rate, reporting “the volume of business created by 
the better-housing program has been so extensive that the bank has 
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found it difficult to keep up.”117 Though Valley National was prevented from 
making direct FHA loans in 1935 after reaching its federally prescribed 
loan-to-reserves limit, it continued to actively market the program to 
Arizona households. Acting as a loan broker, Valley National wrote $1 
million worth of FHA loan commitments, which were subsequently sold to 
Transamerica, then the parent company of Bank of America.118 The 
resounding success of Valley National’s FHA lending effort was repeated 
when the bank ventured into the world of personal installment loans. 
Intending personal installment loan figures to reach “mass 
production” levels, Walter Bimson approved the creation of an Installment 
Loan Department in September of 1936.119 Arizona was one of a handful 
of states in which such a department could easily come into existence at 
the time.  While Arizona joined Maine, North Carolina, South Carolina, and 
Virginia in its lack of licensing requirements for personal lending 
departments, all other states of the union mandated licensure of personal 
loan departments to prevent usury and unfair practices.120 However, 
Arizona consumers were assured a maximum loan rate by state statute. 
Capped at a contract rate of eight percent, Arizona personal loan 
consumers enjoyed rates lower than the contract maximum specified in 
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the statutes of twenty-one states, and were limited to borrowing just 
$1,000.121  Once again blazing a trail that would be followed by 
innumerable institutions in future years, Valley National’s entrée into 
personal installment lending placed the institution in the company of no 
more than twelve institutions nationwide making such loans.122  
As stated by Carl Bimson, personal installment loans could be used 
“for every useful purpose”, including the purchase of automobiles, farm 
equipment, furniture, appliances, or even vacations.123 Indeed, while 
installment loans were issued for a wide variety of purposes, the bulk of 
the dollars lent between 1935 and 1936 were applied toward the purchase 
of essential consumer goods, with 31.4 percent of loan dollars used to 
purchase furniture, twenty percent applied toward the purchase of 
automobiles, 15.4 percent invested in new refrigerators, and 8.2 percent 
used to buy radio receivers.124 Walter Bimson strongly believed in the 
power of small installment loans, and spoke highly of the benefit the loans 
provided to the lending institution, the borrower, and the quickening 
national economic recovery. When chided by a colleague for the alleged 
immorality demonstrated in his extension of easy debt to consumers, 
Bimson angrily retorted,  
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Immoral to show a man how he can buy a washing machine so his 
wife won’t break her back over a washboard? Immoral to help an 
enterprising individual equip and start a small business of his own? 
Immoral to enable a teacher to go to summer school so she can 
earn more pay and teach better? If these things are immoral, then 
all credit is immoral. Immoral? Nonsense!125 
If judged by volume, it may be argued that Arizona consumers viewed 
personal lending as a fundamentally moral exercise. When tallied from the 
inception of the Valley National Bank Installment Loan Department in 
September of 1936 through the end of 1940, 89,208 installment loans 
totaling $22,751,136 were distributed in a state claiming a population of 
approximately 499,000 people. Averaging $255, the tens of thousands of 
installment loans issued by Valley National Bank undoubtedly aided 
Arizona consumers to stretch the purchasing power of their $466 per 
capita income, leading to the purchase of large quantities of consumer 
goods and direct stimulation of the local economy.126  
 Beneficial as the installment loan trade might have been for the 
Arizona economy, it may be argued that it was of the most utility to Valley 
National shareholders. When considered in conjunction with the shrewd 
political maneuverings and effective business practices employed by 
Valley National Bank management during Walter Bimson’s first decade as 
                                            





president, the blockbuster business generated through the issuance of 
personal loans translates to dollars and cents sensibility. Between 
Bimson’s arrival in 1933 and the end of 1936, Valley National Bank 
deposits increased from $6.7 million to $25.2 million, while outstanding 
loan amounts increased from $3 million to $8,603,000 during the same 
period.127 Figures continued to climb through the end of the decade. At the 
close of 1939, the bank held $41,837,681 in deposits and carried 
$19,462,090 in outstanding loans.128 Installment lending alone totaled 
$68,087 in June 1939; an institutional record referred to by banking 
historian Larry Schweikart as the climax of Bimson’s 1933 call to make 
loans.129 However, the clouds of war gathering in Europe soon shifted the 
operational focus of Valley National Bank. 
  Arizona banking industry deposit totals did not reach pre-
Depression levels until 1941.130 The staggering population and industrial 
growth of the state during the war years ensured that deposit volume 
would grow at a far more rapid pace. Cited as a “watershed for the 
region,” World War II drastically altered the landscape, economy, and 
culture of the American West.131 During the conflict, seven million people 
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relocated to the trans-Mississippi West and nearly four million service 
members were stationed, at least temporarily, in Western states.132   
Phoenix, home to 65,414 people in 1940, experienced a dramatic 
population surge as a result of wartime manufacturing and defense facility 
employment needs. Military bases and training camps established during 
the war years include Falcon, Higley, Luke, Thunderbird, Thunderbird II, 
and Williams Fields, each drawing scores of personnel to the Valley for 
training exercises and other duties. Meanwhile, the influx of war industry 
workers employed at the new AiResearch, Alcoa, and Goodyear Aircraft 
Corporation plants, among others, further swelled the local population. 
With the manufacturing sector alone nearly doubling in size from 15.2 
percent of the state economy in 1940 to 27.4 percent by the end of the 
war, the residential growth fueled by wartime industries and facilities was 
unrelenting.133 As a result, in 1945, Phoenicians were confronted with a 
severe housing shortage.134 Thus, while the incredible in-migration 
overwhelmed local resources, the newcomers were a welcome source of 
business for banks just returning to pre-Depression deposit levels.  
 Between 1939 and 1945, deposits in Arizona banks soared by 
415.8 percent, a significantly larger amount than the overall national 
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increase of 260.3 percent.135 Valley National results were similarly buoyed 
by the surge in population and output. By 1945, the bank claimed fifty-four 
percent of all deposits in the state, more than double the market share of 
its next largest competitor, the First National Bank of Arizona.136 Although 
it benefitted greatly from the cash flow generated by government, 
corporate, and individual deposits, the institution lost revenue streams 
associated with its aggressive pre-war lending strategy. As federal 
restrictions limited the availability of loans for individuals and nondefense 
enterprises during the war years, most lending business occurred in 
conjunction with the federal government, though Valley National 
executives did execute a clever loan initiative aimed at Phoenix-trained air 
cadets.137 Known as the “300 Club,” this program offered three-hundred 
dollar loans to graduating airmen, despite industry-wide cautions against 
lending to service members. Popular as a means of financing a trip home 
prior to deployment, this successful promotion drew widespread attention 
and positive response.138 However, war bonds proved to be the most 
appealing opportunity of the day.  
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Government securities offered a higher interest rate than most 
other low-risk investments available during the war, and were a favored 
vehicle for surplus bank assets. Indeed, commercial banks purchased 
more war bonds than any other group, accounting for nearly fifty percent 
of bond sales.139 Institutions such as Valley National received three distinct 
benefits from war bond sales. By purchasing government securities, banks 
supplied funds critically needed to outfit the ongoing war effort, thus 
increasing the flow of capital and, accordingly, commercial deposit 
volume.140 Banks also generated handsome profits from the relatively high-
yield government debt. A common bank strategy involved liquidating 
short-term, low interest federal bonds through sales to the Federal 
Reserve, and then reinvesting the proceeds in longer-term, higher rate 
                                                                                                                       
collection problem when we return to our peacetime pursuits,” and advised bankers to 
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federal debt. While this practice inflated corporate profits, it also posed 
inflationary risks and defied the intent of government officials. Bemoaned 
by Federal Reserve Chairman Marriner Eccles as a strategy employed by 
banks to generate “windfall profits,” or a “profit for their patriotism,” the 
practice continued unabated throughout the war owing to the need to 
capitalize the costly military effort. Nonetheless, Eccles and others sought 
to “remedy the evils connected with the war-loan drives.”141 However, it is 
unlikely the general public viewed banking industry involvement in the war 
bond effort as a nefarious attempt to capture excess profits. 
Banks were often active supporters of war bond sales drives. In 
Arizona, two groups formed to promote government securities. The Victory 
Fund Committee focused on convincing high net worth individuals and 
institutional investors to finance the war effort, while the War Savings Staff 
pushed lower face value Series E, F, and G bonds. Both organizations 
were managed by the State War Finance Committee, which was headed 
by Walter Bimson.142 The Valley National president also served on the Los 
Angeles Regional Victory Fund Committee at the behest of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco.143 This involvement garnered public 
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goodwill for the bank, and strengthened connections with regulators and 
regional competitors, thus demonstrating great value to Bimson and the 
institution. The fact that Arizona war bond purchases exceeded assigned 
quotas in every drive also provided a powerful story for future bank 
histories and press releases. However, as the end of the war neared, 
bankers realized that the lucrative war bond trade would soon cease.  
In markets such as Arizona, the heady deposit increases enjoyed 
as a result of wartime industry and personnel also threatened to 
disappear, prompting questions regarding whether the post-war state 
economy might contract in size to pre-war levels. Indeed, some Phoenix 
area military facilities and pilot training fields were shuttered as early as 
1944, further exacerbating concerns.144 However, not everyone viewed the 
future as pessimistically as Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion 
director Fred Vinson, who predicted that a sharp drop in war-related 
manufacturing would be accompanied by a rising unemployment rate 
following the anticipated Allied victory.145 Philip M. Hauser, an employee of 
the federal Bureau of the Census, categorized Maricopa County as “Class 
A-1 area,” meaning a population center that experienced rapid growth 
during the war years, and was “adjudged to have superior prospects of 
retaining wartime growth.” Citing the likely need for post-war service and 
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manufacturing sectors in war boomtowns such as Phoenix, Hauser 
declared such cities to “contain automatic insurance against complete loss 
of their wartime population increments in the period of postwar 
adjustment.”146 When compared with more negative forecasts, this 
prediction of relative stability highlights the disparate opinions surrounding 
Arizona’s peacetime population. 
While probable post-war economic conditions and population 
trends were matters of debate, the need for post-war planning was nearly 
universally acknowledged. The prospect of a peacetime economy spurred 
the creation of thousands of post-war strategic planning bodies operating 
at all levels of government, with cities such as San Diego undertaking 
planning efforts as early as 1942.147 In Arizona, Governor Sidney Osborn 
called upon leaders to devise a plan that would enable the state to utilize 
its new facilities as a foundation for post-war growth. Meanwhile, Robert 
S. Breyer of the federal Smaller War Plants Corporation spoke of a bright 
future for the state, but cautioned that residents and leaders would need to 
“work for this prosperity.”148 Organizations such as the Phoenix Chamber 
of Commerce eagerly took on the task of fostering continued economic 
wellbeing. In 1943, the group created a Post-War Development 
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Committee tasked with leading peacetime planning efforts.149 While 
government entities or private associations were responsible for many of 
these planning initiatives, individual businesses were also encouraged to 
map their post-war operational strategies. 
A 1943 issue of The Journal of Marketing emphasized the 
importance of post-war planning by advising that, “individual business 
enterprisers in this country have to start planning their individual programs 
of products and marketing now- yesterday would have been preferable.”150 
Valley National executives, facing a future likely devoid of free-flowing 
deposits from defense contractors, war workers, and military personnel, 
robust profits from war bond holdings, and infusions of Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation funds, began charting a course for the post-war 
future of the organization in 1944. This planning resulted in the 
identification of advertising and promotions, increased product and service 
offerings, and geographic expansion as key components of a successful 
post-war operational strategy, and helped to ensure that the bank entered 
the immediate post-war period poised for growth. Though the bank would 
encounter successes and setbacks over the coming years, the wartime 
planning efforts served as a roadmap to the institutional growth that 
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placed Valley National on a trajectory to rank among the fifty largest banks 
in the nation by the end of the 1950s.  





MARKETING MONEY: HARNESSING ADVERTISING AND POSITIVE 
PUBLICITY TO BUILD THE BRAND 
 In a 1945 letter to Walter Bimson, Valley National statistician 
Herbert Leggett cited the ongoing wartime economic boom as the primary 
impetus for the profitability then enjoyed by the bank and many other 
businesses. Acknowledging that the recent success of the institution 
required little marketing as “running a business during the war has mainly 
been a problem of turning out the goods (or services),” and was, therefore, 
“a production job and not a marketing job,” Leggett addressed the 
importance of advertising in what he anticipated to be a vastly different 
post-war environment. In recommending a strategy for peacetime 
operation, he emphasized, “Any initiative and ingenuity we exercise must 
be directed to the selling end of the business.”  Leggett underscored the 
perceived value and impact of a well-executed marketing strategy in the 
years following the war by writing, “Thus, whether or not we call it 
Salesmanship, Public Relations or Propaganda, this will be the most 
important department in any organization.”151 This enthusiastic acceptance 
of modern marketing philosophy would prove essential to the post-war 
growth and profitability recorded by the bank. 
                                            
151 Though relatively sure that the war would end in 1945, as stated in a June 
1944 memo to Walter Bimson, Leggett did acknowledge that, “In the Pacific Theatre, it 
could well drag on for 3 or 4 years.” Nonetheless, bank post-war planning efforts focused 
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Though competitor institutions also moved toward a fuller embrace 
of public relations in the immediate post-war period, Valley National 
leaders differentiated the bank within the Arizona market by presenting it 
as an information broker and community resource. While promoting the 
institution and state through bank-published works such as the monthly 
Arizona Progress, the annual Arizona Statistical Review, and other 
effective and innovative marketing practices, bank executives also 
employed promotional strategies common to the industry and period. 
Thus, while the company gained nationwide attention for the clever writing 
and valuable information found in its publications, Valley National 
executives also relied upon less innovative advertising practices to drive 
post-war growth and profitability. This measured combination of industry-
accepted promotional practices and inventive new strategies and 
techniques proved essential to attracting new clientele while retaining 
more traditional older depositors. However, innovative practices such as a 
full embrace of modern marketing tools, widespread distribution of 
advertising pieces, and quality copywriting aided the institution in 
achieving a level of success likely unattainable solely through the staid 
marketing employed by early twentieth-century banks.  
 Not unlike practitioners in the fields of law and medicine, American 
bankers had long considered advertising to be an inappropriate exercise. 
Indeed, as self-promotion was widely viewed as an “unethical” activity, 
early bank advertisements often displayed little more than the name, 
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address, and resources of a sponsoring institution.152 Aside from minimal 
branding, most banking houses also chose to forgo the use of illustrations, 
which were perceived by many bankers to be “undignified.”153 Instead, 
minimal advertising paired with an emphasis on personality, service, and 
institutional stability were presented as the key aspects of a successful 
promotional strategy in a 1919 text on bank advertising. Reminding 
readers that, “banks that grow, and grow, and grow, never ‘plaster the 
town.’ You may know of such banks. Quietly, without any garish literature, 
news-copy, or souvenirs, they build steadily, strongly, permanently, 
unaffected by competition, in the midst of their competitors,” author C. 
Maclaren Freeman urged banks to prioritize actions over advertising. 
Nonetheless, an evolution of thought was underway.154 During the first half 
of the twentieth century, the banking industry slowly accepted the practice 
of proactively seeking publicity.  
 Four years prior to the warning against papering a town with ads, a 
book entitled Two Thousand Points for Financial Advertising urged 
bankers to, “above all things, be consistent, insistent and persistent in 
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[their] advertising.”155 Though most contemporary texts counseled more 
restraint than advised in Two Thousand Points, business historian Richard 
Germain contends that “the transformation of American banks from a 
passive to an aggressive marketing strategy was complete by 1930.”156 
However, a review of industry literature produced in the decades following 
1930 challenges the veracity of this assertion. 
 A 1946 Billboard article discussing sales of radio advertisements to 
banking concerns quoted Bert Hauser of the Mutual Broadcasting System 
bemoaning the fact that “some banks have an ethical outlook and refuse 
to use advertising,” while a 1950 study found that banking industry leaders 
perceived less value in public relations efforts than executives in all other 
surveyed fields.157 Similarly, in a 1953 journal article, a Columbia 
University business professor cautioned that banks must not be too 
aggressive in their operation.158 Despite the meteoric growth of advertising 
in the larger post-war business world, the first section of a 1954 booklet 
entitled Bank Advertising and Publicity is devoted not to effective 
marketing techniques, but rather, selling the reader on the need to 
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advertise the services of a financial institution.159 Indeed, the angst related 
to the practice and respectability of marketing continued into at least the 
late 1960s. In a nod to the sensitivity of the ongoing dilemma, the writers 
of a 1967 American Institute of Banking publication explicitly avoided 
expressing a terminology preference for “the activities concerned with 
winning and retaining friends and customers for banks at a profit.” This 
semantic exercise allowed the organization to forgo the task of 
determining whether advertising and related pursuits should be labeled 
“public relations, business development, selling, communications, 
marketing, or something else,” thus highlighting the hesitancy of some 
bankers to recognize and embrace the value and growing acceptability of 
advertising.160 Valley National leadership demonstrated no such restraint in 
their embrace of modern marketing practices. 
 Archival materials indicate that Valley National in-house advertising 
efforts commenced in the immediate post-war period. This forward-looking 
undertaking was still rather unique within the banking industry, for which 
the expansion of such efforts remained a topic of debate. However, the 
                                            
159 John Y. Beaty, Bank Advertising and Publicity (Cambridge, MA: Bankers 
Publishing Company, 1954), 1-3; Stephen Fox, The Mirror Makers: A History of American 
Advertising and Its Creators (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1984), 172-176. 
 
160 Later in the American Institute of Bankers-produced work, an effort is made to 
discern the difference between marketing and public relations, or, “the planned, 
organized practice or public relations,” though throughout the text the terms are grouped 
together as “public relations and marketing.” In attempting to differentiate the terms, it is 
argued that proactive public relations strategies were embraced by banking firms 
“beginning in the 1930s.” While acknowledging that banks began to embrace marketing 
in the post-war years, the author contends the industry did not fully “adopt the principles 
of the marketing concept until the 1960s.” American Institute of Banking, Bank Public 
Relations and Marketing (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1967), v. 
 70 
 
enhanced emphasis on advertising and publicity demonstrated through 
the creation of internal marketing positions was consistent with activities in 
the larger business world, as demonstrated by a 1947 Advertising Age 
article examining the rapid increase in advertising budgets and broadened 
scope of the field in the early post-war years. Proclaiming, “public relations 
is the fashion of the day, as well as the need of the hour,” the article 
unknowingly echoed Leggett’s 1945 recommendation to Walter Bimson.161  
 Valley National had retained Advertising Counselors of Arizona, a 
well-established Phoenix-based advertising agency, for its promotional 
needs since before the beginning of World War II. When measured in 
terms of national recognition, it is clear that the institution realized a 
favorable return on this investment. By 1948, ads produced for the bank 
by the Phoenix-based firm had been judged among the ten best bank ads 
in the country for eight years running by Bank Ad-Views, a nationally 
distributed publication focused on the marketing of financial services 
companies. A Valley National advertisement won top honors in the Bank 
Ad-Views sponsored Socrates contest in 1947, while another ad won 
second place in 1948.162 Bank management viewed this successful run as 
noteworthy enough to warrant placement in the 1948 annual report, 
marking the first known discussion of advertising efforts included in an 
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external publication.163 Given the ongoing success of their externally 
produced marketing efforts, it is unlikely that bank executives were 
displeased with outsourcing the work. This assertion is supported by a 
review of bank records, which reveal that advertising received little to no 
internal discussion prior to the mid-1940s. From the early 1930s onward, 
the institution had experienced tremendous growth and profitability, and 
the onset of war brought vast numbers of new individuals and businesses 
in need of banking services, thus mitigating the need to deviate from 
established practices. However, the seemingly endless suggestions of one 
employee evaluating options for post-war operations prompted a 
reconsideration of corporate promotional strategy. 
 Herbert A. Leggett, a former advertising copywriter, brokerage 
partner, and insurance executive, relocated from New York to Arizona in 
1943. Though he traveled west “as a refugee from high finance, high 
humidity and high blood pressure,” his respite from the world of high 
finance proved rather brief. Leggett joined Valley National as corporate 
statistician in January of 1944.164 Over the course of his career with the 
bank, he would become known as “Mr. Economist of Arizona,” and a man 
whose “hobby [was] promoting Arizona.”165 His passion for selling the state 
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manifested itself through boosterist literature and service on numerous 
boards and committees, and paralleled with a strongly held philosophy of 
both Walter and Carl Bimson. Multiple sources published over the span of 
several decades quote the brothers expressing their belief that the bank 
benefitted greatly from the growth of the state, and conversely, that the 
state benefitted from the success of the bank.166 Leggett wholeheartedly 
embraced this belief. Soon after joining the bank, he began analyzing 
post-war prospects for the state and institution, as well as offering 
suggestions relating to peacetime operational strategies.167  
After researching population figures and bank deposits in states 
boasting impressive post-World War I growth, Leggett determined that 
with help, Arizona, and, by extension, Valley National Bank, might enjoy a 
post-World War II future even more promising than the post-World War 
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expansions experienced in subject states. Informing Bimson of his 
findings, he stated, “All we need is the Imagination to see it, the Capital to 
develop it and the Publicity to put it across. It can be just as BIG as we 
want to make it.”168 In order to achieve this task, the bank diversified its 
marketing efforts and enlisted the aid of staff members hired solely for the 
purpose of promotional work. Over the coming years, this cadre of 
employees grew to include Leggett, publicist G. E. Arnold, and Phoenix ad 
man Marelle G. “Mert” Reade.169 Immodestly credited by Leggett as “the 
most terrific team of publicists ever assembled in the financial field,” and a 
group who “missed few bets in telling the world and showing the world that 
the Valley Bank was the darndest, growingest, rootin-tootin bank in the 
WORLD,” this team of Valley National public relations staffers successfully 
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leveraged known publicity strategies and innovative new techniques in 
their quest for post-war growth.170 
Arnold founded Advertising Counselors of Arizona, originally known 
as the Associated Advertising Company, in 1931. He remained affiliated 
with that firm until 1943, when he founded a competing agency. Though 
research has uncovered little documentation detailing Arnold’s career with 
the bank, notices published in Round-Up, the Valley National employee 
newsletter, establish his tenure with the company. Hired in May of 1950, 
Arnold served as publicity director for just four years before passing away 
in May of 1954.171 However, during his short tenure with the bank, the 
press relations strategy employed by the institution changed dramatically. 
In 1951, the institution released its first professionally-drafted press 
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release, prepared by Arnold. A steady stream of similar releases followed 
this document in subsequent years. All press releases issued between 
June 1950 and Arnold’s death bear his name, indicating that he authored 
the pieces or oversaw their production. In 1951, the talents of Phoenix ad 
man and former Advertising Counselors of Arizona employee Mert Reade 
supplemented Arnold’s publicity efforts.172 Reade, who wrote all ad copy 
used by the bank until approximately 1963, viewed the firm as an 
enterprise “set up to serve the public in money matters the same way 
another business might serve it in food, or clothing or home furnishings.” 
Characterized by Carl Bimson as, “an unorthodox ad manager,” Reade’s 
operating philosophy dovetailed neatly with that of Bimson, who described 
the bank as “[marketing] money (credit) in much the same manner that 
other merchandisers market, soap, automobiles, or breakfast foods.”173 
This shared outlook would lead to Reade craft “retail advertising” 
campaigns different than those utilized by other financial services 
companies, thus further separating Valley National from its competitors 
during this period.174        
 Established bank marketing practices employed by Valley National 
in the post-war years include print ads featuring asset statements, ranking 
among competitors, and images of their corporate headquarters. These 
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“institutional advertising” techniques were well established and widely 
used, and were intended to demonstrate strength and stability.175 Referred 
to by Reade as “’board of directors’ type” advertising, such practices were 
consistent with expert recommendations and industry standards. The 
publication of bank balance sheets ranks as the most common example of 
this conservative approach to corporate promotion. Acknowledged in a 
1924 TIME Magazine article as the oldest form of bank advertising, 
numerous books and articles discussing banking industry advertising 
published throughout the first half of the twentieth century continued to 
suggest this understated method.176  
Post-war Valley National newspaper and magazine advertisements 
often featured a balance sheet, or statement of condition, accompanied by 
minimal text printed in a conventional typeface listing the bank name, 
home city, and assuring reminders of Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and Federal Reserve System affiliation.177 The ubiquity of 
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such ads highlighting bank deposits and other resources is likely 
attributable to the otherwise forward-thinking Herbert Leggett. In a 1945 
memo to Walter Bimson, Leggett professed a desire to “see [their] 
Statement of Condition published more frequently and more widely.”178 
While this suggestion seems to reflect an embrace of the status quo, 
another recommendation contained in the same document would soon 
enhance the intended balance sheet ad message of stability and success.  
Seeking to “distinguish the Valley Bank, nationally, as outstanding 
in this area,” and, “reflect additional prestige upon Phoenix and the State 
of Arizona,” Leggett suggested that the bank “feature and trade-mark” a 
slogan announcing their newly attained status as the largest bank in the 
Rocky Mountain region.  Excepting a brief period during the Depression, 
Valley National or a predecessor institution had ranked as the largest bank 
in the state since 1914. However, through the end of World War II, the 
status of the institution was gingerly promoted with a politely worded 
statement reminding readers that Valley National was “The Largest of 
Arizona’s Many Excellent Financial Institutions.” This stilted and rather 
modest pronouncement was consistent with accepted bank promotional 
techniques of the era.179 Leggett advised Bimson that a “simpler, more 
striking, and probably more sincere” statement extolling the regional 
prominence of the bank needed to be adopted, and submitted “Largest 
                                            
178 “Some Suggestions for 1945,” January 3, 1945, file 509, VNB Collection. 
 
179 Germain, 14-15; MacGregor, Two Thousand, 69.  
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Bank in the Eight Mountain States” as a potential slogan. In what appears 
to be an afterthought, he scribbled “or ‘in the Rocky [Mountain] States’” as 
alternate phrasing on the typewritten memorandum, thus drafting the final 
wording.180  Often paired with the motto “Progressing with Arizona,” the 
phrase “Largest Bank in the Rocky Mountain States” was incorporated into 
most bank advertisements and literature throughout the early 1950s. By 
adding information trumpeting their size and regional ranking, Valley 
National executives began to shift toward a more direct marketing 
approach than employed in past campaigns. Emerging Modernist branch 
architecture trends would provide company leaders another opportunity to 
build upon the accepted yet staid marketing techniques employed 
throughout the industry. 
Bank architecture had long served as a symbol of institutional 
strength, as demonstrated by an 1867 New York Times article 
acknowledging the value of notable bank structures as “profitable standing 
advertisements.”181 More recently, the late New Yorker columnist Brendan 
Gill opined that early twentieth-century bank buildings “proclaimed an 
impregnable fiscal integrity,” while architect and writer Charles Belfoure 
has noted that early banks often “used impressive architecture to instill 
                                            
180 “Some Suggestions,” January 3, 1945, VNB Collection. 
 




faith in their patrons.”182 While perhaps of most impact when viewed from 
street level, the psychological impact of such architecture was not limited 
to in-person impressions.  
Banks sometimes featured illustrations or photos of their 
headquarters in advertisements, often paired with a statement of condition 
or other indication of stability. This marketing technique further capitalized 
on the “standing advertisements” erected by banking concerns, and was 
widely encouraged in early twentieth-century texts discussing financial 
institution advertising strategies. Though most 1950s bank advertisements 
were no longer solely text, as late as 1956, some banks still opted to use 
images of their primary facility as the only illustration present in their 
promotional materials.183 While post-war Valley National ads employed 
diverse imagery including the octagonal corporate logo, a small map of 
Arizona indicating banking center locations, and, beginning in 1952, a 
bespectacled cartoon mascot named Mr. Valley Banker, the Professional 
Building retained a place of prominence throughout the subject period.184  
                                            
182 Brendan Gill, introduction to Money Matters: A Critical Look at Bank 
Architecture, Joel Stine and Caroline Levine, eds. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990), 4; 
Charles Belfoure, Monuments to Money: The Architecture of American Banks (Jefferson, 
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183 Lindquist, 204. 
 
184 Mert Reade conceived Mr. Valley Bank, the character also known as The 
Valley Banker, in 1952. Reade conceptualized the mascot as an accompaniment to the 
widely-known VNB octagonal seal featuring a spread-winged eagle, mountains, two 
saguaro cacti, two pine trees, an outline of the state of Arizona with the words “Statewide 
Banking Service” on the eagle’s chest, the phrase “Progressing with Arizona” above the 
eagle, and the bank name below the bird. According to Reade, “that seal was sort of 
sacred… everybody agreed that we had to have it in our ads, but I got tired of seeing it 
just sitting there taking up space. So I conceived the idea of this little guy who would 
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Balance sheet ads throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s 
featured a bold sketch of the 1931 building as reinforcement of the sound 
financial status of the institution already spelled out in the accompanying 
statement of condition and slogan regarding regional ranking. Though the 
bank headquarters was not of new construction and did not rank as the 
tallest building in Phoenix, Leggett still viewed the tower as an 
underutilized marketing resource.185 In early 1945, he suggested to 
                                                                                                                       
stand there beside it, or lean on it, or point to it, or do something else.” Phoenix artist 
Reese Turner drew the character in 1952. As may be deduced, Reade did not share in 
the general sense of veneration for the decades-old corporate seal. By the time he 
assumed the role of advertising director in 1953, he felt “that eagle of ours had become a 
pretty tired-looking bird through the years,” and believed that the logo “had too many 
words on it.” Prior to ordering a sign for the new East Van Buren Street branch (opened 
in 1954), Reade pared down the logo text by removing “Progressing with Arizona” and 
“Statewide Banking Service.” Though no other logo changes are mentioned in the 
document describing this reduction in wording, the full extent of the change is evident 
when comparing the logos displayed on the September 1953 and October 1953 editions 
of Arizona Progress. In addition to the removal of six of the nine words present in the seal 
published in September, the saguaros, pine trees, and mountains are absent from the 
October example, though the state outline remains on the eagle’s chest. The October 
logo also features new placement for the bank name. The word Valley is printed above 
the eagle, National is overlaid across the center, and Bank is found in the bottom third of 
the image. Perhaps due to its popularity within the institution, the old logo was used on 
various documents published after the Reade-directed alterations, including the 1956 
Arizona Statistical Review and a 1966 letter from Walter Bimson to VNB shareholders. 
“Mert Reade of the Valley Bank: The Man Behind the Advertising,” April 2, 1971, VNB 
Collection; Branch List, March 6, 1959, file 442, VNB Collection; Arizona Progress, 
September 1953, file 907, VNB Collection; Arizona Progress, October 1953, file 907, 
VNB Collection; Arizona Statistical Review, 1956, file 896, VNB Collection; Walter 
Bimson to VNB Stockholders, May 2, 1966, file 529, VNB Collection. 
 
185 The Westward Ho Hotel was the tallest building in the city and state during the 
immediate post-war period. Located at 618 North Central Avenue, this landmark structure 
was the tallest building in Arizona from the time of its construction in 1928 until bested by 
the Guaranty Bank Building at 3003 North Central in Phoenix in 1960. The Guaranty 
Bank Building (now the Phoenix Corporate Center) was the tallest in the state until 1971, 
when the First National Bank Plaza tower was completed. The First National tower (now 
Wells Fargo Plaza) at 100 West Washington Street in Phoenix held the title of tallest 
building in the state for just over one year, losing it in 1973 to the newly completed Valley 
Center. “History and Architecture,” The Westward Phoenix: An Exploration of a Historical 
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Bimson, “maybe we should feature our building more than we do.” 
Proposing a grand plan that never came to fruition, he wrote, 
Since street addresses are not used a great deal in Phoenix, as 
yet, I believe we should make a land-mark as well as a trade-mark 
out of our beautiful and impressive Home Office Building. Instead of 
being known as “that building north of the Adams Hotel,” our 
building should be the Hub for all direction givers in downtown 
Phoenix. We should educate people to relate other locations to 
ours so that all directions will be given in terms of “north, south, 
east or west of the Valley Bank Building.”186 
 
Though the Professional Building was never to gain the iconic status 
sought by Leggett, bank executives did not dismiss the idea of using 
company facilities as publicity tools. 
 The post-war period was a time of tremendous architectural change 
throughout the nation. Depression-era financial limitations and wartime 
material restrictions had stifled the domestic construction industry for 
nearly two decades prior to the prosperous peacetime economy of the 
mid-to-late 1940s. Thus, bank facilities erected prior to the building slump 
                                                                                                                       
Midcentury Marvels: Commercial Architecture of Phoenix, 1945-1975 (Phoenix: City of 
Phoenix, 2010), 146-147. 
    
186 Though Leggett referred to the home office as the “Valley Bank Building,” this 
term does not appear to have been widely used, and may have been a name created he 
created or hoped to bring into popular usage. A 1949 Phoenix Gazette article, a 1962 
Phoenix Gazette article, and a 1983 book on Phoenix architecture all use the term 
Professional Building when referring to the structure, indicating that even while occupied 
by the bank, it was not commonly known as the Valley Bank Building. In the same 
document, Leggett suggested including an illustration of the Professional Building on “the 
long awaited and hoped for Map of Phoenix.” This reference likely refers to the maps of 
Phoenix distributed by the bank from the late 1940s onward. Now rather collectible, early 
VNB-issued maps included colorful, comic-like illustrations by Arizona Highways artist 
George M. Avey. However, an early map (as dated by the logo used and number of 
branch locations listed) in the possession of the author does not include an illustration of 
the Professional Building, nor does a 1963 example also in the author’s possession. 
“Some Suggestions,” VNB Collection; “Valley National Bank Plans Expansion of 2 
Departments,” Phoenix Gazette, July 14, 1949; “Valley Bank to Erect 35-Story 




often underwent little to no renovation until the post-war years, leaving in 
place an environment in which “the banker was still enthroned in his 
august temple granting his favors reluctantly.”187  Faced with a growing 
need to remodel existing facilities and construct new branches to meet 
shifting post-war population patterns and make banking more accessible 
to the masses, bankers began to look to the Modernist architectural 
movement for stylistic inspiration.  
Defined by flat roofs, minimal ornamentation, large glass wall 
sections, and the presence of visible structural elements, Modernist style 
buildings were considered to be open, inviting, and en vogue in the years 
following World War II.188 Bankers were encouraged to incorporate similar 
design principles into new branches in order to “open their doors and 
hearts to the whole community,” and imitate the architectural styling of the 
retail stores to which banks were increasingly compared in periodicals 
such as Banking, Burroughs Clearing House, and Architectural Record, 
among others.189 This building style, described by historian Donna Reiner 
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as one displaying “openness, adaptability, and modernity,” was widely 
adopted by Arizona financial institutions in the post-war era, during which 
branches joined iconic corporate headquarters as “part of [a] bank’s 
advertising repertoire.”190 
 In 1947, Walter Bimson, who at one time had considered pursuing 
a career in architecture, commissioned noted architect and part-time 
Scottsdale resident Frank Lloyd Wright to design branches for planned 
Tucson and Sunnyslope locations. Wright dubbed his futuristic-looking 
Tucson concept “The Daylight Bank” because of its domed skylight roof 
and open interior layout. However, bank officials chose to scrap the plans 
as they believed construction costs to be prohibitive and the inclusion of 
drive-in windows to be unnecessary, despite having promoted a teller-
extended long handled popcorn popper basket as the state’s first drive-in 
service just one year prior.191 In a move that likely generated untold 
amounts of consternation on the executive floors of the Professional 
Building, the First National Bank of Arizona received widespread publicity 
for opening the first true drive-in equipped branch in Arizona in October of 
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1947. The newsworthiness of this event was increased by the fact that the 
state’s first “aerial depositor” delivered a deposit via helicopter during the 
grand opening ceremonies, ensuring widespread coverage and 
discussion.192  The publicity resulting from this branch opening, paired with 
the coverage garnered by the 1946 opening of a Western-themed Valley 
National branch in Wickenburg complete with a horse hitching rail, likely 
persuaded bank executives of the advertising value of notable branch 
architecture.193 Indeed, bank marketing personnel undertook significant 
publicity efforts detailing the art, architectural features, and convenient 
location of all branches opened by the bank after 1947, capturing the full 
                                            
192 “New First National Branch: Bank Opens Office Today,” Arizona Republic, 
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1946, and was described by the bank as its “most picturesque office.” A photo of Walter 
Bimson dressed in stereotypical Western attire leaning against the hitching rail located in 
front of the wood-front building while accompanied by a railroad executive and two burros 
named Jack Junior and Clementine was published often over the coming decades, 
including a April 1973 Arizona Highways article profiling Bimson. Special emphasis was 
placed on the idea of a bank with such a presence being ranked “Largest Bank in the 
Rocky Mountain States.” Hopkins, 265, 272; Don Dedera, “Walter Reed Bimson: 
Arizona’s Indispensable Man: Compleat Banker,” Arizona Highways, April 1973, 28. As 
construction materials were difficult to obtain immediately following the war, the bank 
renovated existing buildings, as was the case in Wickenburg, or erected temporary 
structures until more permanent facilities could be constructed, as was the case with the 
surplus Quonset hut used as the Tolleson branch in 1946. A branch built to replace the 
temporary location opened on March 2, 1953. Captioned photo of Tolleson Quonset hut, 
1946, file 157, VNB Collection; Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection.   
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promotional potential of the newfound institutional emphasis on 
architecture. 
 Permanent Valley National branches erected from 1948 onward 
displayed many Modernist characteristics. Presented by increasingly 
publicity savvy bank officials as highly innovative facilities, these buildings 
were the subject of numerous newspaper articles outlining their utility and 
design. The first two such branches opened in Glendale and Phoenix on 
July 31st and December 20, 1948, respectively.194  
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“Styled along modern lines,” yet demonstrating a Southwestern 
influence through the stacked stone design elements used on the front 
façade, the Glendale branch was built to replace an older facility of 
insufficient size, which was likely the office acquired through the 1924 
purchase of the First National Bank of Glendale. The new office, located 
on the northeast corner of Glendale and 57th Avenues, boasted a 
community room, drive-in banking service, and a color scheme selected 
by color consultant Gustave Plochere.195 Free of Southwestern influences, 
the new Phoenix location was more Modern in styling, and won 
widespread press recognition.  
Designed by noted Phoenix architect H. H. Green, the Phoenix 
branch, located at 1820 West Van Buren Street, featured a flat roof, a 
front wall comprised primarily of glass, and a two-window drive-through. 
The modern amenities of this branch were heavily promoted by the bank, 
and well-reported by the local press. Valley National offered opening day 
guests a pamphlet highlighting the “modern, colorful and attractive” 
banking center and clearly displaying the auto-friendly features of the new 
branch. Local newspaper articles provided detailed descriptions of the 
building, giving specific attention to the overall color scheme, which was 
also formulated by Plochere, who was identified in the press as a “noted 
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color consultant”.196 Subsequent branches and innovations garnered 
similar favorable press coverage.  
The September 6, 1949 opening of a branch at 11 West Van Buren 
in Phoenix serves as a strong example of the publicity value of well-
designed, innovative offices. Though built in a remodeled retail space on 
the first floor of the 1928 Renaissance Revival-style Security Building, the 
new H. H. Green-designed branch incorporated “an all-glass modern 
entrance” including plate glass doors trimmed with “unusual, aqua-tinted 
corrugated structural glass” described by the Arizona Times as “an 
innovation in architectural design.”197 Blending innovation and traditional 
design also proved to be an effective means of capturing media attention, 
as demonstrated by the 1950 Winslow branch. 
Opened on March 10, 1950, the new Winslow branch replaced the 
facility acquired from the First National Bank of Winslow after a 1946 
merger. In a nod to its location near the large Native American 
reservations of northeastern Arizona, the Edward Varney-designed branch 
blended local indigenous styling with modern design, leading the Arizona 
Republic to describe the branch plan as “[combining] the traditional 
aspects of ancient Indian culture with contemporary functional design.” 
                                            
196 “Officers Inspect New Valley Bank Branch,” Phoenix Gazette, December 18, 
1948; West Van Buren branch opening day brochure, December 20, 1948, box 120, VNB 
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The location also gained notice for its regionally appropriate art, which 
included four sculptures of Native American dancers.198 The inclusion of 
noteworthy art was a common practice in post-war Valley National 
branches, and often gained positive press. 
A 1959 Arizona Architect article written by muralist Jay Datus cites 
the bank as “a leader in using architectural sculpture,” and states that, 
“[Walter] Bimson’s personal interest in the fine arts has unquestionably 
influenced all Arizona banks to greater use of art works in their design, 
ornamentation and display.”199 In addition to the Winslow sculptures, other 
examples of art and sculpture being featured prominently in post-war 
Valley National banking centers include specially commissioned Walter E. 
Bohl wildlife water colors for the Glendale branch and wood carvings 
replicating Painted Desert petroglyphs custom-made for the 1951 Central 
and Indian School (Phoenix) branch. Both installations received lengthy 
and favorable Arizona Republic articles, including a description of the 
1951 wood carvings as items “thought to be the first of their kind in the 
southwest,” likely sparking curiosity and visitation from existing and 
                                            
198 “Valley Plans New Building at Winslow; Striking Design to Feature Bank Unit,” 
Arizona Republic, June 17, 1949; “Bank Building has Interesting Design,” Phoenix 
Gazette, March 10, 1950; “Valley Bank’s Winslow Branch to Open Today,” Arizona 
Republic, March 10, 1950; “Sculpture Completed for New Building,” Arizona Republic, 
March 10, 1950; “Scottsdale Sculptor Finishes Two Carvings,” Arizona Republic, June 
20, 1950; “Bank Typifies City Progress,” Arizona Republic, August 17, 1952. 
 




potential clients alike.200 While extremely successfully at winning press 
coverage on a local level, the bank also effectively captured national 
publicity for its operations and success, thus further promoting the 
institution and expanding the audience of potential clients. 
 In November 1945, American Magazine published a highly 
laudatory article chronicling Walter Bimson’s tenure at the helm of Valley 
National. Entitled “Bank Knight in Arizona,” the piece was a seven page 
story recounting the successes enjoyed by Valley National since Bimson’s 
1933 arrival, peppered with anecdotes relating to his leadership and 
quotes from Arizona business leaders highlighting the positive economic 
impact of the bank. The article was subsequently reprinted in condensed 
form in the January 1946 edition of Reader’s Digest.201 The widespread 
circulation of the two publications ensured a vast readership. Paired with 
the post-war rush for employment and opportunity, the reach of this article 
resulted in an inundating stream of correspondence and inquiries 
regarding the Arizona climate, economy, and culture addressed to 
Bimson. During the six months immediately following publication, the bank 
claimed to receive an average of seventy-two letters per day from across 
the nation and globe in response to the article, while later, “almost no day 
[passed] without at least one” letter. By September 1946, 2,690 pieces of 
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correspondence requesting information, loans, employment, and advice 
had been received at Valley National headquarters. 202  
 The bank seized upon the promotional opportunities presented by 
the success of “Bank Knight in Arizona.” By February 1946, a six-page 
standard reply selling the charms of Arizona had been drafted in response 
to the flood of letters received from readers of the article. While boosterist 
in nature, the reply did present immediate post-war employment and 
housing prospects in realistic terms, warning would-be Arizonans that jobs 
were not readily available and housing was in short supply. One page of 
the form letter was devoted to statistics relating to the state, and one page 
was dedicated to providing a list of potential sources for additional 
information and statistics regarding the state and its economy.203 The need 
for a general reply likely prompted bank officials to consider the value of 
positive press and may have brought about the idea of compiling Arizona-
specific statistics for publication in conjunction with anecdotes and 
humorous writing in monthly bank-produced periodicals. 
Under the leadership of Herbert Leggett, the Valley National 
research department had compiled and published statistics relating to 
                                            
202 Building upon the publicity value already gained from the well-read article, an 
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Arizona since 1945. As Arizona did not then have a state Chamber of 
Commerce or other organization tasked with promoting the state and its 
businesses to outsiders, the bank opted to create informative resources 
typically undertaken by such associations. The first such project was a 
thirty- to forty-page annual publication entitled Arizona Statistical Review. 
This booklet was comprised entirely of state-specific data, and was mailed 
out to companies and individuals throughout the country. Information 
included in this useful, yet dry, effort ran the gamut from population figures 
to meteorological data to economic information. By 1950, Arizona 
Statistical Review reached a distribution list of 10,000 recipients, including 
5,000 readers living out-of-state and “every leading executive in the 
country.” However, despite the value of such information to persons 
considering a move to the state, or businesses considering relocating their 
operations or establishing new facilities in Arizona, bank corporate files do 
not reflect a widespread response to this thoroughly researched work.204 
Bank records do reflect a strong positive reaction to a more limited 
monthly publication featuring the writing of Leggett in addition to two to 
three pages of statistics regarding Arizona’s population and economy.  
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 Published monthly from October 1946 onward, the Arizona 
Progress served as what may have been the most effective means of 
promoting Valley National both inside its home state and throughout the 
rest of the nation.205 Arizona Progress was geared toward a more general 
audience than the fact-rich Arizona Statistical Review, and as such, 
gained far more notice and media attention than the more comprehensive 
annual publication. Specifically, the informative, entertaining, and 
sometimes sardonic cover stories penned by Leggett won the periodical 
the attention and affection of many.206  
Described by Barry Goldwater as “a philosopher-turned-banker, or 
perhaps vice versa,” Leggett was a skilled analyst and keen observer of 
emerging trends.207 Though a statistician and economist by training, 
Leggett also excelled at drafting engaging prose outlining current events 
and other topics of interest, for which he received frequent praise from 
local and national publications. “A noted pundit whose writings delight 
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state of Arizona Progress) since Bimson stepped down from the presidency. In particular, 
Leggett complained that, “the Holy Spirit Himself couldn’t ghost-write what the Master 
Minds think they want for Ariz Prog.,” and suggested, “as for the front page of Ariz Prog, it 
would be better to change the formula entirely than to run some schoolboy essays or 
other amateurish drivel which will only point up the fact that the Valley Bank is sinking 
rapidly into Mediocrity as it departs from your leadership genius.” Leggett to Walter 
Bimson, August 27, 1963, VNB Collection. 
 
207 Barry Goldwater, “Some Philosophy From a Banker,” Los Angeles Times, 




readers while at the same time giving his followers something to think 
about,” Leggett drafted literary offerings described as “un-banker-like,” and 
“the main reason the bulletin is read wherever people customarily do read 
bank publications- and in a host of places where no bank material would 
normally ever be read.”208 As indicated by numerous contemporary 
reviews and mentions of his work, his ability to distill complex economic 
topics into short, entertaining passages accessible to most readers is 
likely the primary reason for the widespread success of Arizona Progress.  
 The monthly publication began with a circulation of 2,000 copies. 
However, within one year, the distribution list grew to more than 5,000 
recipients, half of whom lived outside of Arizona.209 By 1949, the bank ran 
approximately 14,000 copies of the bulletin, and sent over 7,000 issues to 
out-of-state residents, including individuals in every state and twenty-one 
foreign nations.210 According to Leggett, by 1951, copies of Arizona 
Progress “[reached] practically every man of importance in the United 
States.” Circulation growth continued to rise throughout the 1950s, leading 
to a press run of 30,000 issues by 1959. In a testament to the value of the 
bulletin, an Arizona Republic writer credited the widespread reach and 
                                            
208 “By Any Other Name, It’s Baloney,” Southtown Economist, October 13, 1957, 
4; “New Head of Bankers Draws Bead on Stuffiness,” New York Times, September 21, 
1960, 51; Joseph Stocker, “Portrait of a Bank: Financing America’s Most Flourishing 
Frontier,” Arizona Highways, November 1956, 38. 
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popularity of the publication as a potential explanation for a rise in Valley 
National stock ownership among non-Arizona investors.211  While the 
growing Arizona economy and population and the continued success of 
the bank likely factored into the desirability of company stock during this 
period, the importance of Arizona Progress cannot be overstated. 
As written in the 1948 annual report, Arizona Progress, as well as 
Arizona Statistical Review, had gained “a reputation for reliability and 
[served] the very useful purpose of constantly associating the name of 
[the] bank with the State of Arizona, or vice versa, in the public mind” soon 
after its debut.212 The veracity of this statement is evidenced by the 
frequency with which Arizona Progress statistics were reprinted in 
newspaper articles or used as the basis for entire stories, as was often the 
case in local papers such as the Arizona Republic.213 Indeed, by the time 
Leggett retired in 1962, a California newspaper referred to Arizona 
Progress as “among the most widely reprinted of all U.S. banking 
publications,” while the Arizona Republic quoted sitting Valley National 
president James Patrick as saying, “by word, deed and his writings,” the 
retiring writer “played a key role in both the growth of our state and 
                                            
211 By the time Leggett retired from VNB in 1962, Arizona Progress boasted 
monthly circulation of approximately 30,000 copies. “Reflecting our Prosperity,” Arizona 
Republic, July 14, 1951; “Herbert Leggett, Bank Executive Retiring June 30,” Casa 
Grande Dispatch, June 27, 1962, B8. 
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bank.”214 Patrick’s contention makes clear the significance assigned to 
efforts such as Arizona Progress by bank leadership. Arizona Highways 
reported results more translatable into dollars and cents in a 1956 feature 
on the bank. In the article, the author stated that Arizona Progress, which 
then reached 25,000 individuals, “[brought] in a considerable number of 
new residents lured to Arizona by Leggett’s eulogistic essays on the 
subject- and many of them [became] Valley Bank customers.”215 
Though merely one aspect of a multi-pronged outreach strategy, 
the statistical information presented in Arizona Progress, and to a lesser 
degree, Arizona Statistical Review, allowed the bank to serve as an 
information broker to those seeking information relating to the growing 
post-war Arizona population and economy. When both publications were 
first produced, no state booster organizations capable of compiling and 
distributing the vital data contained in the monthly and annual Valley 
National offerings yet existed. The absence of such organizations lent the 
bank a quasi-official status in the minds of many recipients and potential 
clients, and proactively connected the bank with the state and its post-war 
“Progress,” as intended by the name of the monthly bulletin.216 Frequent 
use of bank compiled statistics as fodder for local and national newspaper 
                                            
214 “Financial Humorist: ‘Letter’ Writer Plans to Retire,” Bakersfield Californian, 
July 14, 1962, 23; “Executive of Bank to Retire,” Arizona Republic, June 28, 1962. 
 
215 Stocker, 38. 
 
216 The title of the monthly bulletin was created as an homage to and reminder of 
the bank’s “Progressing with Arizona” slogan. “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1948, 6, VNB Collection; Collins, Emerging Metropolis, 192-193; “Don 
Graham Explains Tourist Possibilities”; “Banker Lists West’s Needs.” 
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and magazine articles further enhanced bank credibility and multiplied the 
promotional value of the labor-intensive publications. The authoritative 
status gained through the distribution of these information resources also 
reinforced the idea of institutional stability demonstrated through state and 
regional institutional rankings, and worked to build name identification and 
positive association for the bank. Such goals were also accomplished 
through the continued employment of more traditional marketing strategies 
throughout the subject period. 
 Conservative advertising techniques such as balance sheet ads 
and the use of bank architecture as “standing advertisements” present in 
Valley National promotional efforts throughout the immediate post-war 
years rounded out bank marketing efforts during the subject period. Given 
the public memory of Depression-era bank failures and the influx of new 
residents unfamiliar with the comparative size and stability of local 
institutions, these “board of directors’ type” advertisements served to 
boost consumer confidence and drive new business for the institution. The 
pairing of innovative practices with traditional methods proved highly 
effective for the Valley National bottom line.  
 Although no records documenting the effectiveness of company 
advertising during the subject period in a quantitative manner exist, a 
strong inference can be made correlating institutional promotional strategy 
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with growth and profitability.217 Additionally, bank-produced documents 
such as annual reports and internal memos document the efficacy of 
period promotional efforts, as do several articles in the national media, 
including an advertising industry trade journal. Reflecting on the outcomes 
of a Valley National advertising program, a 1959 Advertising Age article 
cited the unique approach of “hacking away” at traditional methods and 
mores as responsible for much of the growth enjoyed by the bank over the 
course of that decade.218 Recognition of the bank’s marketing 
accomplishments even reached the pages of small town newspapers such 
as the Lubbock, Texas Evening Avalanche Journal, which ran a late-
1950s editorial commending the company on its efforts, and concluded by 
commenting, “Not all banks could adopt such a program- or would want to. 
But it’s interesting to note what happens when one does.”219  
In the case of Valley National, the result of such a program was 
increased name identification, positive association with a rapidly growing 
                                            
217 This inference assumes a healthy operational baseline, which includes factors 
such as institutional solvency, competent (though not necessarily exceptional) leadership, 
a healthy economy, and a lack of corporate scandal or controversy that might hamper the 
effectiveness of an advertising campaign. If records documenting the financial benefit of 
the bank’s advertising efforts did exist, it would prove challenging, if not impossible, to 
factor out the impact of the substantial growth experienced throughout the state during 
the subject period. Further difficulty would arise when considering the impact of the bank 
on the growth of the state. As stated by the editors of Advertising Age in 1959, the 
question of “whether the bank [owed] its growth to the growth of the state, or the state 
[owed] its growth to the canny promotion of the bank,” is a “chicken-and-egg” matter. “Not 
Afraid of Being Different…,” 1. 
 
218 “Not Afraid of Being Different…,” 1. True to form, the bank promptly issued a 
press release detailing the laudatory write-up of its “gay, offbeat” ad strategy. VNB Press 
Release, July 6, 1959, file 145, VNB Collection. 
 
219 “Today’s Editorial: Bank Does ‘Selling Job’,” Lubbock Evening Avalanche-
Herald, December 18, 1959.  
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state and economy, inferred stability, and increased media coverage. The 
new clients and statewide economic development resulting from this 
effective mix of innovative and traditional marketing techniques set the 
stage for the introduction of new product offerings and the continued 
expansion of the company’s geographic footprint. As such, the intensive 
marketing efforts of Leggett, Reade, Arnold, and others at Valley National 
proved an essential component of the three-pronged strategy for growth 





DOLLARS IN, DOLLARS OUT: THE POST-WAR TAILORING OF 
DEPOSIT AND LOAN PRODUCT OFFERINGS 
 Just as Herbert Leggett had predicted the importance of advertising 
in the post-war era, he also identified the potentially unprecedented 
significance of bank lending programs in the years to follow the war. 
Believing the estimates of peacetime lending put forth by many experts to 
be “grossly underestimated,” Leggett speculated that Valley National 
lending volume could double within a two to three year period following the 
war, reinforcing this possibility with the assertion, “When people can 
borrow, they do borrow. This is human nature- and history.”220 Though 
lending had always been a key function of the bank, particularly following 
Walter Bimson’s 1933 assumption of the presidency and continuing 
through World War II, the nature and staggering volume of lending 
activities undertaken in the post-war years differed greatly from the 
wartime lending practices of the bank.221 
                                            
220 “RE: THE OUTLOOK FOR BANK LOANS,” September 9, 1944, file 507, VNB 
Collection. 
 
221 VNB annual reports serve as the best indication of bank lending activity during 
the period. Though relatively limited in content when compared to annual reports issued 
by large, publicly-traded companies of the present day, post-war era VNB annual reports 
were considered in-depth at the time of their publication. In a 1945 Business Week 
article, the newly issued VNB annual report covering 1944 operations was compared to 
“the easy gaited, conversational type of report now widely used by industrial 
corporations.” The article credits VNB with producing an annual report superior to its 
industry peers, stating, “Other banks have come a long way in the direction of unraveling 
the mysteries of the annual report, but few in such detail as the Valley National.” 
However, while the reports do contain data highlighting clear shifts in year-over-year 
lending activity by category and dollar amount, in many cases the actual dollar value of 
new lending volume is difficult to determine as most reports list only loans outstanding at 
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 Valley National had built a reputation for mortgage and installment 
lending during the Depression years. However, the need for such loans 
declined substantially following American entry into World War II due to 
material restrictions and an associated decrease in residential 
construction activity. While lending remained an essential component of 
Valley National operations and profitability during the war, the nature of 
loan activity shifted toward lending money to the federal government 
through the purchase of government securities. Indeed, by 1945, 
government securities accounted for seventy-five percent of credit issued 
by banks in the Twelfth Federal Reserve District. Nationwide, bank 
holdings of government securities increased by 555 percent between 1939 
and 1945, while in Arizona, bank ownership of government securities 
skyrocketed by 1,200 percent during the same period.222 Valley National 
holdings of federal debt grew at a rate slightly higher than the state 
average, increasing by 1,516 percent between the fourth quarters of 1939 
                                                                                                                       
year-end as opposed to the dollar value of new loans issued. In some cases, information 
relating to new loan volume can be obtained from the commentary found in the first 
section of an annual report. Some reports list new loan totals for installment lending, but 
not other loan categories. Overall, however, information relating to the value of loans 
issued in a given year is unavailable. Thus, most references to loan volume found in this 
chapter are derived from year-end outstanding figures, not annual new loan volume. “And 
How It Grew: Valley National Bank of Arizona Reflects the Enterprise of its President in 
Annual Report Detailing 13 Years of History,” Business Week, February 17, 1945, 58. 
   
222 During the period of study, the San Francisco-based Twelfth Federal Reserve 
District included Washington, Oregon, California, Idaho, Nevada, Utah, Hawaii, Alaska, 
and all but the southeastern portion of Arizona. The District has since been enlarged to 
include all of Arizona. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Men, Money, and the 
West, 36, inside back cover; Schweikart, A History, 108-109; Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco, “About the Fed,” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 




and 1945.223 However, the anticipated decrease in postwar federal 
spending and borrowing, paired with predicted increases in consumer 
borrowing demand, necessitated planning for a diversification of Valley 
National lending operations. Programs such as the veterans home and 
business loan guaranties made available through the Servicemen’s 
Readjustment Act of 1944, more commonly known as the GI Bill, served to 
further increase loan demand and availability. 
 Championed by Arizona Senator Ernest McFarland, among others, 
the GI Bill authorized a number of benefits for returning veterans. 
McFarland worked to include provisions creating government loan 
guaranty programs for veteran home purchases and business financing, 
now popularly known as VA loans.224 These loans, intended as an 
                                            
223 Information obtained from the “U. S. Government Bonds” section of the fourth 
quarter 1939 statement of condition, and the “U. S. Securities” section of the 1946 annual 
report. “Statement of Condition at Close of Business December 30, 1939,” December 30, 
1939, file 1074, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 
January 8, 1946, 8, file 1030A, VNB Collection. 
 
224 McFarland is sometimes referred to as the “Father of the GI Bill.” The initial 
program envisioned by McFarland and others involved direct federal lending to veterans. 
However, the final version of the bill created a federal loan guaranty program in place of 
direct loans. Though initially unsupportive, McFarland cautiously embraced the idea of 
federal loan guaranties after the maximum allowable interest rate was lowered from six 
percent to four percent. McFarland’s opposition to loan guaranties stemmed from his fear 
that banks would “make a profit off the returning veteran who has made a great sacrifice 
for his country.” Continuing, he stated, “In other words, this provision of the bill is for the 
benefit of private lending agencies, rather than the returning veteran.” Though McFarland 
and Walter Bimson were both registered Democrats, and both advocated liberal lending 
policies, they held vastly differing views on the role of banks and government. Further 
political, and possibly personal, disagreements are evident when one reviews material 
relating to the 1954 Arizona gubernatorial election between McFarland and Republican 
incumbent Howard Pyle. VNB Collection documents relating to the campaign highlight 
the likely lack of regard McFarland and Bimson felt for one another. In April 1954, 
Senator Barry Goldwater wrote the following to Bimson: “Walter, I just can’t see Arizona 
coming under the domination of the McFarlands, Buseys and all of the others who now 
control the Democratic Party, and I am sure that you, even as a Democrat, agree with 
me.” Later that year, Bimson served as secretary of the Maricopa County Democrats for 
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alternative to a cash bonus for returning service members, were backed 
by a federal guaranty of fifty percent of the loan amount, to a maximum of 
four thousand dollars, on funds borrowed to purchase a primary 
residence, and a guaranty of fifty percent of loan value, to a maximum of 
two thousand dollars, on unsecured funds or funds secured by non-real 
estate assets used for business purposes.225 Given the anticipated surge 
of veterans moving to Arizona in the post-war years, loans to returning 
service members would clearly be of great importance to the state banking 
industry and economy, regardless of whether such loans were issued 
under the provisions of the GI Bill.  
   In a January 1945 memo to Walter Bimson, Leggett predicted that 
Arizona “will ultimately have at least 200,000 war veterans,” thus creating 
a substantial market in a state home to fewer than 500,000 residents prior 
                                                                                                                       
Pyle Committee, proclaiming, “I am a registered Democrat, but I shall vote for Howard 
Pyle for governor because he has proved to be one of the best governors this state has 
ever had.” McFarland countered by alleging that Bimson supported Pyle because Pyle’s 
administration did not require banks (Valley National among them) to pay interest on 
state deposits. This controversy peaked with a series of newspaper ads placed by the 
McFarland campaign in October of 1954 in which the matter of bank support for Pyle was 
highlighted. United States Senate, “Senate Leaders: Ernest McFarland, “Father of the GI 
Bill,” United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/ 
generic/People_Leaders_McFarland.htm (accessed October 5, 2011); James E. 
McMillan, ed., The Ernest W. McFarland Papers: The United States Senate Years, 1940-
1952 (Prescott, AZ: Sharlot Hall Museum Press, 1995), 94, 103; Barry Goldwater to 
Walter Bimson, April 14, 1954, file 451, VNB Collection; “Bimson Joins Pyle-Demos Vote 
Drive,” Arizona Republic, October 25, 1954; McFarland Campaign Ad, n.d., file 193, VNB 
Collection. 
 
225 Department of Veterans Affairs, “Legislative History of VA Loans,” Department 
of Veterans Affairs, http://www.benefits.va.gov/homeloans/docs/history.pdf (accessed 
July 19, 2011); R. J. Saulnier, Harold G. Halcrow, and Neil H. Jacoby, Federal Lending 




to the war.226 Valley National created inroads to this future market through 
its banking services provided at Arizona military installations during the 
war, as was acknowledged in the 1945 annual report, in which Bimson 
informed shareholders that the “contacts and acquaintances” gained 
through servicing military installations “should prove of incalculable value 
in the future.” Leggett quantified the incalculable value referenced by 
Bimson in an internal memo in which he predicted GI Bill-related lending 
demands of “astronomical proportions” on which bank lending officers 
could “go to town,” resulting in up to ten million dollars in Valley National-
issued VA-backed home mortgages.227 Such predictions were not 
uncommon. The July 1944 issue of Finance included an article predicting 
that veterans would borrow a sum totaling more than all bank loans then 
outstanding in the United States.228 However, while the demand for post-
war loans was evident to many in the banking industry, the method of 
securing funding for such a tremendous volume of lending was uncertain.  
                                            
226 The 1940 census counted 499,261 persons residing in Arizona. Leggett to 
Walter Bimson, January 10, 1945, VNB Collection; U. S. Census Bureau, “Resident 
Population and Apportionment of the U. S. House of Representatives,” U. S. Census 
Bureau, http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/resapport/states/arizona.pdf (accessed August 
6, 2011). 
 
227 “RE: THE OUTLOOK FOR BANK LOANS,” September 9, 1944, VNB 
Collection. 
 
228 Horace Russell, General Counsel for the United States Savings and Loan 
League, stated, “The loan plans are so liberal that it seems undoubted that many 
veterans will take advantage of them. I estimate that of an expected fifteen million 
veterans, first and last, perhaps five million of them will secure loans under Title 3 of the 
Act, and that the total amount will exceed $25 Billions.” Horace Russell, “U.S. Veterans 
May Borrow $25 Billions,” Finance, July 1944, 27; “RE: THE OUTLOOK FOR BANK 
LOANS,” September 9, 1944, VNB Collection. 
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 Sufficient deposits and liquid reserves are required for banks to 
make loans in accordance with banking laws and regulations and within 
the bounds of their fiduciary responsibility to shareholders and 
depositors.229 While deposits are critical to ensuring the ongoing lending 
ability of a bank, deposit dollars also tend to be most scarce in times of 
high consumer spending and borrowing, thus creating an ongoing 
challenge for financial institutions to attract the deposit dollars necessary 
to fulfill client loan requests. This issue proved to be the greatest single 
challenge faced by Valley National in the immediate post-war period.  
 Personal, commercial, and government deposit volume increased 
rapidly and substantially throughout World War II. Between 1939 and 
1945, product rationing and government defense expenditures resulting in 
nearly full employment led to a doubling of personal disposable income 
and an increase of more than one-third in the ratio of consumer liquid 
assets to income. These trends were further aided by an increasing 
money supply resulting from heavy investment of wartime wages and 
corporate profits in government securities such as war bonds, the 
proceeds of which were quickly returned to the marketplace in the form of 
defense expenditures. The combined factors of increasing incomes and a 
                                            
229 The most restrictive of these regulations was the federally mandated limitation 
on real estate lending, which was not allowed to exceed sixty percent of time deposits, or 
depositor funds held by the bank for a set term in instruments such as certificates of 
deposit. Overall, Walter Bimson sought to limit total lending (real estate, installment, 
commercial, etc.) to fifty percent of total deposits held at valley National. Lynne Pierson 
Doti and Larry Schweikart, “Financing the Postwar Housing Boom in Phoenix and Los 
Angeles, 1945-1960,” Pacific Historical Review 58 (May 1989): 187; “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” January 17, 1950, 5, file 1031A, VNB Collection.  
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growing money supply, coupled with purchasing restrictions, created an 
atmosphere conducive to saving. By the end of the war, nationwide 
personal savings totals had reached an all-time high. Corporate deposits 
also reached record levels during this period as companies tended to 
maintain unusually large cash balances during the war years.230 
 Nationwide, corporate deposits grew from $13.96 billion at the end 
of 1941 to approximately $22 billion by the end of 1945.231 Possibly owing 
to the out-of-state ownership of many corporations active in the state for 
purposes of war production, Arizona banks held a smaller percentage of 
corporate accounts than was average on a nationwide basis. However, 
while corporate accounts comprised just twenty-eight percent of Arizona 
checking accounts during the war, as opposed to an average of fifty-one 
percent at banks nationwide, the impact of such accounts on the state 
banking industry was nonetheless significant.232 At Valley National, 
corporate deposits increased from $26,813,177.85 to $90,568,949.91 
between the end of 1940 and the end of 1944, an increase of 238 percent 
representing a total of nearly sixty-two percent of all Valley National 
deposits. In percentage terms, only government deposits grew at a more 
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significant rate at Valley National, though the dollar amount of government 
deposits held at the end of 1944 totaled $24,275,142.58, a figure equal to 
just twenty-seven percent of corporate deposits held at that time.233 As 
judged by overall deposits, Arizona banks gained greatly from wartime 
expenditures.  
 Nationally, overall deposits increased approximately 260 percent 
during the course of the war. Member banks of the Twelfth Federal 
Reserve District enjoyed checking deposit growth rates double the 
national average, with Arizona institutions experiencing a 415 percent 
increase in deposit dollar volume during the war.234 Valley National, the 
largest bank in the state throughout the war years, began 1945 holding 
nearly fifty-one percent of all Arizona deposits.235 In a memo to Walter 
Bimson outlining post-war market possibilities, Leggett warned that the 
substantial increase in deposit volume enjoyed during the war years was 
likely to be greatly reduced by pent-up consumer demand, housing down 
payments, and corporate reconversion needs. Leggett also predicted that 
shifts in wages and buying habits would result in a post-war savings rate 
                                            
233 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” January 9, 1945, 11, VNB 
Collection. 
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close to zero percent, thus further jeopardizing prospects of reliable 
deposit growth.236 
 Leggett’s cautionary analysis of post-war deposit prospects proved 
largely accurate. Consumer demand surged following the war, 
necessitating individual depositors to draw down their bank account 
balances. A combination of industrial reconversion expenses and higher 
interest rates offered on non-deposit asset categories prompted a sharp 
reduction in corporate account balances.237 In addition to the deposit 
decrease spurred by consumer activities and industrial reconversion, 
government deposit totals also dropped in the post-war period.  
Federal deposits held at Valley National had increased dramatically 
between the end of 1940 and the end of 1945, growing from 
$6,282,581.96 to $30,882,286.12, or approximately fifteen percent of all 
deposits by the end of the war. However, by the end of 1946, government 
deposits held at Valley National had decreased to $23,283,595.37, a drop 
of nearly twenty-five percent from the 1945 figure.238 Significant reductions 
in government deposits impacted banks more severely than decreases in 
personal or corporate deposits as federal law allowed banks to serve as 
government depositories without paying interest on federal deposit dollars 
in exchange for providing public services such as bond sales, government 
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check cashing, and tax collection.239 Thus, a substantial loss of 
government deposit dollars translated to a decline in interest-free capital 
available for lending and institutional reserves, thereby increasing the 
average cost of a bank deposit program. When combined, the anticipated 
level of post-war loan demands coupled with the predicted decrease in 
deposit volume necessitated a shift in operational strategy in order to meet 
consumer demands, satisfy regulatory requirements, and perform to 
shareholder expectations. In order to accomplish this range of post-war 
goals, Valley National leadership employed a retail strategy focused on 
marketing volume-based deposit and loan products to a middle-income 
clientele seeking to share in the booming post-war American economy. 
The first component of this two-tiered strategy involved expanding 
the bank deposit base through innovative deposit product developments 
intended to appeal to a mass consumer base. New product offerings, 
including low-minimum-balance checking accounts, Christmas savings 
accounts, and baby savings accounts were created to broaden the bank 
customer base and increase overall deposit volume, thereby generating 
the capital necessary to fund the anticipated increase in post-war loan 
demand. Valley National post-war lending philosophy embraced a mix of 
stable, yet relatively low yielding government-insured loans, paired with 
higher risk, albeit higher yield, installment loans. Loans were issued to the 
greatest capacity possible given prevailing regulations and capital 
                                            
239 This interest-free arrangement remained in place until November 1978. 
Klebaner, American Commercial Banking, 216.  
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availability, though a scarcity of available funds did necessitate an 
emphasis on higher margin, shorter term lending. While the bank offered a 
wide variety of loan products, factors including private and public 
competition, regulatory restrictions, and product limitations led to relatively 
high-margin installment loans being the most prevalent loan type issued in 
terms of volume and dollar amount, thus contributing significantly to Valley 
National post-war profitability and growth. 
Implementation of this dual-pronged strategy was complicated by 
the post-war expansion patterns of competitor institutions, many of which 
opened de novo branches in existing markets and expanded their 
geographic footprints into new areas during the period. The Transamerica-
owned First National Bank of Arizona grew from just three branches 
statewide in 1939 to forty by the mid-1950s, while the southern Arizona-
based Bank of Douglas opened its first Phoenix branch on April 1, 1945. 
Pam Hait, author of The Arizona Bank: Arizona’s Story, credits this entry 
into the Phoenix market as the primary reason for their 1944 to 1945 year-
over-year deposit growth of seventy-five percent.240 The growth of rival 
banks such as First National and the Bank of Douglas, among others, 
increased competition for deposits and other revenue sources, thus 
exacerbating the need for new product offerings and a broadened market 
focus.   
                                            
240 The first Bank of Douglas branch in Phoenix was housed in the Phoenix Title 
and Trust Building, located at 116 N. 1st Avenue. The building still stands as of October 
2011. Schweikart, A History, 117-119; Hait, 125-129.  
 110 
 
    The market to which new deposit products were sold grew at a 
rapid clip in the immediate post-war era. In addition to the large numbers 
of returning veterans predicted by Leggett and others, many new residents 
were drawn by the widespread availability of climate control devices such 
as air conditioners and evaporative coolers, growing automobile 
ownership rates allowing for comfortable living in suburbanizing urban 
areas such as Phoenix and Tucson, and the fact that the Phoenix area 
enjoyed sunny skies eighty-five percent of the year.241 Many newcomers 
relocated to Arizona in pursuit of the jobs available at new, relocated, and 
reopened businesses. Large employers such as Reynolds Aluminum, 
Motorola, AiResearch, and others were drawn to Arizona for its climate, 
low average wages, right-to-work laws, accessibility by air, rail, and 
                                            
241 By 1951, over ninety percent of Arizona homes were equipped with 
evaporative coolers, air conditioners, or other cooling devices. Automobile ownership 
doubled between 1945 and 1950. With respect to overall state growth versus growth in 
specific areas, it is important to note for the sake of context that the bulk of immediate 
post-war population and economic growth occurred in the Phoenix metropolitan area. 
The total value of projects for which building permits were issued in Phoenix increased 
from $549,255 to $928,295 from September 1945 to September 1946, while the dollar 
value of projects for which building permits were issued in Tucson, the second largest city 
in the state, decreased during the same period from $202,679 to $198,454. The rapid 
expansion of areas such as Phoenix caused Leggett to note, “Just as New York, Chicago 
and Los Angeles are getting too large and congested to suit many people, we observe 
that some of our citizens are beginning to complain about Phoenix and Tucson for the 
same reason. In other words, decentralization is not only a national trend, but may 
become a local or area trend as well. People looking for elbow room, neighborly living 
conditions and an opportunity to assist in building the new Main Streets of America will 
find many such attractive locations in the smaller communities of Arizona.” While some 
may have found the growth of Arizona’s urban areas unattractive, these areas, though 
particularly the Phoenix metropolitan area, claimed the greatest population and economic 
growth of the period. Leggett to Walter Bimson, January 10, 1945, VNB Collection; 
Bradford Luckingham, “The American Southwest: An Urban View,” The Western 
Historical Quarterly 15 (July 1984): 272. Michael Konig, “Phoenix in the 1950s: Urban 
Growth in the ‘Sunbelt’,” Arizona and the West 24 (Spring 1982): 22; Schweikart, A 




highway, and, by the late 1940s, an attractive business tax code.242 Valley 
National leadership sought to capitalize on this growth on a volume basis 
by pursuing deposits on a retail level, thus expanding its pool of customers 
to bolster total deposit balances thought to be at risk due to the probability 
of post-war asset deployment. The sizeable influx of returning service 
members predicted by Leggett proved vital to the bank’s early efforts to 
drive additional business.  
Great thought was given to the economic value of returning 
servicemen. The potential “incalculable value” of the military personnel 
serviced at Arizona bases during the war acknowledged by Walter Bimson 
in his 1945 annual report was paired with the possible impact of other GIs 
expected to be drawn to post-war Arizona for various reasons, prompting 
consideration of a vastly different post-war Arizona market. When 
predicting an eventual Arizona population of 200,000 or more veterans in 
January 1945, Leggett informed Bimson that discharged service members 
were then moving to Arizona “at the rate of three non-residents for every 
former resident,” and presented the task of winning over veterans as “one 
                                            
242 Reynolds Aluminum took over the Phoenix Alcoa facility in 1946, Motorola 
established a presence in the Phoenix area in 1948, and AiResearch reopened its 
Phoenix facility in 1951. Tax code changes implemented in the late 1940s involved 
inventory taxation relief and other business-friendly measures suggested by commercial 
leaders, the Phoenix Chamber of Commerce, and the Governor’s Industrial Development 
Council, on which Herbert Leggett sat as a member. Konig, 20-30; Michael S. Wade, The 
Bitter Issue: The Right to Work Law in Arizona (Tucson: Arizona Historical Society, 
1976), 82.  
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of the most important and urgent matters of policy to be taken into 
consideration for 1945.”243  
Bank efforts to win the business of veterans included the creation of 
a Veterans Department, or “GI Bank,” in late 1944 or early 1945. Though 
this division is most often credited with generating loan business, it also 
undoubtedly served an important promotional function as an outreach 
program and a bridge to peacetime business relationships with military 
personnel familiar with the bank through its wartime operations at defense 
facilities in Tucson, Marana, Kingman, and throughout the Phoenix area.244 
Indeed, attracting new clientele through publicity may have been the 
primary value of the short-lived department, as indicated in the 1946 
annual report, which reported that just ten percent of the three thousand 
clients served by the GI Bank received loans. Rather, the report stated, 
“the majority of those who come in are seeking information and advice.”245 
                                            
243 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1945, 7, VNB Collection; 
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244 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1945, 4-5, VNB Collection; 
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245 Though frequently cited in works discussing the development of post-war 
Arizona, the GI Bank was small in size, limited in verifiable results, and possibly in 
existence only briefly. The department is mentioned in the 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948 
annual reports, but receives no discussion in later reports. The 1947 report indicates 
underwhelming departmental performance. A January 1946 personnel roster lists the 
department and includes five dedicated employees, while the annual report issued that 
same month mentions a staff of seven, and the 1947 annual report places department 
staff size at ten individuals. No other records of staff size could be located. Perhaps 
indicative of its relative significance, the department was not included in the list of groups 
contributing to issues of Round-Up, the monthly employee newsletter, though seemingly 
less important departments such as the mail room and payment processing team 
received columns for news and gossip updates. No document detailing the date or 
circumstances of its disbanding could be found. “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1945, 4-5, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the 
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Thus, the institutional focus on veterans demonstrated through the 
establishment of this otherwise largely unsuccessful department, 
combined with past Valley National service to the military community and 
its status as the largest bank in the state and region, likely served to aid 
the company in the race for new accounts in the post-war period.  
  Overall, Valley National registered mixed success in their drive for 
new deposit accounts and dollars immediately following the war. As 
reported by Walter Bimson in the 1949 annual report, total deposit dollars 
rose more quickly than lending volume from the conclusion of the war 
through 1948. Deposit account unit growth was also rapid, allowing Valley 
National to claim nearly 150,000 deposit accounts in a state of 200,000 
households by the end of 1948, a figure almost fifty percent greater than 
their account total at the beginning of 1945.246 Consistent with the 
emerging national trend of increased bank account ownership, as 
highlighted by nationwide checking account penetration rates increasing 
from thirty-four percent of households in 1946 to fifty percent in 1956, 
Valley National sought the business of previously unbanked individuals as 
part of its growth strategy and drive to increase its deposit base.247  
                                                                                                                       
Stockholders,” 1946, 4-5, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the 
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However, the 150,000 account figure touted by Bimson included 
both checking and savings accounts, and failed to reference important 
information such as average balances. New checking relationships surged 
immediately following the war, but quickly reached a plateau, while 
savings account production increased at a consistent pace from 1944 
through 1949. Notably, a drop in average account balances accompanied 
the sizeable post-war increase in checking account units, which rose in 
number from 70,646 to 84,216 between 1945 and 1946.248 Average 
account balances remained relatively stable between 1946 and 1949, as 
did the number of open checking accounts, indicating a relatively flat 
demand for such accounts during that period. Though the number of 
savings accounts held at Valley National grew in a stable manner during 
this period, the average balance maintained in such accounts dropped 
from a high of $867 in 1946 to $680 in 1949, equating to a decrease of 
nearly twenty-two percent.249 Were it not for a twenty-five percent increase 
in government deposits in 1948, year-over-year deposit growth would 
have been an anemic $28,183.19 over the 1947 deposit total of 
$224,270,570.93, equating to growth of just over one-tenth of a percent as 
                                            
248 Though both the number of checking accounts held and the total checking 
deposit balance held at Valley National increased between December 31, 1945 and 
December 31, 1946, the average balance held dropped from $1,868 to $1,746. 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 15, VNB Collection; “President’s 
Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1947, 15, VNB Collection. 
  




opposed to actual recorded growth of two and three-quarters of a 
percent.250  
Decreases in checking, savings, and government deposit totals in 
1949 led Valley National to declare its first year of zero deposit growth 
since Bimson assumed the presidency in 1933, and placed significant 
restraints on bank dividends and lending capability.  Further complicating 
the matter, national personal consumption rates continued to rise during 
this period, thus fueling consumer borrowing demand.251 Indeed, in the 
Phoenix market, loan demand “soaked up all available local funds,” as 
characterized by banking historians Lynne Doti and Larry Schweikart.252 
Given the consistent loan demand of the period, the situation 
required immediate and sustained attention. By 1948, the need to 
stockpile capital funds received mention in the Valley National annual 
report, in which Walter Bimson acknowledged a “very penurious” dividend 
policy intended to grow the corporate capital fund account. In the same 
                                            
250 The reason for the sizeable increase in government deposits is not addressed 
in the 1949 annual report. However, following an increase in certain interest rate 
categories in late 1947, the federal government periodically supplied additional reserves 
to the banking system in an effort to ensure overall rate stability. This action may account 
for the dramatic increase in government deposits recorded in 1948. “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” 1949, 16, VNB Collection; Hickman, 66. 
 
251 A slight nationwide economic contraction did occur during the years 1948 and 
1949. However, personal income statistics remained relatively stable during this 
correction period, and personal savings rates increased throughout 1948. Economist Bert 
Hickman attributed the economic blip to a readjustment of business inventories and 
construction activities following the surge of 1946-1948. Bank deposit figures were likely 
impacted by the fact that as incomes remained relatively stable, consumer consumption 
demand continued to increase, thus drawing down bank balances. “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 1, VNB Collection; Hickman, 69-75. 
 




section, Bimson cited a forecasted stabilization in deposit and loan 
demand, warranting hope that the bank’s “capital position would soon 
become more comfortable.”253 However, 1949 brought increased questions 
relating to loan volume, capital accounts, and potential institutional risk. 
In February 1949, the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency sent a 
letter informing bank leadership of his concern regarding lending volume 
and reserves insufficient to cover potential loan losses. In a detailed reply, 
Bimson outlined the overall fiscal health of the institution and countered 
specific examples of risk provided in the original letter, though he did write 
that “a general reduction in loan volume” was a “desirable aim.”254 While 
the amount of loans outstanding at the end of 1949 was considerably 
lower than the amount of loans outstanding one year prior, the amount of 
loans made or renewed in 1949 equaled average total deposits held 
throughout the year, revealing an ongoing struggle to attract deposit 
business sufficient to comfortably meet lending needs.255 By early 1950, 
the need for a larger deposit base was dire. 
Though the bank capital fund had been pronounced “eminently 
‘respectable’” given prevailing circumstances in the 1950 annual report, at 
$11,320,377.13 in capital funds versus $224,875,937.36 of deposits, the 
five percent ratio of capital to deposits remained lower than the pre-war 
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ratio of 7.2 percent.256 In addition to the limited dividends mentioned by 
Bimson in the 1948 annual report, growing the capital account balance to 
a five percent ratio had also required implementing or raising service 
charges on many accounts and other products, and floating two additional 
common stock offerings valued at a total of $2.5 million between 1943 and 
1950.257 New divisions such as the foreign department, founded in 1944 to 
provide international accounts receivable collection, currency exchange 
services, and letters of credit to firms engaged in cross-border trade, also 
assisted in growing the capital account balance. The foreign department 
“built up a substantial volume of earnings” by 1947, and its success 
through 1949 merited another special mention in the 1950 annual report.258 
Nonetheless, generating deposit volume sufficient to meet loan demand 
remained a troubling issue for the bank. 
The need for additional deposits prompted Walter Bimson to 
include an unprecedented plea for business in the 1950 annual report. 
Presented as a means of aiding the economic development of the state, 
Bimson informed readers that, “In order to maintain, and increase, our 
volume of loans and thus continue to provide the life-blood for a growing 
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Arizona, it goes without saying that we must also continue to enlarge our 
volume of deposits.” He continued by reminding the reading audience that, 
“it is to the direct financial advantage of all who live or do business in 
Arizona to increase their funds on deposit with us.” After announcing a 
planned ad campaign designed to underscore the large-scale economic 
significance of banking with the institution through the slogan, “Your 
Dollars Are Working For You, When Deposited In The Valley National 
Bank,” Bimson reiterated the importance of banking with Valley National. 
Imploring, if not pressuring, those reading the report to patronize the bank, 
he closed the section by stating, “Since this is also a matter of personal 
interest to stockholders as well as our staff members, both of these groups 
are urged to participate actively in this campaign.”259 For the marketplace 
outside of those reading the annual report, the company debuted new 
mass-market deposit products that year. 
                                            
259 The plea for additional deposit business found in the 1950 report was 
repeated in the 1951 report, in which Bimson reminded readers, “We cordially invite, and 
urge, each stockholder not only to make personal use of the bank’s services, whenever 
possible, but to ask their friends and relatives to do likewise.” Bimson also used the 1951 
annual report as a forum to express his gratitude to businesses that had increased their 
deposits over the course of 1950. In recognition of this trend, Bimson stated, ”In 
surveying the record results of the past year, I wish to make special mention of the large 
number of business concerns that have increased their deposit balances with us or in 
other ways evidenced a greater measure of interest in Arizona’s financial needs. In 
publicizing Arizona’s growing capital requirements, both long and short term, I am 
pleased to report that we have reached many receptive ears. Sincere thanks to those 
who have listened to our story, and especially to those with sufficient foresight to realize 
the ultimate advantage, to them, of actively contributing to Arizona’s economic 
development.” “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 5-6, VNB 
Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” January 16, 1951, 5, 10, file 




The bank introduced a “Christmas Club” savings account in 1950. 
This goal-oriented savings program required customers to make fifty 
consecutive weeks of deposits in order to reach a stated savings target 
and receive a one percent bonus.260 Though likely a very low margin 
product, if not a loss leader, such accounts did generate new deposit 
activity and provided a reliable supply of funds for a short-term period. The 
“Special Checking Account” was another low-margin product first offered 
in 1950. Unique in its lack of service charges and minimum balance 
requirements, this account was promoted as a product “for persons having 
a limited need for bank checking accounts,” and a “means of broadening 
[Valley National’s] scope of service, bringing the safety and convenience 
of a checking account within the reach of thousands.”261 Additional small 
balance accounts introduced during this period include the “Baby’s Bank 
Book” passbook savings account offered to new parents, the success of 
which was featured by passbook printing company John Rosen 
Advertising Reminders in a 1953 Banking advertisement.262 The limited 
yield potential of products such as the Special Checking Account, 
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Christmas Club savings account, and Baby’s Bank Book account is 
consistent with Walter Bimson’s 1950 annual report description of the 
value of drawing new deposits.  
Explaining,  
deposits turn over, on the average, once every month- or twelve 
times a year. Much of this activity, of course, produces little or no 
direct income for the bank, being primarily an accommodation or 
convenience to the residents and businesses of the state. However, 
the ready flow of money and credit is necessary to the economic 
health and growth of every community. This, in turn, makes it 
possible for the bank to operate safely and profitably,263  
Bimson walked stockholders through the necessity of maintaining and 
growing a healthy deposit base. Operating safely includes maintaining a 
strong capital fund, a task cited as “a continuous management problem” in 
the 1951 annual report. Indeed, ensuring a capital fund balance 
commensurate to the amount of deposits held and loans extended posed 
a challenge for the bank throughout the subject period. Official word that 
the “capital position should be reasonably comfortable from this point on” 
was finally given in early 1954, capping a decade of struggles and 
limitations.264 Although dire in nature, the challenges faced by the bank 
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during this period were masked by the generally positive, albeit somewhat 
deceptive, production results posted throughout the immediate post-war 
years.  
With the exception of 1949, year-over-year deposit totals increased 
throughout the subject period. The total number of open accounts grew 
significantly year-over-year without exception, though new checking 
account production was inconsistent year-over-year. The average 
checking account balance recorded throughout the period remained 
relatively stable, with the end of 1952 average balance of $1,827 slightly 
lower than the average end of 1945 balance of $1,868. After peaking at an 
$867 average balance in 1946, average savings account balances 
dropped considerably, and, with the exception of a slight increase 
between 1951 and 1952, consistently. By the end of the subject period, 
the average savings account carried a balance of $656, a figure twenty-
four percent lower than the 1946 high. Thus, while the number of accounts 
held at Valley National grew from 84,040 on January 1, 1944 to 209,856 
on December 31, 1952, the relative value of each account declined 
throughout the period, reducing the already limited margin potential of 
most deposit products and hampering bank lending capabilities.265 
Therefore, the much-touted growth in deposit account numbers and 
deposit dollar totals in the immediate post-war period does not represent 
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an unmitigated success. As average balances decreased, deposit 
operations grew less profitable and compelled bank leadership to devote 
more resources to the solicitation and retention of an increasing number of 
low-balance accounts. Restrained lending ability further impacted profit 
potential, and likely influenced the loan product types embraced by the 
bank during this period. 
Loan products consistently contributed more to annual revenues 
than any other operational category, averaging approximately two-thirds of 
gross income recorded in each year of the period of study.266 Though 
constrained by funding limitations, Valley National lending operations grew 
at a dizzying pace in the immediate post-war years, quickly outpacing the 
volume and return of significant wartime lending to the federal 
government. By the end of 1945, Arizona banks held a total of $202.1 
million in government securities, an increase of 1,200 percent from the 
1939 total.267 Of this total, Valley National held $103,019,285, a figure 
more than twice as large as all other loan categories combined. Within the 
span of one year, the gulf between government security holdings and 
dollars extended for all other loan types shrank dramatically, with 
government loan totals decreasing to $93,122,054 compared to consumer 
and corporate lending activity increasing from $48,585,429.21 to 
$78,351,199.28. By the end of 1947, other lending category volume 
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totaled $108,818,488.93, surpassing government security holdings totaling 
$66,949,550. The 1948 annual report attributed the reduction in 
government debt holdings to increasing statewide loan demand.268 Initially, 
a large percentage of the loans issued with funds formerly dedicated to 
government securities were government agency-backed mortgages, thus 
continuing a Valley National practice originating in the mid-1930s.269 
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269 Prior to Executive Order 11063 (November 20, 1962), the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974, as amended in 1976, and the Community Reinvestment Act of 
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period Valley National mortgagor demographics and whether the bank or individuals in its 
employ engaged in discriminatory lending practices are important, though such questions 
prove difficult, if not impossible, to answer definitively. In the Phoenix market, as well as 
many others across the nation, minorities seeking to purchase homes and vacant land 
encountered resistance from home sellers and real estate agents attempting to prevent 
non-Anglos from acquiring property in predominantly Anglo neighborhoods. Although the 
United States Supreme Court ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) prohibited 
racially restrictive covenants, many Phoenix homeowners and real estate agents 
remained steadfast in their opposition to allowing minority buyers to enter Anglo 
neighborhoods for years to come. This “de facto segregation” of post-war Phoenix is 
chronicled in Bradford Luckingham’s Phoenix and Minorities in Phoenix, Matthew 
Whitaker’s Race Work, and two ethnic property historic context reports issued by the 
Phoenix Historic Preservation Office titled Hispanic Historic Property Survey and African 
American Historic Property Survey. Local banks are alleged to have been complicit in the 
effort to maintain existing geographic racial divisions as a result of perceived bias in their 
real estate lending operations. Refusing to issue loans to borrowers residing in areas 
known to have significant minority populations was common throughout the United States 
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government and private financial institutions not to lend in certain neighborhoods 
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lending institutions as tools to determine the value of proposed mortgage collateral, 
assigned different areas within a city letter grades ranging from A to D based upon 
factors including the presence of minority residents. The Phoenix appraisal map 
characterized neighborhoods with significant minority populations as “hazardous areas,” 
thus establishing or reinforcing a perception of areas such as south Phoenix being 
unworthy of bank attention. Unfortunately, very few subject period Valley National loan 
records exist, thus limiting the possibility of making a determination as to whether the 
 124 
 
Though known for liberal lending policies, as judged by number of 
loans issued and dollar value of said loans, a key plank of Valley National 
post-war lending strategy relied upon conservative, government-backed 
loan programs. Throughout the war, the bank carried a large number of 
Federal Housing Administration-guarantied real estate loans. This lending 
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category accounted for ninety-three percent of outstanding Valley National 
real estate loans in 1942, and over ninety-five percent of outstanding real 
estate loans in 1944.270 Authorized by the National Housing Act of 1934, 
FHA-insured new construction mortgages, or Title II loans, were attainable 
and affordable for customers, and a relatively secure product category for 
financial institutions. This type of loan required a minimum borrower down 
payment of twenty percent and offered a twenty-year amortization term, 
which was an unusually lengthy repayment period at that time.271 Once 
disbursed, lending institutions could sell FHA-backed loans on the 
secondary market to the federal Reconstruction Finance Corporation 
Mortgage Corporation (RFCMC) or the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae), thus further limiting risk and allowing for new 
loan origination. FHA-insured loans could also be marketed to private 
firms on the secondary market, though that marketplace expanded and 
contracted in response to prevailing economic conditions more swiftly than 
the government agency marketplace.272 Following passage of the GI Bill, 
Veterans Administration-insured mortgages, or VA loans, added to the mix 
of government-backed products offered by lenders. 
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VA loans were issued with a fifty percent government guaranty to a 
maximum amount of $4,000, a four percent interest rate, twenty-five 
amortization terms, and a more liberal loan-to-value ratio than FHA 
loans.273 The favorable borrowing terms associated with this loan product 
generated strong initial interest. In the 1945 annual report, Walter Bimson 
cited the fact that “applicants are coming in daily asking for the 
accommodations they are told are available to them under this legislation” 
as evidence of the potential demand for VA loans, though he 
acknowledged that lending volume was likely to be low until Congress 
reworked specific provisions of the program.274 This prediction proved 
correct both nationally and locally as VA loans accounted for only three 
percent of mortgages issued nationwide in 1945, and just over one 
percent of mortgages held by the bank at the end of that year.275 However, 
Valley National VA loan production spiked in 1946 and 1947, rising from 
$99,633.85 in 1945 to $8,974,599.33 in 1947.276 This volume increase, 
however, was to be short-lived. 
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The RFCMC was dissolved in June of 1947, eliminating the federal 
agency secondary market for VA loans until Fannie Mae began 
purchasing such loans on July 1, 1948.277 The resulting absence of a 
reliable secondary market slowed VA loan origination. During the same 
period, interest rates on conventional mortgage products increased to a 
level higher than the maximum legal VA loan rate of four percent, further 
hampering VA loan availability as many banks opted to pursue higher 
margin lending opportunities.278 Both factors likely served to limit the 
potential of this promising government-backed product.  
Accordingly, after a rapid and significant increase of $8,965,060, or 
nearly 9,000 percent, in outstanding VA loan totals between the end of 
1945 and the end of 1948, Valley National year-end outstanding VA loan 
totals dropped each remaining year of the subject period, with the 
exception of 1951. This trend is inconsistent with total outstanding real 
estate loan figures reported by the bank, which increased every year from 
1944 to 1953.279 The 1948 annual report marks the last mention of the GI 
Bank found in the corporate archives, indicating that both the GI 
department and the institutional emphasis on VA loans may have been 
dropped due to interest rate concerns, secondary market difficulties, or a 
                                            
277 Saulnier, 81. 
 
278 Hickman, 67. 
 
279 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1954, 19, VNB Collection.  
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combination of the aforementioned reasons.280 However, the decline in VA 
loan volume does not indicate an overall decline in loan demand on the 
part of veterans and other clients. Instead, true to Leggett’s wartime 
predictions regarding peacetime lending volume, people could and did 
borrow vast sums in the immediate postwar years. 
As was the case nationwide, much of this lending volume involved 
federally insured mortgage products. Overall, the amount of government-
backed lending programs increased in volume from 2.2 percent of national 
gross domestic product in 1945 to 3.8 percent of gross domestic product 
in 1953. The resulting impact of federal loan programs on the national 
housing market was significant. During the subject period, approximately 
forty percent of all new single and double family home construction 
nationwide was financed by FHA or VA loans. This figure was likely much 
greater in communities such as Phoenix and Tucson as metropolitan 
areas recorded higher percentages of government-backed loan usage 
than smaller towns, which tended to demonstrate a preference for 
conventional mortgages.281 Markets such as Phoenix provided ample 
potential for mortgage lending. Between 1940 and 1950, the number of 
housing units in Maricopa County alone rose from 54,358 to 108,162, an 
increase of ninety-nine percent.282 In order to meet the borrowing needs of 
                                            
280 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1948, 3, VNB Collection. 
 
281 Klebaner, American Commercial Banking, 245; Saulnier, 52, 55. 
 
282 Pumo, 48. 
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the newcomers purchasing these homes, Valley National management 
embraced the stability of FHA loans. 
Bank leaders trumpeted the high ratio of relatively safe 
government-backed loans carried by the institution in annual reports and 
external correspondence regarding corporate strategy and share 
valuation. In a 1953 letter to Connecticut investment analyst Arthur W. 
Frank, Jr., Walter Bimson explained, “Practically the only real estate loans 
made by our bank are FHA insured loans. These loans have two distinct 
advantages. They are more readily saleable than conventional loans and 
they are classified by the examiners as non-risk loans.”283 By the end of 
the subject period, the bank’s emphasis on FHA loans was clear as such 
loans accounted for seventy-four percent of all outstanding real estate 
loans, though true FHA loan volume was likely significantly higher as the 
bank sold an average of fifty percent of FHA loans issued annually on the 
secondary market.284 However, as a result of competitive forces and 
regulatory restraints, Valley National likely issued far fewer FHA loans 
than desired given the salability and security of this loan type. 
Regulatory lending ratios such as the federal requirement that real 
estate loans not exceed sixty percent of time deposits held by an 
institution limited loan production by restraining capacity throughout the 
                                            
283 Walter Bimson to Arthur W. Frank, Jr., August 17, 1953, file 442, VNB 
Collection. 
 
284 Outstanding FHA loans totaled $24,975,012 versus a total outstanding real 
estate loan balance of $33,696,873 on December 31, 1953. “President’s Annual Report 
to the Stockholders,” 1954, 19, VNB Collection.  
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period of study. Acknowledging such challenges in the 1953 annual report, 
Walter Bimson informed shareholders that a significant portion of 
mortgage loans issued by the bank had been sold “to out-of-state 
investors in order to keep within legal loaning limits.” Efforts to cap 
outstanding loan amounts also included a 1949 effort at lending restraint 
discussed in a letter between Walter Bimson and Frank, in which Bimson 
stated the bank “purposely restricted new loans” in order to reduce its 
loans to deposits ratio, as outstanding loans equaled fifty-two percent of 
total deposits held at the end of 1948. This ratio exceeded the fifty percent 
goal mentioned by Bimson in the 1950 annual report.285 However, even if 
generating deposit volume and capital account balances sufficient to meet 
all loan demands did not present an issue, growing competition from other 
commercial banks and new entities executing more efficient business 
models alone likely would have hamstrung Valley National lending 
operations. 
  In the immediate post-war years, the First National Bank of 
Arizona and the Bank of Douglas both expanded aggressively, with First 
National growing throughout the state and the Bank of Douglas focusing 
on the Phoenix area. The Phoenix presence of the Bank of Douglas posed 
a particular competitive challenge in the largest market in Arizona as that 
                                            
285 In the sentence following the announcement of mortgage sales to out-of-state 
investors, the practice of selling loans was presented as a means of aiding the state, as, 
“By this process, we are instrumental in obtaining substantial amounts of long term 
capital from outside sources to assist in the development of our state.” Doti, “Financing 
the Postwar,” 187; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 5-6, VNB 
Collection; W. Bimson to Frank, August 17, 1953, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 5, VNB Collection.  
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institution held a state charter as opposed to a national charter. This 
charter status allowed that bank more liberal lending allowances than 
those permitted for nationally chartered banks such as Valley National.286 
Savings and loans also sought a share of the Arizona mortgage market, 
though their impact was rather nominal. Two savings and loans were in 
operation in Phoenix in 1946, with the number increasing to five by 1953. 
Combined, these institutions provided $23 million of mortgages in 1953. 
This aggregate amount is less than the same year mortgage holdings of 
the A. B. Robbs Agencies, a Valley National competitor using a new and 
innovative business model to generate significant mortgage loan totals 
during this period.287 
  This new model had been foreseen by Herbert Leggett as early as 
1945, when he cautioned Walter Bimson, “insurance companies are 
getting more and more into the banking business.”288 In the 1954 annual 
report, Walter Bimson informed shareholders that “savings banks and 
insurance companies in New York and New England” had been 
purchasing Valley National mortgage loans on the secondary market since 
at least the late 1930s.289 One of these East Coast insurance firms gained 
                                            
286 By the late 1940s, the Bank of Douglas moved their headquarters to Phoenix, 
thus bolstering their presence in the financial capital of the state. Schweikart, A History, 
117-119; Doti, “Financing the Postwar,” 184-185. 
 
287 Doti, “Financing the Postwar,” 184-185. 
 
288 Leggett to W. Bimson, April 16, 1945, file 509, VNB Collection. 
 
289 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1954, 3, VNB Collection.  
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a direct conduit to the Arizona mortgage market in the immediate post-war 
years, thus changing the local mortgage landscape. 
In 1947, insurance provider National Life of Vermont designated 
Phoenix insurance broker A. B. Robbs, Jr. its Arizona correspondent, 
granting him authority to broker National Life-funded mortgage loans to 
local borrowers through the A. B. Robbs Agencies. This business 
arrangement provided National Life direct access to the booming Arizona 
mortgage market. As Robbs’ company closed loans funded with outside 
capital and was not chartered as a bank, it did not need to seek depositors 
or comply with required capital account ratios, allowing for minimal startup 
and operational expenses and ensuring a healthy margin on each 
transaction brokered. In exchange for processing and closing mortgages, 
the firm received a two percent origination fee from borrowers, a one-time 
fee of three percent of loan proceeds on VA loans or four percent on FHA 
loans, and an annual fee of one-half of a percent of loan value for 
servicing the loans. Additional revenue was generated through a joint 
venture company aimed at meeting borrowers’ insurance needs.290 This 
lucrative structure operated efficiently and effectively for the Robbs 
Agencies and National Life. 
                                            
290 The A. B. Robbs Agencies began operating under the name A. B. Robbs 
Trust Company in 1958. The firm opened Continental National Bank, a commercial 
banking endeavor, in 1964. Doti, Banking in the American West, 159; Schweikart, That 
Quality Image, 1-9, 11; Doti “Financing the Postwar,” 179. 
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Between 1947 and 1950, the Robbs Agencies originated and 
serviced more than $12 million in mortgages on behalf of National Life.291 
Though a small amount compared to the volume posted by Valley 
National, the differing business models likely ensured Robbs a far higher 
margin on each transaction. By 1950, Robbs Agencies gained an FHA 
charter, allowing it to act independently of National Life and locate 
additional sources of loan funding. Institutions working with Robbs 
eventually grew to include sizeable East Coast insurance firms such as 
Travelers, John Hancock, and Paul Revere, as well as many New York-
based banks.292 Robbs Agencies business was likely aided by a long-
strained relationship between Phoenix homebuilders and the “abrasive 
and opinionated” lead Valley National loan officer.293 Indeed, even 
longtime Valley National client Del Webb, a bank board member from 
1951 onward, obtained financing through the Robbs Agencies.294 By the 
end of 1953, Robbs serviced over $30 million of mortgages for secondary 
market investors, though the amount sold through that date is likely much 
larger.295 Given the profitability, volume potential, and relative ease of 
                                            
291 Doti, Banking in the American West, 159. 
 
292 Schweikart, That Quality Image, 5-6. 
 
293 Ibid., 6; Doti, “Financing the Postwar,” 182. 
 
294 Larry Schweikart, “Financing the Urban Frontier: Entrepreneurial Creativity 
and Western Cities, 1945-1975,” Urban Studies 26 (1): 180. 
 
295 Many questions exist regarding the actual volume of loan production at the A. 
B. Robbs Agencies. Throughout the subject period, the Robbs firm was privately held, 
with Robbs, Jr. and his parents A. B. Robbs, Sr. and Beulah Robbs sharing ownership 
through 1952, and Robbs, Jr. gaining one-hundred percent ownership in 1953. As a 
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result, the company was not required to produce an annual report for public distribution, 
thus precluding future researchers from reviewing most annual performance data from 
this period. The issue of limited documentation is compounded by the fact that the 
company is no longer in existence, having been purchased by JPMorgan Chase in 1987. 
Larry Schweikart’s book entitled That Quality Image: The History of Continental Bank 
does provide information relating to the activities of the company in the late 1940s and 
early 1950s. However, this information does not substitute for the detail found in most 
annual reports. The primary unanswered question is one of volume and ranking. Sources 
such as Schweikart’s chapter entitled “A Record of Revitalization: Financial Leadership in 
Phoenix” found in G. Wesley Johnson’s Phoenix in the Twentieth Century: Essays in 
Community History cite Robbs as the leading mortgage lender in Arizona by 1953. 
Specifically, Schweikart writes: “in 1953 [Robbs] had 30 million dollars’ worth of 
mortgages and had long surpassed mighty Valley Bank as the leading mortgage lender in 
the state.” A 1989 Pacific Historical Review article co-authored by Schweikart and Lynne 
Pierson Doti claims, “in 1953 the Robbs Company alone loaned $30 million.” However, 
the information is presented slightly differently in That Quality Image, which reads: “By 
1953 these secondary market sources had purchased over $30,000,000 worth of 
mortgages,” seemingly indicating that the total value of all mortgages purchased from 
Robbs through 1953 totaled $30 million. This information is presented in a passage 
discussing secondary market investors secured by Robbs after obtaining an FHA charter 
in 1950. Thus, it is possible that this figure refers to the value of loans funded from 1950 
through 1953. However, the $30 million figure may also be derived from a table of 
outstanding Robbs Agencies loan values as of December 31, 1953 copied from the A. B. 
Robbs ledger and included in That Quality Image. On this table, National Life of Vermont 
is listed as owning $2,798,776.64 in outstanding mortgages. However, between 1947 and 
1950, Robbs originated over $12,000,000 in mortgage loans on behalf on National Life. 
Therefore, given the lengthy amortization terms of FHA and VA loans, this figure may 
represent the amount sold to National Life by Robbs after obtaining a charter in 1950, or 
the amount of loans closed for National Life in 1953, but is unlikely to represent the total 
value of outstanding loans closed for National Life since 1947. If ranking is to be based 
on outstanding balances as of the end of 1953, Valley National triumphs over Robbs with 
$33,099,623 in real estate loans outstanding. When including Valley National originated-
loans sold on the secondary market but still serviced by the bank, by the end of 1953, 
Valley National was servicing $73,286,039 worth of real estate loans. It is important to 
note that the Robbs business model called for all loans to be sold, thereby avoiding 
holding any notes in the company portfolio. If Robbs did, in fact, originate $30 million 
worth of loans in 1953, they may have bested Valley National. In the 1954 annual report, 
Walter Bimson announced the sale of $14,462,000 worth of mortgages over the course of 
1953, and stated, “Since we started making FHA loans seventeen years ago, we have 
disposed of approximately 50% of our loans in this way.” If the $14,462,000 figure 
represents half of all real estate loans issued in 1953, then the full amount issued that 
year totaled $28,924,000, or over $1 million less than the $30 million cited for Robbs. 
However, if Bimson was referring solely to the percentage of FHA loans sold on the 
secondary market, and not the percentage of all real estate loans sold, it is possible that 
Valley National produced more than Robbs. Schweikart, That Quality Image, 3-9; “Chase 
to Buy Arizona Bank,” New York Times, October 18, 1985; Schweikart, “A Record of 
Revitalization,” 133; Doti, “Financing the Postwar,” 185; “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1954, 3, VNB Collection.   
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operation associated with this business model, outfits such as the Robbs 
Agencies posed a clear threat to the lending divisions of large commercial 
banks such as Valley National.  
FHA loans, though low risk, required a long-term capital 
commitment when retained in bank portfolios and offered relatively small 
margins due to low average rates and government insurance premium 
costs. Although Valley National recorded few losses associated with FHA 
loans, ongoing loan funding challenges, relatively low rates of return 
compared to other lending products, a 1949 real estate market plateau, 
and increased competition from other banks and non-banks such as the 
Robbs Agencies ultimately reduced the appeal and volume of such loans. 
This decreased emphasis on FHA loans was consistent with an industry 
wide decline in real estate lending of all types, resulting in banks being 
outpaced by other mortgage providers after 1950.296 Nationwide, banks 
even limited participation in the government-backed mortgage programs 
once coveted for their stability and salability. Between 1946 and 1965, the 
banking industry share of such loans declined from thirty-seven percent to 
twelve and one-half percent.297 Faced with numerous real estate loan-
related challenges, overall Valley National mortgage lending leveled off by 
the end of the subject period, with the amount of outstanding real estate 
loans carried by Valley National declining from $37,505,058 to 
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$33,696,873 between the end of 1951 and the end of 1953.298 Competitive 
challenges of a different nature frustrated Valley National commercial 
lending efforts during the immediate post-war period. 
With the exception of agricultural loans, which remained a strong 
segment of bank business throughout the immediate post-war period, 
business lending was constrained by both capital limitations and, to a 
more limited degree, direct loan programs offered to businesses by federal 
agencies.299 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was the 
primary federal agency in competition with banks for business loans 
during this period.300 Created in 1932 primarily to aid banks struggling with 
bad assets, the RFC was granted expanded lending authority throughout 
the 1930s and 1940s in order to meet the needs of essential war-related 
                                            
298 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1954, 19, VNB Collection. 
  
299 Actual Valley National agricultural loan volume is unavailable for most years 
as only the outstanding dollar amount as of year-end was typically included in annual 
reports of the period. However, by the end of 1953, the outstanding value of agricultural 
loans, including loans on livestock, crops, farm commodities, farm machinery, and other 
loans to farmers and ranchers, totaled $24,952,594.53, or 18.7 percent of all outstanding 
VNB loans. Outstanding installment loan value totaled $46,201,438.85, total outstanding 
real estate loans held in the bank portfolio totaled $33,696,872.81, and outstanding 
commercial loan balances totaled $22,887,550.39. The fifth lending category, collateral 
loans secured by stocks, bonds, government securities, and other such assets, totaled 
just $5,361,165.99. By nature, agricultural loans were relatively short-term products, with 
crop loans typically due upon harvest and livestock loans often maturing within one year. 
In 1953, Walter Bimson advised investment analyst Arthur Frank, Jr. that Arizona farming 
had likely reached capacity as land was becoming limited and water supply challenges 
constrained further development. Nonetheless, agriculture remained an important 
component of the state economy throughout the subject period. Even in booming 
Maricopa County, agriculture accounted for the largest sector of the local economy until 
1955. “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1954, 19, VNB Collection; Walter 
Bimson to Frank, August 17, 1953, VNB Collection; McCoy, 254. 
 
300 The Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Federal Reserve Banks, and the 
Export-Import Bank all made direct loans to businesses during this period. The RFC lent 
funds at the highest volume, followed by the Export-Import Bank, then the Federal 




industries.301 Though many direct loans issued by the RFC may not have 
been approved by commercial banks due to credit risk factors, RFC 
interest rates often averaged below commercial banking rates, thereby 
enticing even businesses with strong financials to seek RFC funding. The 
RFC did offer loan guaranty programs, though the low interest rates and 
two percent bank premium associated with such loans likely limited their 
appeal and use.302 In general, direct government lending, though 
particularly the RFC program, was wildly unpopular within the banking 
community.  
Many bankers, including Bimson, viewed the RFC and other 
government agencies running direct lending programs as improperly 
competing with private sector banking enterprises. Given the favorable 
borrowing terms associated with such programs, their offerings 
undoubtedly presented a significant challenge to commercial bank 
business lending operations, though the true impact is debatable. 
Nonetheless, the furor of the banking community and others concerned 
about perceived governmental interference in the private market 
eventually led to action at the federal level. Congressional committees 
investigated alleged improprieties at the RFC, and President Truman 
appointed Walter Bimson to the Department of Commerce Small Business 
Advisory Board, which discussed alternatives to the programs then in 
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operation. A plan drafted by the group that came to be known nationally as 
the “Bimson Plan” eventually served as the framework for the Small 
Business Administration, which succeeded the RFC in late 1953.303 
                                            
303 By the late 1940s, several members of Congress expressed concerns relating 
to government competition with private lenders. Allegations that the RFC issued loans to 
business associates of agency insiders, as well as to non-essential businesses such as 
night clubs, movie theaters, casinos, and a snake farm led Senator J. William Fulbright of 
Arkansas to initiate an investigation. The resulting report, entitled “Favoritism and 
Influence,” was regarded by many as the death knell for the beleaguered agency. Bimson 
served as the only banker on the twenty-three member Small Business Advisory Board. 
The report issued by this body presented both the RFC and the Federal Reserve Banks 
industrial loan programs unfavorably, citing inefficiency and other issues. Indeed, the 
body concluded, “many borrowers refuse to subject themselves to the ordeal of trying to 
get a loan from either agency,” though the banking industry clearly felt the competition of 
these agencies sufficient to object to their continued operation. Bimson assisted in 
drafting the Small Business Act of 1950, sometimes known as the Bimson Plan, which 
would have created a federal business loan insurance program in place of widespread 
direct lending. Various versions of the plan would have insured between ninety to ninety-
five percent of eligible loans, capped at a maximum institutional coverage of ten percent 
of all such loans. Banks would have paid a maximum coverage premium of one and one-
half percent. A component of the bill likely as appealing to bankers as the concept of 
government-insured versus direct loans was the provision allowing banks and insurance 
companies to form joint investment concerns not subject to Federal Reserve oversight. If 
allowed, this measure would have allowed banks to circumvent the capital issues that 
severely limited their lending ability during this period. Reaction in the banking community 
was mixed. Though many supported the idea of limiting direct government lending, others 
questioned the need for any government involvement. In a 1950 Changing Times (now 
Kiplinger’s Personal Finance) article entitled “Bankers Going Socialist, Too?,” Louisville 
Trust Company president Earl Muir warned that government lending- both direct loans 
and loan guaranties- “appears to be another foundation stone in the building of a socialist 
state.” In the same issue, Everett D. Reese, president of the Park National Bank of Ohio, 
opined, “Where there is a potential profit, there should be a potential loss,” concluding, “I 
do believe that private industry and banking can work together and accomplish more than 
they will be able to if the government continues its expansion into business.” The Small 
Business Act of 1950 (S. 3625) did not become law. Following its defeat, Bimson 
expressed his belief that the ideas in the bill “aroused considerable opposition, not 
because they were ineffective or unsound, but because they involved the use of a 
government agency and government money to get them started.” He then suggested that 
banks and insurance firms work together to provide insured loans to businesses, which 
he viewed as an alternative to government involvement altogether. The Small Business 
Act of 1953 (P.L. 83-163), which incorporated many of the provisions found in the 1950 
plan, did become law, having been signed by President Truman on July 30, 1953. This 
act abolished the RFC and created the Small Business Administration (SBA), which is 
still in operation today. RFC lending authority expired on September 28, 1953. SBA 
lending began slowly, with only $5,000,000 in loans outstanding by mid-1954. During the 
hearings for the 1953 bill, representatives of the American Bankers Association testified 
in opposition to the creation of a new agency, but in support of abolishing the RFC. 
Saulnier, 218, 400, 425-426; Parris, 14, 21, 25; “U.S. Insured Loans Small Lines’ Aim,” 
New York Times, December 7, 1949, 49; Schweikart, A History, 123; Walter Bimson, “A 
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However, it is unlikely that federal direct lending programs posed the level 
of threat indicated by many in the banking industry. While RFC loan terms 
were difficult to match, post-war capital challenges, salability concerns, 
and product profitability considerations also likely factored into the volume 
of business loans provided by banks such as Valley National.   
RFC loans tended to be larger than business loans issued by 
commercial banks. In 1946, the average commercial bank business loan 
totaled $27,000, though the majority such loans were far smaller. RFC 
loans issued between 1935 and 1951 averaged $70,000, and industrial 
loans issued by the Federal Reserve Banks averaged $175,000 through 
1950.304 By early 1945, most commercial loans carried on Valley National 
books had been issued to small businesses. At that time, the bank was 
“actively soliciting loans to small businesses, for reconversion and other 
                                                                                                                       
Plan for Aiding Small Business: Condensation of Proposal to Small Business Advisory 
Committee of the Department of Commerce and Presented to the Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report,” Northwestern Banker, February 1950, 16-17, 54-55; Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, Small Business Act of 1950: Hearings on S. 529, 
S. 2943, S. 2947, S. 2975, S. 3386, and S. 3625, Bills to Make Capital and Credit 
Available for Financing Small Business, Part 1, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1950, 55; Herbert E. 
Dougall, “Government Financial Aid to Small Business: Summary and Conclusions,” 
Journal of Finance 6 (June 1951): 158-159; “Small Business Loans, Government Insured: 
The Idea is Gaining Ground,” Changing Times, April 1950, 29; “Bimson Plan for Business 
Aid Explained,” Arizona Republic, March 3, 1950; Walter Bimson, “Small Business Loan 
Insurance Plan Would Aid Bank Earnings,” American Banker, December 16, 1949; 
“Bimson-Miller Loan Plan Put to Congress,” Arizona Republic, December 7, 1949; 
“Bimson Loan Plan Draws Split Reaction,” Phoenix Gazette, May 6, 1950; Earl R. Muir, 
“Bankers Going Socialist, Too?,” Changing Times, June 1950, 25; Everett D. Reese, 
“Banks and Small Business,” Changing Times, June 1950, 48; Klebaner, American 
Commercial Banking, 198; “Bimson Urges Plan for Small Business,” Phoenix Gazette, 
October 6, 1950; George F. Break, Federal Lending and Economic Stability (Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution, 1965), 91-92. 
 




purposes, now, as well as in the [post] war period.”305 Demand for such 
loans was anticipated to be significant following the war. During the war 
years, many one-man businesses closed as a result of material 
restrictions or the owner being called to war, allowing for tremendous 
peacetime opportunities in fields lacking strong competition. Business 
failure statistics further underscore post-war small enterprise prospects. 
By 1944, business failures were exceedingly rare, averaging 
approximately one hundred per month nationwide. This figure indicates 
that restrictions on materials and consumption ensured that primarily 
essential industries remained in operation at that point, leaving significant 
opportunities for post-war entrepreneurs and bankers.306 However, while 
Valley National was quick to capitalize on business lending opportunities 
in the years immediately following the war, commercial loan volume and 
relative significance soon declined. 
The bank ended 1944 with $7,434,737.59 worth of outstanding 
business loans. By the end of 1945, the amount of business loans 
outstanding increased to $13,262,580.71. In addition to extending credit 
directly to businesses, the bank also participated to a limited degree in 
state and regional banking credit pools designed to meet large or 
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potentially risky commercial credit requests.307 Outstanding Valley National 
business loans reached a subject period high of $33,269,516.43 by 
December 1948, then dropped by nearly one-third the following year. 
Though some recovery was made in 1950, dollar volume remained in the 
low to mid-$20 million range through 1953. As a percentage of total loan 
dollars outstanding, Valley National commercial lending decreased in 
relative significance from a subject period high of 36.7 percent of all loans 
held by the institution at the end of 1946 to 15.9 percent by the beginning 
of 1953. However, national figures reflect a net increase in bank credit to 
businesses for each year but 1949.308 Thus, it seems likely that the funding 
limitations plaguing Valley National during this period impacted not only 
mortgage lending ability, but also business lending capacity.  
                                            
307 The American Bankers Association put forth the idea of bank-run business 
credit pools in 1944 as a goal of its Post-War Credit Commission for Small Business. 
Leggett viewed such pools as an opportunity for the banking industry to maintain a strong 
lending presence in the face of government and insurance firm competition. Beginning in 
1945, Valley National participated in a $1,000,000 credit pool run by Arizona banks, and 
contributed $1,000,000 to a Pacific region pool. Such pools were widespread immediately 
following the war, with forty-eight regional pools offering $670 million in financing by early 
1946. “Post-War Credit Commission for Small Business,” Banking, May 1944, 21; Leggett 
to Walter Bimson, April 16, 1945, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1945, 4, VNB Collection; Saulnier, 217. 
   
308 Percentage of total outstanding loan dollars figures obtained from “Loans as 
of…” tables printed in the 1945 and 1946 VNB annual reports, and the “Distribution of 
Loans” tables printed in the 1947-1953 VNB annual reports. “President’s Annual Report 
to the Stockholders,” 1945, 10, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1946, 9, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 
1947, 12, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1948, 10, 
VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1949, 15, VNB 
Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 12, VNB Collection; 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1951, 12, VNB Collection; “President’s 
Annual Report to the Stockholders,” January 15, 1952, 21, file 1031A, VNB Collection; 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 21, VNB Collection. National bank 
credit information taken from “Corporate Business” line of “Table 33- Bank Credit, A. 
Annual changes, in billions of dollars” found in Flow of Funds, 188.  
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Given the general increase in business lending nationwide and the 
stated desire of Bimson and Leggett to pursue small business loans, the 
plateau in dollar amounts outstanding and the decline in category 
significance when measured in percentage terms appears illogical. 
However, if viewed through the context of prioritization of limited lending 
capacity, the trend is rational. Faced with competition from government 
direct lending programs, a lack of secondary market buyers for 
commercial loans, and limited amounts of capital available to fulfill all 
manners of loan requests, Valley National commercial lending arguably 
presented a greater challenge than residential lending. However, lending 
was and is an essential component of bank profitability. Deposit 
operations, in addition to being the “convenience to the residents and 
businesses of the state” described by Bimson in the 1950 annual report, 
existed to fund bank loan and investment programs.309 As subject period 
commercial bank revenue and profitability were driven primarily by lending 
operations, identifying and executing a practicable lending strategy was 
essential. In the case of Valley National, this strategy relied on a product 
first offered by the bank in the mid-1930s. 
Valley National had offered installment loans, or short-term 
extensions of credit granted at relatively high rates to low-to-middle 
income borrowers for the purchase of consumer goods or other needs 
                                            




since 1936.310 The bank also extended installment credit to small 
businessmen and farmers seeking to purchase equipment or cover other 
business expenses.311 Compared to government-backed mortgage rates in 
the range of four to five percent throughout the subject period, the eight 
percent installment loan rate allowed by Arizona law provided a higher 
yielding option for the limited funds available for lending operations in the 
immediate post-war years.312 Thus, the continuation of installment lending 
operations provided the bank an appealing means of generating 
significant revenue through a high demand, comparatively low dollar loan 
product issued with relatively short maturity periods, thus ensuring greater 
flexibility for limited lending funds than longer term loan products.  
In the same 1944 memo to Walter Bimson in which he pronounced 
post-war loan predictions to be “grossly underestimated by most 
‘authorities’,” Leggett issued an optimistic prediction relating to Valley 
National installment lending volume. Citing an increased money supply, 
                                            
310 The term installment loan technically refers to any loan repaid over a pre-
determined length of time through regular principal and interest payments. As such, 
purchase mortgages may be referred to as installment loans. For the purposes of this 
project, the term is used to refer to loans offered through the VNB Installment Loan 
Department, which included FHA Title I home improvement loans secured by previously 
purchased residences, automobile loans, and other installment loans, which could be 
secured or unsecured. Purchase money mortgages and mortgage refinances are not 
considered installment loans for the purpose of this study as these loans types were 
offered through a different VNB channel. Carl Bimson, Transformation, 21. 
 
311 The bulk of VNB installment loans were made to individuals, but the flexibility 
of the product allowed for its use across lines of business. Walter Bimson acknowledged 
this in the 1953 annual report, in which he said, “While most of these loans are to 
individuals, this department also extends credit to many small businesses and assists in 
the financing of farm and industrial equipment.” “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1953, 6, VNB Collection. 
  




historically low interest rates, and his perception that, “People have a lot of 
‘wants’,” Leggett called for a possible tripling of installment lending 
between the beginning of 1944 and the end of 1946. His prediction was 
borne out by market demand, which resulted in a 1946 installment loan 
year-end total of $10,968,137, or more than triple the December 31, 1943 
outstanding total of $2,860,202.08.313  
Both individual consumers and entrepreneurs sought installment 
loans, with young newlywed couples of the period likely using installment 
financing to purchase durable goods and other household items, and 
small business owners relying upon installment lending to acquire the 
tools and equipment necessary for business success.314 Indeed, as 
declared by Walter Bimson in the 1950 annual report, short-term 
installment lending, which was “usefully serving the great mass of people 
with modest incomes, [had] become almost an institution in the American 
scheme of living.”315 This “institution,” embraced by Valley National prior to 
adoption by most other commercial banks, was a clear opportunity for the 
company in the post-war period. In a time when the long-term, capital 
intense, relatively low return nature of mortgage and commercial loans 
                                            
313 Leggett predicted that installment lending totals may reach $10,000,000 by 
the end of 1946, as opposed to the December 31, 1943 total of $2,860,202.08. In the 
memo, Leggett erroneously cited the 1943 year-end total as $2,600,000. “President’s 
Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1945, 18, VNB Collection; “RE: THE OUTLOOK 
FOR BANK LOANS,” September 9, 1944, VNB Collection. 
  
314 Hickman, 250-251; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 6, 
VNB Collection. 
 




challenged the viability of such products, the short-term, high return nature 
of the installment lending market presented an appeal to profit-minded 
Valley National executives. Further adding to the appeal of this loan 
category was its protected nature, ensuring limited competition for the 
bank. 
Through at least July 1952, Arizona was one of just three states 
that had not liberalized the original terms of the Uniform Small Loan Law 
of 1916, meaning that consumer finance companies operating in the state 
could not lend more than $300 per borrower, though commercial banks 
were allowed to do so.316 In the period between 1916 and 1953, 
inflationary pressures had reduced the purchasing power of $300 by 
nearly sixty percent, thus requiring a minimum legal limit of $735 just to 
maintain parity with the original value of the 1916 consumer finance 
company loan cap.317 This outdated law alone likely directed post-war 
borrowers to Valley National and other commercial banks given the 
reduced economic impact of consumer finance company loans. By the 
end of 1952, the average amount of a Valley National installment loan 
exceeded $688, or more than twice the maximum allowable loan amount 
                                            
316 Clyde William Phelps, “Consumer Finance Company Charges: II,” Journal of 
Marketing 17 (July 1952): 36. 
 
317 Difference in purchasing power obtained through use of the U.S. Department 
of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics online CPI Inflation Calculator. Calculation run: $300 
in 1916 has the same purchasing power as X in 1953. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
“Inflation Calculator: Bureau of Labor Statistics,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, 




of a finance company operating in Arizona, but less than state-mandated 
$1,000 cap on commercial bank installment loans.318 
Installment lending, particularly that of Valley National, has been 
credited with providing the financing for an eighty percent increase in 
statewide air conditioning unit sales between 1940 and 1951, as well as 
the rapidly increasing car ownership rates recorded during the period.319 In 
addition to the large demand for installment loans to be used for the 
purchase of such products, the installment lending category held value as 
a relatively recession-proof area of operations. During the post-war period, 
as is the case during all eras, the national economy expanded and 
contracted, impacting disposable personal income and the purchase of 
services and durable and nondurable goods. However, despite fluctuating 
economic indicators throughout the subject period, Valley National 
installment lending increased in both dollar amount of new loans issued 
and dollar amount of loans outstanding at year-end for each full year of 
the period of study.320 In addition to strong demand, installment loans also 
                                            
318 Valley National issued 105,323 installment loans in 1952 totaling $72,526,200. 
Total amount divided by number of loans equals $688.607426677. “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 18, VNB Collection; Schweikart, A History, 106. 
 
319 Schweikart, A History, 115, 159. 
 
320 The amount of new installment loans issued grew consistently from a total of 
$7,032,189 in 1944 to $72,526,200 in 1952, the last full year of the study. The amount of 
new installment credit issued in 1953 dropped to $70,042,641, marking the first such 
decline of the post-war period. The amount of year-end outstanding installment credit 
also increased consistently in the post-war years, from $2,860,202 on December 31, 
1943 to $44,552,461 at the end of 1952. Though 1953 installment lending activity 
decreased, the dollar value of installment loans outstanding at the end of year increased 
from the 1952 year-end total, reaching $46,201,439. Hickman, 24-25, 260; “President’s 
Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1954, 20, VNB Collection. 
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offered the bank stability and profitability as a result of short contract 
terms, low average default rates, and yields higher than those available 
through government-secured mortgage or commercial lending options. 
The contract term of Valley National installment loans averaged just 
seven months, permitting for greater flexibility in adjusting loan volume to 
capital availability than longer-term mortgage or commercial loans.321 This 
short principal repayment period also helped to protect the bank from rate 
spread risk, as short-term installment loans were more likely to return a 
rate of interest comparable to prevailing market conditions, whereas 
extended term fixed-rate loans entailed the potential for lost revenue 
should the bank find itself in an increasing rate environment. Despite a 
customer base of modest means and contract collateral far more difficult 
to seize than real estate, Valley National installment loan losses remained 
exceedingly low throughout the subject period. Indeed, during the 1940s, 
the bank lost just thirteen one-hundredths of a percent on installment 
lending, while the loss rate from the beginning of the program through 
1952 was just one-eighth of one percent.322 Bimson attributed the low 
delinquency rates to a rigorous applicant appraisal process, stating, “The 
soundness of these appraisals is indicated by the very low rate of 
delinquency on the part of our customers and the negligible amount of 
                                            
321 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 6, VNB Collection. 
  
322 “VOLUME OF LOANS AND LOSSES,” ca. 1950, file 496, VNB Collection; 




losses experienced by this department.”323 Though the rates of default 
through the 1940s exceeded the three ten-thousandths of one percent 
rate of loss associated with real estate loans during that period, the higher 
rates assessed for installment loans likely compensated for the increased 
risk profile of this loan type.324 
By nature, installment lending is a higher risk activity than financing 
real estate or commercial equipment. In addition to lacking government 
guaranties for all installment products but FHA-insured Title I home 
improvement loans, the collateral used to secure installment contracts 
other than automobile loans is often small and easily concealable. As 
such, the possibility of full or partial reimbursement of bad debt through 
repossession is often negligible. Additionally, the more pressing financial 
circumstances of many installment loan borrowers further complicates the 
overall risk equation. Accordingly, installment loan rates are typically 
higher than rates offered on more stable loan categories. Though no 
records of installment lending rates assessed by Valley National or other 
commercial banks during the period of study have been located, several 
historical sources citing the more costly nature of commercial bank 
installment loan products during this period do verify the higher rate 
                                            
323 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1948, 4, VNB Collection. 
  




structure of such loans.325 In addition to higher interest rates, installment 
loans issued for automobile purchases and other consumer activities 
aside from FHA Title I-related home repairs did not require bank payment 
of an annual insurance premium to a federal loan insurance fund, thus 
further increasing installment lending profit margins. As a result, 
installment loans were the preferred method of revenue generation for the 
bank during the subject period. The short-term nature of the loan category 
made installment lending a viable practice as it allowed the bank flexibility 
with regard to available capital and protected the institution from long-term 
interest rate risk. Though a low-dollar, high-volume product category, such 
loans were also high margin offerings, further incenting the bank to 
aggressively pursue installment lending. This loan type, used to fuel 
economic growth through consumer spending on durable and nondurable 
goods, was also the most attainable and accessible loan product offered 
through the bank, making it an appealing option to customers seeking to 
purchase goods and services in the booming post-war economy, and 
                                            
325 Arizona law allowed for a maximum rate of eight percent, but no VNB 
Collection sources document the actual installment lending rates offered during the 
subject period. Issues of Federal Reserve Charts on Bank Credit, Money Rates, and 
Business and the Federal Reserve Bulletin from the subject period also lack 
documentation of installment loan rates offered by commercial banks. Generally, such 
rates are unavailable for years prior to 1972, when truth-in-lending laws required bank 
disclosure of such rates. Chapman, 50; Sidney Homer and Richard Sylla, A History of 
Interest Rates (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1996), 426. For 
information regarding the higher rates of return on commercial bank installment loans of 
the period, see Reavis Cox, The Economics of Instalment Buying (New York: Ronald 
Press Company, 1948), 310, 345-346; Homer, 424-428; Chapman, 22-23, 37, 166-171, 
188-189; Marshall, 36; Wallace P. Mors, “Commercial Banks and Competitive Trends in 
Consumer Instalment Financing,” The Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 
21 (July 1948): 133-167. 
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further solidifying its importance as a key plank in an ongoing drive to 
grow Valley National market share, revenue, and profitability. 
Overall, the institutional focus on driving growth across 
performance metrics during the immediate post-war years required a 
strong retail orientation in order to increase deposit account numbers and 
balances as a key step in meeting community borrowing needs. Though 
the goal of attaining account unit and balance growth was achieved, this 
accomplishment required an increasing level of work and a decreased 
margin on deposit account operations as low balance account types were 
offered as a means of generating the deposit volume necessary to fund an 
overwhelming volume of loan requests. Given the struggle to raise deposit 
levels sufficient to those required to meet the credit needs of the growing 
market, the immediate post-war years cannot be regarded as entirely 
successful for the bank from the standpoint of deposit and loan 
operations.  
Though deposit volume, loan volume, revenue, and net profits 
generally increased throughout the subject period, shortcomings in 
attracting new deposit dollars at a pace equivalent to community loan 
demand undoubtedly limited the growth and profitability of the institution 
by negatively impacting lending capabilities. Further, the institution was 
hampered by regulatory restraints and both public and private competition. 
FHA and VA loans, both stable albeit relatively low yield products, 
required long-term capital commitments and a deposit volume greater 
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than that found at Valley National during the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
With the advent of savings and loans, established commercial banks from 
elsewhere in the state entering the Phoenix market, and loan brokers such 
as A. B. Robbs, Jr. funneling East Coast insurance company funds into 
the residential loan market to issue mortgages free of commercial bank 
deposit requirements, the potential of such products was severely limited. 
While agricultural loans remained an important component of Valley 
National lending operations throughout the period, their absolute and 
relative value declined by the mid-1950s, consistent with Walter Bimson’s 
1953 appraisal of the future of Arizona agriculture.  
Business lending proved challenging for the institution due to 
governmental competition and an inability to fulfill large-dollar loan 
requests. Although Bimson worked to lay the legal foundation for more 
limited direct government lending and greater commercial bank business 
lending through proposed government loan guaranty programs, the impact 
of this effort was not realized during the period of study. Thus, the 
installment loan program initiated by Carl Bimson in 1936 proved critical to 
the success and growth of the institution in the immediate post-war years. 
This high volume, low dollar, short term loan category returned generous 
profits and allowed the bank to maintain and build upon its standing as the 
largest bank in the state and region by providing the funds necessary to 
pursue an aggressive branching and acquisition campaign designed to 
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further solidify the status and profitability of Valley National during the 




GROWING WITH THE STATE: BRANCHING AND ACQUISITION AS A 
MEANS OF EXPANDING MARKET SHARE 
Given Arizona’s terrific post-war economic and population booms, 
Valley National leaders needed to grow the bank’s geographic footprint in 
concert with their efforts to aggressively promote the institution and draw 
in new borrowers and depositors through market-appropriate product 
offerings. Only by expanding to meet the needs of a growing customer 
base could company management hope to maintain and grow their 
position as the dominant financial institution in the state. Ranked as the 
largest bank in Arizona since 1934 and the largest bank in the Rocky 
Mountain West as of 1945, Valley National appeared secure in its position 
within the state financial landscape. However, in 1932, the institution had 
surrendered the top ranking to a competitor as the result of a trying 
economy.326  
Though post-war economic prospects appeared far more promising 
than the calamitous years of the early 1930s, during the period of rapid 
growth following World War II, the bank was susceptible to losing market 
share to competitors, whether newly established or deep-rooted. Indeed, 
at the close of the war, only four banking offices existed within Phoenix 
                                            
326  The Valley Bank and Trust purchased Consolidated National on November 
21, 1934. However, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had not approved the 
sale by the time the transaction was completed. The institutions officially merged 
following Valley National’s receipt of a national charter on February 11, 1935. Schweikart, 
A History, 102; Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 20; Hopkins, 239-244.  
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city limits while just two operated within Tucson proper. Of these six 
locations, only two were Valley National branches; one in Phoenix and 
one in Tucson.327 In such an environment, a failure to keep up with 
growing demand for banking centers could stunt institutional growth and 
present tremendous opportunities to competitors. Arizona’s liberal bank 
branching laws and surging post-war population growth only compounded 
such opportunity, thereby creating potential for competitors to open new 
branches, expand their footprint, and capture market share. 
 Arizona banking statutes allowed for branching so long as the 
applicant institution met minimum capital requirements and the new 
location would be of “public convenience and advantage.”328 In additional 
to permissive branching standards, Arizona banks benefitted from a post-
war population surge that led to an underserved market, as measured by 
state population per bank office. In 1946, Arizona averaged 14,518 
residents per branch, far surpassing the nationwide average of 8,949 
residents per bank office in states permitting branching.329 This relatively 
open competitive landscape prompted Valley National rivals such as the 
First National Bank of Arizona and the Bank of Douglas to expand 
aggressively in an attempt to grow market share.  
                                            
327 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1952, 6, VNB Collection. 
 
328 Butt, 2, 25. 
 
329 Marshall, 30.  
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First National, owned by multi-state bank holding company 
Transamerica, had been the second largest bank in Arizona since the mid-
1930s. As early as 1937, the institution boasted two offices in Phoenix 
proper.330 Backed by the significant resources and connections of Bank of 
America-affiliated Transamerica, the bank posed a significant competitive 
threat to Valley National.   
Formerly limited in operation to Southern Arizona, the Frank 
Brophy-owned Bank of Douglas expanded into the lucrative Phoenix 
market in 1945. This move proved highly beneficial for the bank, which 
grew its deposits from $15,000,000 to $25,000,000 within the span of two 
years. Given the fact that statewide deposit growth for all banks increased 
by just twenty-five percent between 1945 and 1950, it is clear that the 
Bank of Douglas had zeroed in on the epicenter of Arizona’s post-war 
growth. A rapid growth of population and commerce allowed the bank to 
open an office at Central and Camelback Avenues in the then far northern 
reaches of Phoenix in 1947. The company relocated its headquarters from 
Douglas to Phoenix in 1948, further demonstrating its commitment to the 
booming capital city.331  
                                            
330 Multi-state bank holding company Transamerica was established in 1928 by 
Bank of America founder A. P. Giannini. The corporation served as a holding company 
through which Giannini controlled Bank of America, the First National Bank of Arizona, 
and forty-five other institutions throughout California, Oregon, Washington, and Nevada 
acquired through 1948. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 66; Doti, 
Banking in the American West, 171-172; Phil C. Neal, “The Clayton Act and the 
Transamerica Case,” Stanford Law Review 5 (February 1953): 180, 191-192. 
 
331 The Phoenix location selected for the relocated Bank of Douglas headquarters 
was 44 West Monroe, less than one block from Valley National’s main office in the 
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While Valley National deposits increased every year of the subject 
period with the exception of 1949, its overall market share displayed a 
general, albeit slight, downward trend due to growing competition in its key 
market.332 In addition to the strong focus on promotion and product 
development demonstrated by bank leaders during this period, the clear 
remedy to this dilution of market share was geographic expansion. This 
expansion to meet the needs of a growing population and economy, 
whether accomplished by branching, acquisition, or both, was critical to 
retaining and growing the bank’s industry ranking, institutional profitability, 
and shareholder value.     
Valley National leaders strongly embraced the idea of expansion, 
and placed particular emphasis on the importance of branching. According 
to Walter Bimson, branching brought value and stability to the bank and 
the state economy by incorporating “diversification and flexibility of 
operation” into the company business model. Continuing, Bimson stated, 
“Each of our offices, no matter how small, has behind it the rather 
considerable resources of our entire system. A small local bank in a small 
community can seldom provide the variety of services, the specialized 
                                                                                                                       
Professional Building. The building that housed the Bank of Douglas headquarters has 
since been demolished, and a new high-rise apartment tower named 44 Monroe has 
been erected in its place. The Bank of Douglas changed its name to The Arizona Bank 
on July 15, 1959. Hait, 126-128, 133, 138, 141, 183-184; Federal Reserve Bank of San 
Francisco, Investigation, 7, 54; Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 22; J. Craig Anderson, 
“Downtown Phoenix condos to be converted into apartments,” Arizona Republic, January 
4, 2011, http://www.azcentral.com/business/realestate/articles/2011/01/04/20110104 
downtown-phoenix-condos-converted-into-apartments-44-monroe.html (accessed 
September 12, 2011). 
 
332 Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 50. 
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information or the loaning capacity that a larger organization like ours 
does.” Emphasizing the value of branching to state economies, he 
stressed that the seven states experiencing the greatest levels of post-war 
growth also allowed for full or partial branch banking.333 Purdue University 
economics professor Rollin Thomas echoed Bimson’s branching claims in 
Modern Banking, a 1946 text in which he highlighted diversification of risk, 
standardization of interest rates, and greater accessibility to banking 
services when measured by the size of local populations served by each 
branch. Addressing branching concerns, Thomas pointed out higher staff 
turnover rates, a funneling of funds away from rural communities in favor 
of larger markets, and market dominance issues as potential downsides of 
branch banking, though he deemphasized his list of potential drawbacks 
as “hardly sufficient to constitute a serious criticism of branch banking.”334 
Valley National leadership clearly perceived branching as a means of 
bringing value to both the institution and the community, as demonstrated 
by Bimson’s defense of the practice. However, the bank faced serious 
hurdles in its attempt to expand through branching.  
 Expansion by means of de novo offices can result in opportunities 
for deposit and loan growth, greater institutional name recognition, and 
                                            
333 Regarding state growth and branch banking, Bimson said, “it is more than 
coincidence, in our opinion, that six of the seven states which lead the nation in growth 
are branch banking states, while the seventh (Florida) has a type of chain banking 
possessing some of the same advantages.” “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1951, 9, VNB Collection. 
 




retention or growth of market share. However, expansion into developing 
areas can result in delayed returns due to an inadequate customer base 
and the possibility of real estate and installment loan demand exceeding 
deposit volume in such communities. Given the existing regulatory 
challenges relating to Valley National loan-to-deposit ratios, such 
expansion was unlikely to have been viewed favorably by bank regulators. 
Furthermore, as leaders of a nationally-chartered institution subject to the 
branching regulations of the Federal Reserve Bank, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Valley National management contended with hurdles not encountered by 
all competitors.335 As an example, the rapidly growing Bank of Douglas 
operated under more accommodating state mandated reserve 
requirements and was not subject to the branching approval processes of 
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve Bank, 
of which it was not a member.336 As a bank holding a national charter 
                                            
335 When established in 1913, the Federal Reserve did not permit member banks 
holding national charters to branch in states allowing the practice, though it did allow 
member banks holding state charters to do so. This restriction was lifted following 
passage of the Banking Act of 1933. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency had 
allowed national banks to branch where allowed by state law since 1927. The Banking 
Act of 1935 enabled Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation-insured banks to branch 
where legally permissible under state law. Ross M. Robertson, The Comptroller and Bank 
Supervision: A Historical Appraisal (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency, 1968), 104-105; Butt, 2. 
 
336 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency oversees banks holding a 
national charter. State-chartered banks apply for new branches through their state 
banking supervisor. The Federal Reserve required member institutions to maintain twelve 
percent of demand deposits and five percent of time deposits as reserves. These funds 
were required to be held as vault cash or on deposit with the Federal Reserve. Non-
Federal Reserve member banks holding an Arizona charter were required to hold just ten 
percent of demand deposits and four percent of time deposits in reserves, which could be 
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issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a membership in 
the Federal Reserve System, and a Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation insurance certificate, Valley National was subject to oversight 
and branching approval from all three federal supervisory agencies. 
Though the Federal Reserve raised questions regarding Valley National 
lending practices during the immediate post-war era, the longstanding 
resistance to widespread branching held by the Comptroller’s office would 
prove to be the greatest hindrance to Valley National de novo expansion 
in the years following World War II.337  
Competitor acquisition served as an alternative to addressing post-
war business needs through de novo expansion alone. Given the many 
potential barriers to organic growth faced by the institution, this business 
strategy received much consideration from bank management. By 
acquiring or merging with competitor institutions, Valley National would 
instantaneously increase its market share, gain pre-existing banking 
offices, and boost deposit figures.338 However, the rewards associated with 
                                                                                                                       
held as vault cash or deposited with a correspondent bank. The lower reserve 
requirements arguably presented a competitive advantage for state-chartered institutions 
as regulations encumbered smaller percentages of overall deposits, and likely explains 
why all state-chartered banks but Southern Arizona Bank chose to forgo Federal Reserve 
membership during this period. Major B. Foster, Raymond Rodgers, Jules I. Bogen, and 
Marcus Nadler, Money and Banking (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1953), 
309; Robertson, 132; Marshall, 23; Bridenstine, 253-254. 
  
337 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency: A Short History (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
2011), 15; “The Comptroller’s Policies on Branch Banks: ‘Unwise, Unneeded Branch 
Growth Can Only Lead to Grave Future Problems’,” 1952, 7, file 1151, VNB Collection; 
Walter Bimson to Carl Hayden, February 13, 1951, file 496, VNB Collection. 
 
338 Marshall, 11. 
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this practice are often accompanied by a troubling set of risks. In addition 
to the inherent risks of acquiring an under-vetted loan portfolio or 
attempting to rebrand a well-known and long-established competitor firm, 
Valley National also had to consider possible antitrust issues. The threat 
of regulatory action relating to limiting market competitiveness likely 
loomed large in the minds of bank leaders as they followed the travails of 
Transamerica, which faced regulatory scrutiny resulting from questions of 
acquisition-related market control during this period.339 Nonetheless, in the 
                                            
339 In 1945, the Federal Reserve attempted to persuade the Department of 
Justice to file suit against Transamerica for violations of antitrust laws, though Attorney 
General Thomas Clark declined to do so. In 1948, at which time Transamerica owned 
twenty-three percent of Bank of America and majority interests in forty-six other banks, 
the Federal Reserve formally charged the company with antitrust law violations. This 
process resulted in an April 1, 1952 Federal Reserve Board determination that 
Transamerica had violated Section 7 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, which deals 
with holding companies. The Board instructed Transamerica to engage in a divestiture of 
all bank holdings aside from Bank of America as interlocking directorates and other 
factors ensured a continuing influence in the operations of that bank. However, by the 
time the decision was rendered, Transamerica owned just 5.8 percent of Bank of America 
stock, which Transamerica subsequently sold in October of 1952. On May 27, 1952, 
Transamerica filed an appeal in the federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. This 
case, titled Transamerica v. Board of Governors, 206 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1953), resulted in 
a ruling in favor of Transamerica as the judges determined that the acquisitions made by 
the company had not resulted in a lessening of competition, among other findings. 
Following this decision, Transamerica resumed acquiring competitor institutions 
throughout the Western United States. VNB Collection documents reveal that Walter 
Bimson and other Valley National executives monitored the Transamerica proceedings 
very closely, as evidenced by related news clippings, incoming correspondence from 
colleagues, and a copy of the recommended Federal Reserve Board decision prepared 
on June 13, 1951 and received in Bimson’s office on June 23, 1951. Valley National 
leadership likely found the case to be of interest given their past and potential future 
acquisitions, as well as the fact that Transamerica attorneys alleged that Valley National 
engaged in anticompetitive behavior that was overlooked by government regulators as a 
result of continued Reconstruction Finance Company preferred stock holdings in the 
institution. Doti, Banking in the American West, 171-172; Neal, 180, 191-192; 
“Transamerica Sells Rest of Bank Shares,” New York Times, October 21, 1952; Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 303-304; Walter Oppenheim to Eugene S. 
Lee, February 9, 1949, file 441, VNB Collection; “United States of America Before the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” June 13, 1951, file 1150, VNB 
Collection; “Discrimination Charged by Transamerica Counsel,” Los Angeles Times, 




years of growth following the war, Valley National management 
recognized the need to expand its office network in order to maintain and 
grow market share and other key metrics. Accordingly, during the subject 
period, Valley National aggressively pursued an expansionary strategy 
involving both de novo branches and competitor acquisitions. 
The bank branched to the extent allowed by regulators, with a 
particular emphasis on the greater Phoenix area, where nine of the 
thirteen subject period de novo branches were opened.340 Though some of 
these branches served then-existing residential areas, many location 
decisions were farsighted bets based upon predicted geographic growth 
patterns and population trends. As Valley National management 
eventually encountered difficulties in expanding through de novo offices, 
the company also worked to maintain and grow market share through 
competitor acquisition. Immediately following the war, the corporation 
purchased the First National Bank of Nogales (1945) and the First 
National Bank of Winslow (1946), both of which operated outside of 
existing Valley National markets.341 However, in what would prove to be 
the boldest move made by bank leaders during the period of study, Valley 
National acquired a non-majority interest in the Bank of Douglas, a direct 
                                            
340 The term “greater Phoenix area” is intended to mean areas then within 
Phoenix city limits, since annexed by Phoenix, or cities now generally understood to be 
within the “Valley of the Sun.” Including the 1946 branch in Wickenburg, ten of the 
thirteen de novo locations were located in Maricopa County. The three remaining 
branches were located in Tucson. Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection. 
 
341 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1946, 3, VNB Collection; 




and rapidly growing competitor, in 1952.342 Though likely to result in 
unwanted regulatory attention, this purchase did allow Valley National to 
greatly increase its control, albeit indirectly, of the Arizona banking market. 
Altogether, the branching and acquisition efforts employed by the bank 
during the immediate post-war years did serve to maintain and grow its 
deposit base, lending opportunities, profitability, and industry ranking 
throughout the subject period and beyond. Its non-majority ownership of 
rival Bank of Douglas increased its overall market share and served as an 
effective tool to maintain its lead over the First National Bank of Arizona, 
the Transamerica-owned longtime second-largest bank in the state.343 
Thus, while costly and damaging regulatory action related to its acquisition 
activities would emerge following the period of study, during the immediate 
post-war years, branching and acquisition served as the most measurably 
effective component of the three pronged Valley National business 
strategy comprised of marketing, market-appropriate product offerings, 
and geographic expansion. 
The expansion component of this three-pronged strategy 
commenced rather modestly. Responding to the needs of Goodyear Tire 
and Rubber Company employees, as well as farmers in the small 
southwestern Maricopa County communities of Avondale, Cashion, 
                                            
342 “VNB Employe Fund Buys Bank of Douglas Stock,” Phoenix Gazette, March 
11, 1952; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 320. 
 




Coldwater, Perryville, and Tolleson, the bank opened its first new branch 
since 1937 in Litchfield Park on December 18, 1944.344 The siting of 
branches in existing underserved communities outside of growing 
metropolitan areas was continued with the opening of de novo offices in 
Wickenburg and Tolleson on April 29 and November 1, 1946, 
respectively.345 It is likely that the Litchfield Park, Wickenburg, and 
Tolleson offices were catch-up facilities as Depression-era spending 
constraints and wartime material restrictions may have limited expansion 
to these communities when first warranted. The fact that the Litchfield 
Park office was opened in a building provided by the Goodyear Tire and 
Rubber Company, the Wickenburg branch was opened in a remodeled 
saloon, and the Tolleson facility was opened in a surplus Quonset hut 
reinforces the probability of material shortages impacting bank growth.346 
The utilization of previously constructed buildings continued with the 1946 
opening of a second Phoenix location in an old house.  
                                            
344 Though the bank established wartime “banking facilities” at Davis-Monthan 
and Marana Army Air Fields in the Tucson area, the Kingman Gunnery School, and 
Williams Field in southeastern Maricopa County “at the request of the War Department,” 
these offices were not counted as branches in Valley National records. The extent of 
services offered at these locations is unknown, though it is likely that these facilities 
conducted only basic transactions. “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 
1945, 3, 7, VNB Collection. 
 
345 Wickenburg, a town in northwestern Maricopa County, was and is outside of 
the Phoenix metropolitan area. Tolleson, though now on the western edge of the Phoenix 
metro area, was then described as a community ten miles west of Phoenix. Branch List, 
March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1947, 8, 
VNB Collection. 
 
346 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1945, 3, VNB Collection; 




Established in a repurposed house on the northwest corner of First 
and Willetta Streets, the new Phoenix branch demonstrated a move away 
from downtown as the commercial core, and also highlighted the ability of 
bank planners to adapt to shifting population and commerce trends. 
Characterized as the “first ‘neighborhood’ bank in the City of Phoenix” in 
the 1947 annual report, the Willetta office was opened in advance of a 
northward development pattern that would unfold over the coming decade, 
though the downtown presence of the bank was bolstered in 1947 with a 
new office in the Security Building.347 Addressing the new strategy of 
placing branches in formerly outlying areas in his January 1947 message 
to shareholders, Walter Bimson stated,  
Metropolitan Phoenix, with an estimated population of better than 
175,000, appears to be entering an era of decentralization, and it is 
likely that other outlying offices will prove desirable as time goes 
on. With more than 60,000 deposit accounts in the Home Office 
and with downtown parking getting steadily worse, we are keenly 
aware of the need for additional bank facilities in Phoenix.348  
 
Accordingly, future expansions were based upon population growth and 
commercial development predictions. 
The bank opened an office in the growing community of 
Sunnyslope on November 1, 1948. Though this area has long since been 
annexed by Phoenix, the town was then described as being a town some 
eight miles north of the Professional Building. However, it was cited as 
                                            
347 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1947, 8, VNB Collection; 
Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection. 
 




“the fastest growing residential community in Arizona, with a population 
already estimated at about 8,000,” thus justifying this otherwise potentially 
questionable expansion.349 Less than two months after the Sunnyslope 
dedication, the bank opened a branch west of downtown Phoenix at 1820 
West Van Buren Street. This expansion, intended to “provide a great 
convenience to the industrial and business firms in the western section of 
the city as well as to the government departments and residential 
population of that area,” underscored the newfound institutional 
commitment to growth in the rapidly decentralizing capital city.350 The 
following year brought a permanent banking center to Williams Air Force 
Base and a second Tucson office. The Tucson branch, housed in rented 
quarters near the University of Arizona campus, demonstrated further 
commitment to the idea of preserving and growing market share through 
geographic expansion as it was the first Valley National office opened in 
the Tucson market since the 1934 acquisition of Consolidated National.351 
                                            
349 Sunnyslope was annexed by the City of Phoenix in 1959, eleven years after 
the bank opened its first office in the area. The 1948 office was established in rented 
quarters, followed by a newly-built replacement on August 11, 1952. “President’s Annual 
Report to the Stockholders,” 1949, 7, VNB Collection; Konig, 32; Branch List, March 6, 
1959, VNB Collection. 
 
350 The West Van Buren branch opened on December 20, 1948. “Opening 
Today, Monday, December 20, 1948,” Arizona Republic, December 20, 1948; Branch 
List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 
1949, 7, VNB Collection. 
 
351 The new Williams Air Force Base office was listed in bank records as a 
branch. As such, the bank assigned it a branch number and recorded its initial date of 
operations on branch lists maintained by the company, thus differentiating it from 
whatever manner of temporary facility the bank maintained on the base during the war at 
the behest of defense authorities. The 1949 Tucson branch, located at 812 N. Tyndall 
Avenue, was opened in a rented space near the University of Arizona campus. However, 
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This strategy was pursued most aggressively in 1951, when the bank 
opened three de novo branches in the Phoenix and Tucson areas. 
On September 15, 1951, the company dedicated two new Phoenix 
offices. The first of these two branches, located in an old house at 2124 
East Van Buren Street, was intended to capture business in an “extensive 
commercial, industrial and residential area previously devoid of local 
banking facilities.” The second new office was built on the north side of 
Indian School Road just west of Central Avenue, an area directly in the 
path of post-war suburban and commercial growth. The value of this site 
was correctly identified by bank leaders, including Walter Bimson, who 
pronounced the location “destined, in our opinion, to become the hub of 
one of the most rapidly developing commercial areas in the city.” Similar 
growth expectations drove the decision to open a third Tucson location on 
East Broadway Boulevard. This branch, sited to the east of both the 
downtown area and the University of Arizona campus, was “designed to 
cover the rapidly developing residential and commercial area in east 
Tucson and, in addition, the new industrial section to the southeast.”352 
                                                                                                                       
a new bank-owned building was soon constructed in its place at 947 North Park Avenue. 
The new building opened for business on August 11, 1952, and, as of October 2011, is 
still standing and in use as a Chase branch. Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; 
“Total Loans, Williams Air Force Base (119),” 1976, file 1120, VNB Collection; 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1949, 7, VNB Collection; 1950 Tucson 
ConSurvey Directory (Columbus, OH: Baldwin ConSurvey Company, 1950), 27; 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1950, 7, VNB Collection. 
 
352 The Indian School Road branch, known internally as the Indian-Central office, 
was located at 110 West Indian School Road. Predictions of rapid growth in the area 
proved prescient, as demonstrated by a June 1952 Arizona Republic article announcing 
an expansion to the branch intended “to accommodate [its] growing needs.” The site is 
now a vacant lot. The Broadway office was built at 3033 East Broadway, at the northwest 
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The final de novo branch of the subject period continued the trend of 
predicting and responding to future growth patterns. Opened in South 
Tucson on November 17, 1952, the office at 1818 South Sixth Avenue 
was touted as a demonstration of bank “confidence in the industrial future 
of the Tucson area.”353  
When judged by deposit dollar volume and loan business, the post-
war de novo branch component of the company expansion strategy was 
highly successful. Over the course of the subject period, total deposits 
held by the bank increased from $117,735,053 to $305,104,125, equaling 
an increase of $187,369,072, or 159 percent. Of this figure, at least 
$43,472,508.80, or more than thirty-one percent, was held at one of the 
thirteen de novo branches opened between 1944 and 1952.354 As the 
                                                                                                                       
corner of Broadway Boulevard and Country Club Road. As of October 2011, this building 
stands and is in use as a Chase branch. Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; 
“President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1952, 6-7, VNB Collection; “Bank 
Branch To Be Enlarged,” Arizona Republic, June 5, 1952. 
 
353 The 1952 South Tucson banking center still stands, and is in use as a Chase 
banking center. Branch List, March 6, 1959; “President’s Mid-Year Annual Report to the 
Stockholders of the Valley National Bank,” July 8, 1952, 2, file 1031A, VNB Collection; 
1953 Tucson City Directory (Tucson: City Directory Service, Inc., 1952), under “Banks” 
heading in classified section; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 
inside back cover, VNB Collection. 
 
354 “At least $43,472,508.80” is used because no figures are available for the 
Williams Air Force Base branch. The document listing year-by-year deposit totals used 
for this section was compiled in 1976, by which time it seems the Williams office had 
been consolidated with the Chandler office for recordkeeping purposes. Though still listed 
on the sheet as a separate branch, no deposit or loan figures specific to Williams are 
included as they were incorporated into the Chandler branch totals without detail relating 
to office of origination. Therefore, with no available sources outlining subject period 
deposit or loan volume at the Williams branch, the $43,427,508.80 is as accurate a total 
for the immediate post-war de novo branches as is possible with the available data. End 
of 1943 and end of 1952 deposit totals were used for calculating the increase in total 
Valley National deposits. “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 12, VNB 




source of nearly one-third of the deposit growth experienced by the bank 
in the immediate post-war years, these de novo locations were of 
tremendous value to the company as a source of funds needed to sate the 
high loan demand of the day. Furthermore, though the de novo centers 
held over $43 million in deposits by the end of 1952, they carried 
outstanding loans totaling just $12,186,320.74, or twenty-eight percent of 
their deposit holdings. As such, the new centers served to strengthen 
overall bank loan-to-deposit ratios due to their rapid deposit growth and 
relatively low lending totals.  
Notably, highly lucrative installment lending accounted for 
$9,011,951.01 of the $12,186,320.74 in loans carried by the new offices 
as of year-end 1952. Thus, 73.95% of de novo lending as measured by 
the amount outstanding on December 31, 1952 was in the form of high-
yield, short-term debt.355 This figure, totaling over twenty percent of total 
installment loan dollars outstanding at the end of the subject period, likely 
equated to a healthy contribution to the company bottom line. In addition, 
the de novo geographic expansion carried out by Valley National during 
this period arguably limited the growth of its competitors. After opening 
offices in developing areas, the bank was able to harness the name 
recognition and positive reputation built through advertising, industry 
ranking, and other factors to draw clients into the new banking centers to 
                                            
355 As per footnote 354, the loan figures cited do not include totals from the 
Williams Air Force Base branch. “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1953, 
12, VNB Collection; “Total Loans,” 1976, file 1119, VNB Collection. 
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open deposit accounts, seek loans, or conduct other banking business. In 
doing so, Valley National effectively retained its market share and 
increased deposit volume, loan business, and overall profitability. 
However, while the branching component of the bank expansion strategy 
was successful when measured by market share retention, deposit 
growth, loan volume, and revenue, growth through de novo branches 
alone proved difficult given the strenuous regulatory resistance faced by 
the company. 
Though Arizona banking laws allowed for unlimited branch banking 
so long as new locations served a clear public need and were fully 
capitalized, Valley National executives faced resistance on the federal 
level. As an Office of the Comptroller of the Currency-chartered, Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation-covered, Federal Reserve member bank, 
the institution was required to gain the permission of the aforementioned 
federal regulatory agencies prior to opening new offices.356 While the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco did express concerns relating to 
Valley National lending practices and reserves ratios during the subject 
period, no documentation has been found outlining Federal Reserve 
resistance to company expansion. Similarly, no records documenting 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation disapproval have been located. 
However, the bank did struggle with the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency over the question of branching. 
                                            




Preston Delano, who strongly preferred unit banking to branch 
banking, served as Comptroller of the Currency throughout the subject 
period.357 Concerned about risks to the American banking system 
stemming from the growth and lending practices of large national banks, 
Delano advocated tirelessly for tighter lending controls and limiting the 
size of branch banks and banking chains.358 He believed large banking 
chains to be “threatening the self-sufficiency” of non-metropolitan 
communities and a danger to banks claiming resources of $500,000 or 
less, which he considered the “guardian outposts of our financial system.” 
Delano voiced similar disapproval on the topic of bank holding companies, 
of which he stated, “In some places they have done a good job but on 
balance I would say that the evils have outweighed the good.”359 Deputy 
                                            
357 Delano, a distant cousin of President Franklin Roosevelt, served as 
Comptroller of the Currency from October 24, 1938 until his resignation on February 15, 
1953, making him the longest serving Comptroller in history. He passed away in 
Washington, D.C. on August 31, 1961. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, “OCC: 
Preston Delano,” Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/about/who-we-are/leadership/past-comptrollers/comptroller-
preston-delano.html (accessed September 15, 2011); “New Controller of Currency Takes 
Office,” New York Times, October 25, 1938; S. Oliver Goodman, “Delano Quits As 
Comptroller After 14 Years,” Washington Post, February 7, 1953; “Preston Delano, Ex-
Treasury Aide: Former Controller of the Currency Dies at 75,” New York Times, 
September 1, 1961. 
 
358 Branching and chain banking both allow for expansion beyond unit bank 
status, though the means of achieving this growth differs. According to economist Rollin 
G. Thomas, “a branch system is one single bank incorporated under a single charter, 
answerable to a single supervisory authority, and all the branches of which are subject to 
direct central control,” whereas chain banking involves “various degrees of common stock 
ownership, ranging all the way from identical ownership represented by trusteeing stock 
of one bank for the benefit of the stockholders of another, to the loose, informal control 
arising from interlocking directorates.” Thomas, 401-405. 
 
359 “Big Banking Chains Opposed by Delano: Controller of Currency Says Their 
Creation Threatens Small Communities,” New York Times, September 18, 1943; “Holding 
Companies for Banks Assayed: Delano Tells Senate Quiz Some Did Good But on 
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Comptroller L. A. Jennings reiterated Delano’s leanings toward unit 
banking in a 1952 talk entitled “The Comptroller’s Policies on Branch 
Banks: ‘Unwise, Unneeded Branch Growth Can Only Lead to Future 
Problems.” In this speech, Jennings stated, “I know of no exception to the 
rule in the Comptroller’s office that the establishment of a unit bank, if it is 
warranted by the facts, always takes precedence over the authorization of 
a branch.” In the same talk, Jennings emphasized the importance of 
branch applicants possessing capital and deposits sufficient to cover 
known risks.360 Over the course of the subject period, Valley National 
faced challenges from the Comptroller relating to both of the 
aforementioned topics; competition and fiscal stability. 
As early as February 1949, the Office of the Comptroller questioned 
Valley National lending practices. In response to their concerns, Walter 
Bimson informed Deputy Comptroller J. L. Robertson by letter that 
examiner statements of risk relating to certain loans issued by the bank 
were “demonstrably untrue.” Continuing, Bimson wrote, “Your implication 
that any portion of our capital is in any way impaired is a grave 
                                                                                                                       
Balance Evils Outweigh Good,” New York Times, March 24, 1950; “Delano Seeks Curb 
on Bank Holding Firms,” Washington Post, September 25, 1946. 
 
360 This passage is underlined in red pencil on the copy of this speech held in the 
VNB Collection, demonstrating its perceived significance to the reader. While the speech 
transcript is housed in the general bank management files found in Series 9, which deals 
with “Bank Management, Operations, and Services 1920-1985,” and not Walter Bimson’s 
personal files, the neat red underlining is consistent with markings found on many 
documents in Bimson’s files. As such, it is possible that Bimson himself reviewed this 
transcript and noted the strong preference toward unit banking highlighted by Jennings. 
“The Comptroller’s Policies on Branch Banks: ‘Unwise, Unneeded Branch Growth Can 




injustice.”361 Whether or not concerns regarding the bank’s loan risks and 
reserves ratios were justified, Bimson perceived the agency to be 
irrationally biased when considering Valley National expansion plans. In 
1951, Bimson outlined his frustrations with the Comptroller in a lengthy 
letter to Carl Hayden, Arizona’s senior United States Senator.  
In addition to providing a point-for-point rebuttal of the Comptroller’s 
concerns regarding Valley National maintaining too little capital and the 
bank’s size compared to other institutions in the state banking market, this 
letter allowed Bimson to formally register his many grievances with the 
Comptroller. Chief among these complaints was Bimson’s perception that 
the Comptroller’s “prejudiced point of view leads him to prefer small 
independent banks, although these small independent banks may not be 
as useful to the communities they serve as a larger and better-managed 
branch bank.” Bimson also stated his belief that the Comptroller’s 
resistance to branching was “encouraging weakness rather than strength 
in the American banking system,” and alleged that the “bias against 
branch banks is a new one in the department that arose during Mr. 
Delano’s regime and only after the Independent Bankers Association 
became politically powerful.” In closing, Bimson quoted extensively from a 
talk he delivered to Valley National managers the month prior entitled 
“Branch Banking Aids Frontier Development.” In this speech, he 
emphasized the economic value of branching and the higher likelihood of 
                                            




small bank failures.362 While the inclusion of portions of the speech made 
for a compelling end to his argument in favor of branching, no explicit 
request for intervention was made of Hayden, possibly indicating that bank 
management had already decided upon an expansion strategy designed 
to achieve geographic growth and market share retention through means 
other than de novo branching. 
Given the tremendous growth opportunities in an underserved 
market such as that which existed in post-war Arizona, as measured by 
the large number of residents per banking office, opening new facilities in 
developing areas was essential to maintaining and growing institutional 
market share. During this time, established competitors such as the First 
National Bank of Arizona and growing rivals such as the Bank of Douglas 
were expanding rapidly in the high-growth Maricopa and Pima County 
markets, as were new institutions such as the Phoenix-based Farmers 
and Stockmens Bank.363 While rival banking firms were capturing valuable 
deposits, vying for loan business, and competing for Valley National 
                                            
362 Bimson opened the letter by asserting, “For three years we have been refused 
every request made of the Comptroller’s Office. He has refused requests for the 
establishment of new branches. He has refused requests to pay stock dividends. He has 
rejected plans we have proposed to provide $5 million of additional capital.” However, at 
a minimum, the statement regarding branch requests seems to be an exaggeration as 
the bank had opened four de novo offices within the prior three years (Sunnyslope, West 
Van Buren, Williams Air Force Base, and North Tyndall in Tucson). The VNB Collection 
does not contain a letter from Hayden in response to Bimson’s correspondence. Walter 
Bimson to Carl Hayden, February 13, 1951, VNB Collection; Branch List, March 6, 1959, 
VNB Collection. 
 
363 Farmers and Stockmens Bank was founded in Phoenix in 1950, and was 
acquired by the Bank of Douglas in 1957. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 




market share, innovators such as A. B. Robbs, Jr. were employing more 
efficient business models to maximize lending profits and increase 
mortgage production, thereby further jeopardizing Valley National market 
share, revenue, and profitability. Confronted with multiple competitive 
challenges and a regulatory environment perceived by bank executives as 
hostile to de novo expansion, the company faced a serious dilemma. 
While the bank had gained valuable deposits and high-margin loan 
accounts through post-war branching, its market share, revenue, and 
profitability were at risk if branching constraints further stifled expansion 
into developing areas. Given the regulatory roadblocks to de novo 
branching, acquiring competitor institutions as an alternative to organic 
market growth appealed to company management. However, this strategy 
was associated with numerous potential regulatory challenges. 
Valley National had acquired competitors in the past. In 1923, the 
bank purchased the struggling First National Bank of Glendale and 
merged its sole banking office into the Valley Bank and Trust system.364 
During the difficult years of the Depression, the bank gained a foothold in 
the Tucson market with its 1934 purchase of the Consolidated National 
Bank, a unit bank which was also merged into the Valley National branch 
network. In both cases, the bank acquired offices in areas not then served 
by the institution. Valley National continued the practice of purchasing 
                                            
364 The sale was completed in late 1923, but the bank was not rebranded as a 
Valley Bank and Trust branch until February 1, 1924. Hopkins, 175-176; Branch List, 




banks operating outside of its existing markets in 1945 and 1946, when 
the company purchased the First National Bank of Nogales and the First 
National Bank of Winslow.365 All of the aforementioned transactions 
brought clear value to the bank, and each was carried out without 
regulatory resistance as the acquired institutions were not direct market 
competitors and generally served to bolster the Valley National balance 
sheet as a result of low loan-to-deposit ratios.  
The 1934 purchase of Consolidated National allowed the company 
to reclaim the position of largest bank in the state, and resulted in an 
immediate profit for bank shareholders following the sale of securities held 
by Consolidated.366 The 1945 acquisition of the First National Bank of 
Nogales, characterized by Bimson as a transaction that would “enable [the 
bank] to serve more adequately [its] growing list of customers located in 
Mexico, to play a useful part in the growing commerce between the United 
States and Mexico, and to offer [its] diversified services to the people of 
the Nogales trade area,” resulted in an immediate deposit gain of 
$6,679,345.33. As the Nogales institution carried only $1,527,001.07 in 
loans, an amount totaling just 22.86 percent of its deposit base, the 
                                            
365 The First National Bank of Nogales was purchased on October 1, 1945. The 
First National Bank of Winslow was acquired on July 22, 1946. Branch List, March 6, 
1959, VNB Collection; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 42; 
Schweikart, A History, 124. 
 
366 As a condition of purchase, Valley Bank and Trust acquired securities held by 
Consolidated that were then believed to be worthless. However, these holdings increased 
in value shortly after the transaction, and were sold by bank leaders at a profit sufficient 




purchase provided Valley National an expanded deposit pool to satisfy 
loan-to-reserves ratio requirements or meet growing post-war loan 
demands.367 The 1946 Winslow purchase yielded similar benefits. 
Described by Bimson as “strategically located to serve the rapidly growing 
communities of northeastern Arizona, heretofore not covered” by Valley 
National, and significant as Winslow was “an important division point on 
the Santa Fe Railroad and [was] generally regarded as the largest town in 
northern Arizona,” the transaction expanded the bank geographically and 
brought in $3,822,657.60 in deposits against just $490,113.89 in 
outstanding loans.368 However, given the limited number of banks in 
operation throughout the state during the subject period and the even 
smaller number of competitor institutions operating in markets without an 
existing Valley National presence, bank leaders were faced with a scarcity 
of acquisition targets likely to be deemed acceptable by supervisory 
authorities. The field of candidate banks operating offices in existing 
Valley National markets proved even more limited. 
 The First National Bank of Arizona had long been the second-
largest bank in the state.369 In addition to proving undesirable as an 
                                            
367 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1946, 3, VNB Collection; 
“Banks Purchased by The Valley National Bank since 1932,” March 12, 1949, file 169, 
VNB Collection. 
 
368 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1947, 8, VNB Collection; 
“Banks Purchased by The Valley National Bank since 1932,” March 12, 1949, VNB 
Collection. 
 




acquisition target due to the regulatory scrutiny that would likely result 
from the merger of the two largest institutions in the state, the First 
National held a federal charter. As such, it was also subject to oversight 
from the Comptroller of the Currency, thereby reducing its appeal as a 
candidate for merger. Furthermore, Transamerica owned First National. 
Though the multi-state holding company was in the midst of antitrust 
proceedings, it is highly unlikely that Transamerica leaders would have 
agreed to the sale of the second largest bank in Arizona, then one of the 
fastest growing states in the nation.370 The Southern Arizona Bank, a 
state-chartered institution then operating exclusively in the Tucson market, 
held approximately eleven percent of Arizona bank deposits and ranked 
as the third largest bank in the state. However, when Lewis Douglas 
purchased the bank in 1949, he announced his intention to maintain the 
institution “as a home owned bank for Tucson,” thus leaving the Bank of 
Douglas as the only viable acquisition target of note.371  
 Mining magnate J. S. “Rawhide” Douglas and other southeastern 
Arizona businessmen founded the state-chartered Bank of Douglas in the 
                                            
370 “Arizona Hailed Fastest Growing State In U.S.,” Arizona Republic, October 7, 
1952. 
 
371 Lewis Douglas, then the U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom, had 
previously served as Arizona’s sole Congressman and as an official in the administration 
of Franklin Roosevelt. He was the son of J. S. “Rawhide” Douglas, co-founder of the 
Bank of Bisbee and the Bank of Douglas. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Investigation, 74; “Deposits of Arizona Banks – In Millions of Dollars, Growth Record of 
Banks in Existence on December 31, 1954,” 1955, file 1110, VNB Collection; Schweikart, 
A History, 118; Hait, 83; “J. S. Douglas Dies; Mining Executive: Father of Envoy to Britain 





eponymous copper mining community of Douglas in 1902. The company 
acquired and merged with the Bank of Bisbee, also founded by Douglas 
and his partners, in 1935.372 Following its 1945 expansion into the Phoenix 
market, the bank opened a branch in Scottsdale and at least two offices in 
both Phoenix and Tucson. Success in the booming Maricopa and Pima 
County markets allowed the bank to double its deposit base from $15 
million to $30 million between 1945 and 1949, and boosted its ranking 
among banks nationwide from the 1,570th largest bank in the country in 
1945 to the 428th largest by 1951.373 In addition to its rapid post-war growth 
rates, the Bank of Douglas was similar to Valley National in other 
respects. 
The Bank of Douglas was owned and managed by Frank C. 
Brophy, a strong-willed personality who valued innovative and effective 
advertising, emphasized the importance of branch architecture and 
atmosphere, and sometimes clashed with regulators with whom he 
disagreed, much like Valley National president Walter Bimson.374 However, 
                                            
372 The Bank of Bisbee opened on February 19, 1900. Aside from Douglas, the 
incorporators included J. B. Angius, Billie Brophy, Mike Cunningham, and Ben Williams. 
The Bank of Douglas opened on June 19, 1902. Hait, 21-22, 32, 91-103; Federal 
Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 54; “J. S. Douglas Dies; Mining Executive: 
Father of Envoy to Britain Had Been Leader in Field – Founded 2 Arizona Banks.” 
 
373 Hait, 126-151; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 58. 
 
374 Brophy, the son of Bank of Bisbee and Bank of Douglas co-founder Billie 
Brophy, gained majority ownership in the Bank of Douglas in 1935 after buying out the 
holdings of J. S. Douglas. In an attempt to promote the then-small bank, Brophy 
commissioned a series of ads featuring Western history vignettes. These ads were well 
received and highly effective, prompting the institution to release a printed compilation of 
the pieces entitled Essays in Advertising. He also placed importance on banking office 
aesthetics, as demonstrated by his participation in the design of branch interiors and his 
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while similar to Valley National in some respects, the Bank of Douglas was 
markedly different in several key aspects of operation. Notably, the 
institution worked to limit lending volume to just twenty-five percent of total 
deposit holdings and waited until the early 1950s to initiate an installment 
lending program, providing a clear contrast to the high-volume lending 
program of Valley National.375 The Bank of Douglas also focused on 
opening new branches in higher income areas, as opposed to the broader 
expansion strategy demonstrated by Valley National. This emphasis on 
relatively affluent areas, which was likely made possible by the bank’s 
relatively low loan-to-deposit ratio and the associated lack of pressure to 
generate deposit volume through low-minimum-balance account offerings, 
resulted in higher-income depositors and an average account balance 
$150 greater than that recorded at Valley National.376 Further enhancing its 
appeal as an acquisition target, the bank retained a strong presence and 
                                                                                                                       
selection of a standard paint color for Bank of Douglas buildings that came to be known 
as “Brophy pink.” His interactions with bank regulators and other authority figures were 
sometimes contentious. Notably, in 1951, he began employing armored cars known as 
“Bankmobiles” as mobile branches that traveled the state each week on a six-day deposit 
pick-up schedule. Though similar in nature to Bimson’s ‘bootleg’ bank branches of the 
1930s, the Bankmobile program proved less successful in gaining regulatory approval, 
and was ended on January 15, 1953. Brophy also stubbornly refused to join the bank 
Federal Reserve System, continuing the resistance to the agency initiated by J. S. 
Douglas and Brophy’s father in 1913. Hait, 79, 93-103, 130, 139, 159; “Douglas Bank to 
Open Unit in Scottsdale,” Arizona Republic, December 19, 1948; Schweikart, A History, 
128-129. 
 
375 Hait, 150-151. 
 
376 In 1956, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco investigators concluded that 
Valley National “consistently followed the policy, it would appear from its history, of 
moving into the more rapidly areas as soon as possible, whether by purchase or by 





deposit base in Cochise County. Home to the Bisbee copper industry and 
the Fort Huachuca Army base, Cochise County ranked as the third largest 
deposit market in the state by the end of the 1940s.377 However, the 
seemingly desirable rapid post-war geographic expansion and impressive 
deposit growth rate charted by the Bank of Douglas presented owner 
Frank Brophy with significant challenges. 
As the majority shareholder, Brophy faced an expansion-related 
capital strain. State banking laws mandated that reserves be in place for 
new offices prior to approval of the branch application. As the Bank of 
Douglas often met this requirement by issuing new stock, Brophy was 
forced to subscribe to each share offering if he wished to maintain or grow 
his stake in the company. As the bank continued to expand, Brophy found 
the constant need for capital infusions and the increasing number of 
shareholders unappealing. By 1949, unspecified regulatory pressures 
believed by Brophy to have resulted from complaints lodged by “local 
banks who might not view with too much magnanimity the rapid growth of 
                                            
377 As of December 31, 1947, Maricopa County bank offices held $186,534,000 
in deposits, or 52.6 percent of the state total, Pima County banks held $74,749,000, or 
21.1 percent of the total, and Cochise County banks held $21,111,000, or 5.9 percent of 
the total. These figures include both time and demand deposits, but exclude 
governmental and interbank deposits, which were housed primarily in Phoenix-area 
banks. Valley National established a Cochise County presence when it purchased the 
Bank of Willcox on June 13, 1936. The bank expanded its Cochise County operations 
with its March 18, 1937 acquisition of the First National Bank of Douglas. However, as of 
year-end 1947, these offices housed only $6,665,616.83 of the $21,111,000 in total 
deposits held in Cochise County (excluding government funds and interbank deposits). 
Fort Huachuca closed in 1947, but was reactivated in 1951 in response to Korean War-
related troop level increases. “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1949, 8, 
VNB Collection; “Banks Purchased by The Valley National Bank since 1932,” March 12, 
1949, VNB Collection; Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; “Valley National Bank 
Total Deposits,” June 24, 1976, 36, 40, VNB Collection; “The Modern Era: 1950-2000,” 
Huachuca Illustrated: A Magazine of the Fort Huachuca Museum 10 (1999): 3-11. 
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The Bank of Douglas” brought further frustration, and likely contributed to 
his decision to sell his stake in the bank. Perhaps in an effort to showcase 
the value of his holdings and thereby elicit a buyout offer, Brophy asked 
Walter Bimson to assign a team of Valley National employees the task of 
studying Bank of Douglas operations in 1951.378 While Bimson did agree to 
undertake a study of Bank of Douglas operations, the possibility of 
purchasing the firm presented many significant challenges. 
From a regulatory standpoint, if Valley National purchased the Bank 
of Douglas and merged the institution into its existing branch system, it 
risked intensifying Comptroller concerns regarding its dominance of the 
Arizona banking market.379 Furthermore, merging with the Bank of Douglas 
would also mean Comptroller oversight of what had been a state-
chartered institution. Accordingly, it is unlikely that such a decision would 
have mitigated the branch permit approval difficulties then faced by Valley 
National. Thus, while acquiring and merging with Brophy’s institution 
would result in a deposit infusion accompanied by a relatively small loan 
portfolio, thereby supplying much-needed deposit funds with which the 
bank could meet the strong loan demands of the period, the potential 
                                            
378 Through 1945, bank ownership was held by a group of approximately thirteen 
shareholders. As a result of new stock offerings intended to fund new branch locations, 
the number of stockholders increased to eighteen by the end of 1946, sixty-one by the 
end of 1948, and ninety-six by mid-1949. It is possible that the regulatory challenges 
faced by Brophy involved the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. In A History of 
Banking in Arizona, Schweikart cites a letter between Brophy and Lewis Douglas in which 
Brophy mentions experiencing difficulty with the F.D.I.C. regarding obtaining a permit for 
a Tucson branch. Butt, 25; Hait, 141-153; Schweikart, A History, 119-120. 
 
379 Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 23. 
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regulatory risks outweighed the immediate rewards. However, a second 
option for expanding Valley National market control by means of acquiring 
Brophy’s ownership stake in the Bank of Douglas did exist, though it 
carried a different and potentially more significant set of risks. 
 If bank leaders wished to acquire Brophy’s interest while 
circumventing Comptroller jurisdiction over Bank of Douglas business 
practices and future branching decisions, they could do so by completing 
the transaction using an entity legally distinct from Valley National Bank, 
such as a holding company or a bank-directed investment fund. However, 
in order to maintain control of the purchased institution, such an entity 
would likely be led by a board of directors comprised of Valley National 
insiders. As such, regulatory authorities might interpret the arrangement 
as violating provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914. One of several 
pieces of early twentieth-century legislation intended to curb 
anticompetitive business practices, the Clayton Act prohibited full or partial 
buyouts that might “substantially lessen competition between the 
corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corporation making the 
acquisition,” and also outlawed interlocking bank directorates.380 The 
                                            
380 An interlocking directorate is defined as a “director or other officer or 
employee” of a bank serving in the same capacity at another bank. Robertson, 232; 
“Rules on Clayton Act: Reserve Board Instructs Banks on Interlocking Directors,” New 
York Times, July 11, 1916; Federal Reserve Board, Interlocking Bank Directorates Under 
the Clayton Act: Regulations of the Federal Reserve Board and Text of Section 8 of the 




Clayton Act served as the legal basis for the Federal Reserve-initiated 
antitrust proceedings against Transamerica in 1948.381  
Bank leaders were clearly aware of the Transamerica case, as 
evidenced by the many news clippings and other documents housed in 
the Valley National Bank Collection files, and were also cognizant of 
existing Comptroller concerns of market dominance, as mentioned in 
correspondence between Bimson and Carl Hayden. Nonetheless, Valley 
National management surely understood the potential value of acquiring 
the Bank of Douglas, an institution then ranked as the fourth-largest and 
fastest growing bank in the Arizona market, and one not subject to 
Comptroller oversight due to its state-issued charter.382 Accordingly, when 
Frank Brophy offered Walter Bimson the opportunity to purchase his stake 
in the Bank of Douglas sometime in late 1951 or early 1952, Bimson 
accepted. In March of 1952, the trustees of The Valley National Bank 
Profit-Sharing Fund acquired forty percent of the Bank of Douglas, thus 
                                            
381 Doti, Banking in the American West, 171; Robertson, 156. 
 
382 The Bank of Douglas was the fourth-largest bank in the state based upon 
deposit totals from 1946 through the end of the subject period. The fastest-growing 
designation is based upon subject period deposit growth percentage. Walter Oppenheim 
to Eugene S. Lee, February 9, 1949, VNB Collection; “United States of America Before 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,” June 13, 1951, VNB Collection; 
“Discrimination Charged by Transamerica Counsel,” Los Angeles Times, February 9, 
1949; “Hearing Snag Met by Transamerica,” New York Times, February 9, 1949; Walter 
Bimson to Carl Hayden, February 13, 1951, VNB Collection; “Deposits of Arizona Banks 
– In Millions of Dollars, Growth Record of Banks in Existence on December 31, 1954,” 
1955, VNB Collection; “Pioneer-Minded Bank of Douglas Still Mixing Historical Flavor 
With Financial Growth,” Western Banker, November 1954, 250; “Giant Valley Bank Gets 
Even Bigger by Swallowing Fastest Growing Rival,” Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1953.  
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gaining a sizeable interest in a direct competitor while managing to avoid 
direct Valley National ownership of the shares.383  
Initially, the size of the purchase was publicly acknowledged only 
as a “substantial block of stock.” In addressing the matter with the press, 
Carl Bimson emphasized that the fund did not own a majority stake in the 
Bank of Douglas and insisted that company leaders had “no intention of 
merging the interests of the Valley bank with those of the Douglas 
bank.”384 However, in a 1980 interview with historian Larry Schweikart, 
Carl Bimson stated that Valley National leaders used the profit plan as a 
“holding vehicle” until a more formal and legally defensible arrangement 
could be made. Period correspondence between Brophy and Southern 
Arizona Bank president Lewis Douglas outlining Brophy’s intention to sell 
                                            
383 Officially known as the Profit-Sharing Plan for Employees of the Valley 
National Bank, the employee profit sharing fund was established in September of 1944. 
Bank leaders created the fund as a mechanism for providing bank employees extra 
compensation in the form of tax-deferred retirement savings during a period of 
government-imposed salary restrictions. The plan required no employee contributions. 
Rather, the bank deposited an amount up to the equivalent of fifteen percent of its total 
payroll each year net profits exceeded $400,000. Contributions were made from funds 
remaining after payment of dividends on preferred and common stock and needed 
contributions to bank reserve accounts. Employees were vested in the plan after a 
minimum of five years of service, at which point they were eligible for a one-time, lump 
sum payment from the fund upon retirement, disability, or death. Several sources list the 
plan as having been established in 1943, while others state 1944 as the date of creation. 
The fund was legally established on September 20, 1944. The 1943 date sometimes 
cited is likely explained by the decision of the bank board to recognize employment from 
January 1, 1943 onward in the vesting equation. Draft of Financing the Frontier, Volume 
Two: The Bimson Period, 1933 ----, by Ernest J. Hopkins, November 5, 1962, file 922, 
chapter 10, page 19, VNB Collection; “VNB Employe Fund Buys Bank of Douglas Stock”; 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 43, 320; “Profit-Sharing Plan for 
Employees of the Valley National Bank, Effective September 20, 1944,” October 1, 1944, 
file 1189, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1945, 5, VNB 
Collection; “Profits for the Staff,” Banking, June 1957, 170; VNB Press Release, March 9, 
1956, file 201, VNB Collection; VNB Press Release, March 24, 1958, file 202, VNB 
Collection. 
 




fifty-one percent of the bank supports the veracity of Bimson’s 1980 
recollection.385 Though the employee retirement plan had held a relatively 
small number of Bank of Douglas shares as an investment since 1950, 
and by 1951 held smaller ownership stakes in the Bank of Flagstaff and 
the First State Bank of Arizona at Mesa, the purchase of approximately 
forty percent of a competitor institution was unlikely to be construed by 
authorities or other observers as strictly an investment decision.386 As the 
Bank of Douglas was competitive with Valley National in the Phoenix, 
Tucson, and Douglas markets, the Office of the Comptroller quickly 
                                            
385 According to Schweikart, Brophy may have initially offered his shares to 
Southern Arizona Bank president Lewis Douglas, the son of former Bank of Douglas co-
owner and Brophy business partner “Rawhide” Jimmie Douglas. Ironically, Walter Bimson 
attempted to broker a merger of the Bank of Douglas and the Southern Arizona Bank in 
August of 1955, by which time Valley National-affiliated interests had acquired majority 
ownership of the Bank of Douglas. However, none of the many scenarios presented in an 
exchange of letters between Bimson, Brophy, and Douglas came to pass. On November 
29, 1955, Transamerica purchased ninety-eight percent of Southern Arizona Bank stock, 
thus further consolidating the state banking market. Schweikart, A History, 124; Multiple 
letters between Walter Bimson, Frank Brophy, and Lewis Douglas, August 1955, file 522, 
VNB Collection; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 73; 
“Transamerica Corp. Makes Bid for Bank,” New York Times, November 19, 1955; 
“Transamerica Adds Bank,” New York Times, November 30, 1955. 
 
386 Exact figures vary depending upon the source consulted, but the initial profit 
sharing plan ownership stakes in the Bank of Flagstaff and the First State Bank of 
Arizona were approximately thirteen and twenty-five percent, respectively. The Bank of 
Flagstaff opened in 1951, and the profit sharing plan acquired an ownership stake at the 
time of opening or shortly thereafter. Valley National senior lending officer Glenn C. 
Taylor sat on the board of the Bank of Flagstaff, as did Valley National cashier James 
Dismuke. The Bank of Flagstaff merged with Valley National in 1957. The First State 
Bank of Arizona was founded in October of 1951. First State Bank management relied 
partly on Valley National capital for its operations. Glenn C. Taylor later served as 
president of the First State Bank. The First State Bank merged with the Bank of Douglas 
in 1955. Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 23; A. R. Gutowsky, “Arizona Commercial Banking: 
A Historical Sketch,” Arizona Business Bulletin 13, October 1966: 7; “VNB Employe Fund 
Buys Bank of Douglas Stock”; Draft of Financing the Frontier, Volume Two: The Bimson 
Period, 1933 ----, by Ernest J. Hopkins, November 5, 1962, chapter 10, page 19, VNB 
Collection; Schweikart, A History, 124-126; Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Investigation, 27, 43-44, 55; Platt Cline, Mountain Town: Flagstaff’s First Century 
(Flagstaff: Northland Publishing Company, 1994), 387. 
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objected to the bank profit plan holding a stake in the Bank of Douglas.387 
Deputy Comptroller Jennings emphasized the official disapproval of the 
recent stock purchase in a June 27, 1952 letter to Walter Bimson. 
In this letter, Jennings informed Bimson that the Comptroller’s office 
believed a merger between Valley National and the Bank of Douglas to be 
“the logical and natural solution” to the issue as merging the banks would 
clarify the ownership in the minds of the public and “estop any criticism of 
‘divided interests’,” stemming from “ownership of the Bank of Douglas by 
the Plan.” Jennings then reminded Bimson that, “not anything in our 
discussions nor in this letter did or does give our sanction to the 
acquisition of practical control ownership of the Bank of Douglas by the 
Profit Sharing Plan for Employees of the Valley National Bank.” The letter 
ended with an invitation to submit additional suggestions, “all leading, of 
course, to a change in ownership of the aforementioned holdings in the 
Bank of Douglas.”388  
While a merger would bring the Bank of Douglas under the 
jurisdiction of federal regulators, thus largely satisfying the Comptroller, 
                                            
387 Only the two Yuma branches of the Bank of Douglas operated without in-
market competition from Valley National. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 
Investigation, 43. 
 
388 Though not specifically addressed in the letter, the Comptroller’s office likely 
disapproved of the plan holding Bank of Flagstaff and First State Bank stock given Valley 
National’s direct competition with First State in Mesa and the presence of Valley National 
employees on the Bank of Flagstaff board. It is also likely that the Comptroller questioned 
the independence of the profit plan trustees as a provision in the profit plan trust 
agreement stated, “The Trustees shall serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors of 
the Bank and shall be subject to removal at any time by said Board of Directors.” L. A. 
Jennings to Walter Bimson, June 27, 1952, file 1151, VNB Collection; “Profit-Sharing 
Plan for Employees of the Valley National Bank, Effective September 20, 1944,” October 
1, 1944, 14, VNB Collection. 
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such a move would likely result in continued branching limitations for 
Valley National. However, maintaining the Bank of Douglas as a separate, 
state-chartered bank would allow for indirect control of a significant portion 
of the state banking market through ownership of a firm that was rapidly 
growing and experienced less difficulty expanding geographically. Indirect 
control would also permit the bank to present a plausible argument against 
potential allegations of anticompetitive practices.389 Additionally, indirect 
control of the Bank of Douglas prevented its acquisition by the Southern 
Arizona Bank or Transamerica, thereby protecting Valley National market 
share and influence relative to other firms in the marketplace in a manner 
potentially perceived by company executives as less likely to incur 
regulatory scrutiny. Accordingly, Bimson soon notified Jennings of Valley 
National’s intention to form a holding company to which the bank profit 
sharing plan would transfer ownership of its stakes in the Bank of 
Douglas, First State Bank, and the Bank of Flagstaff.390  
The creation of this new company would lead to significant legal 
issues for the bank in the period following Walter Bimson’s resignation 
from the bank presidency on January 20, 1953.391 However, during the 
                                            
389 Walter Bimson was very concerned with the possibility of Valley National 
being labeled monopolistic, and is said to have objected to a merger for that reason. 
Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 23. 
 
390 Hait, 162. 
 
391 The Valley National profit sharing plan eventually transferred ownership of its 
shares in the Bank of Douglas, the Bank of Flagstaff, and the First State Bank at Mesa to 
a holding company known as the Arizona Bancorporation, which was founded on January 
21, 1953. In addition to holdings in competitor institutions, the bank also transferred 
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ownership of the Professional Building to the Bancorporation. In exchange, the initial 
200,000 shares of Bancorporation stock were split between the profit sharing plan and 
Valley National shareholders, with the plan receiving 23,792.8 shares and stockholders 
receiving one share of Bancorporation stock for every five shares of Valley National 
owned. The official transfer of assets took place on April 1, 1953. While individual 
stockholders owned the overwhelming majority of Bancorporation shares, the Valley 
National-controlled profit sharing plan retained a sizeable stake, thus raising questions of 
operational independence. However, more significant questions of operational control 
relate to the individuals selected for Bancorporation’s management team. On May 6, 
1953, Walter Bimson, then Valley National chairman of the board, assumed the role of 
Bancorporation president. Carl Bimson, then president of Valley National, was named a 
vice president of the Bancorporation. Leslie A. Wood, a Valley National vice president, 
and Earl Bimson, Valley National acting controller and son of Walter Bimson, were 
selected for the roles of Bancorporation vice president and secretary-treasurer, 
respectively. Earl Bimson was assisted by Valley National assistant controller R. G. 
Housman, who was selected to serve as assistant secretary-treasurer of the 
Bancorporation. Bancorporation board members also held strong ties to Valley National. 
In addition to serving as executive officers, Walter Bimson, Carl Bimson, and Leslie 
Wood also held board positions. Other Bancorporation directors included Valley National 
Insurance Company president C. W. Bond and Valley National board members R. E. 
Brunneau, E. S. Lee, J. Earl Peterson, and Raymond Rubicam. Other Bancorporation 
directors included Frank Snell, a prominent Phoenix attorney and friend of Walter 
Bimson, and former Bank of Douglas owner Frank C. Brophy. In response to alleged 
Valley National control of the Bancorporation and Transamerica’s operations in the state, 
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco investigated the question of market 
dominance in the Arizona banking industry in 1956, one year after the Bancorporation 
gained majority ownership of the Bank of Douglas and two years after the company 
purchased one-hundred percent of the Buckeye Valley Bank. This investigation resulted 
in a report entitled Investigation of Banking in Arizona. In this report, investigators cited 
“an infiltration of VNB personnel into the Bank of Douglas organization,” and “subtle 
changes in the management policy of [the Bank of Douglas], both of which are difficult to 
explain unless the Valley National Bank and the Arizona Bancorporation are pursuing an 
identical purpose.” In the eyes of the investigators, this purpose was to serve “as a 
corporate affiliate used in part for the purpose of buying and holding bank stock on behalf 
of the Valley National Bank.” Investigators then stated their belief that Bancorporation 
ownership of a majority stake in the Bank of Douglas “[violated] the Clayton Act because 
competition [was] or [would] be substantially lessened in three Arizona markets,” and 
emphasized that the Bancorporation “[had] continuously violated Section 7” of the 
Clayton Act, which relates to interlocking directorates. However, the investigators 
determined that the Federal Reserve could take little action to remedy the situation under 
the laws of the time, as “Board action is apparently limited to ordering divestment of 
stock. In the case of the Valley National Bank’s control of the Bank of Douglas, such relief 
may not be entirely satisfactory. Close contact between the two banks may continue 
because of the presence of former Valley employees in important positions in the Bank of 
Douglas. Even if the new ownership desires a management change a successor group of 
similar caliber may not be available.” In December of 1962, the Department of Justice 
filed an antitrust suit against Valley National, the Arizona Bancorporation, and The 
Arizona Bank (formerly the Bank of Douglas). This suit was settled by consent decree on 
November 23, 1966. Under the terms of the settlement, Valley National officers and 
executives and the Valley National profit sharing plan were required to sell their holdings 
in the Bancorporation within five years, the bank was prohibited from acquiring other 
Arizona banks for a period of fifteen years, and the practice of placing Valley National 
insiders on the Bancorporation board was ended. Signal Oil of Los Angeles purchased 
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subject period and immediately thereafter, the acquisition of a sizeable 
ownership stake in the Bank of Douglas benefitted Valley National by 
preventing the Transamerica-owned First National Bank of Arizona or the 
Southern Arizona Bank, the second and third largest institutions in the 
state, from expanding their footprint, customer base, or reputation through 
the purchase of the fourth-largest bank in Arizona. Though held indirectly 
and not representing a majority stake in any institution, the Bank of 
Douglas, Bank of Flagstaff, and First State Bank shares acquired by the 
profit sharing plan allowed Valley National employees, and later 
shareholders, to benefit financially from the operations of competitor 
banks. Finally, the resulting interbank relationships provided Valley 
National with sources to which loan inquiries originating in non-competitive 
markets throughout the state could be directed without losing all 
                                                                                                                       
the Bancorporation in 1967. In 1985, The Arizona Bank was purchased by California-
based Security Pacific, which was then purchased by Bank of America in 1992. Maricopa 
County Recorder’s Office, “Articles of Incorporation of Arizona Bancorporation,” Maricopa 
County Recorder’s Office, http://recorder.maricopa.gov/recdocdata/GetRecData 
Detail.aspx?Rec=19530002347 (accessed October 1, 2011); Maricopa County 
Recorder’s Office, Professional Building Deed, Maricopa County Recorder’s Office, 
http://recorder.maricopa.gov/recdocdata/GetRecDataDetail.aspx?Rec=19530035536 
(accessed October 1, 2011); VNB Press Release, April 1, 1953, file 442, VNB Collection; 
Maricopa County Recorder’s Office, Stock Transfer Form, Maricopa County Recorder’s 
Office, http://156.42.40.50/UnOfficialDocs/pdf/19530023634.pdf (accessed October 1, 
2011); Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, ii, 44-45, 56, 325-326, 358-
366; “Carl Bimson in Valley Bank Presidency,” Phoenix Gazette, January 20, 1953; VNB 
Press Release, May 6, 1953, file 201, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to the 
Stockholders,” 1953, inside back cover, VNB Collection; “President’s Annual Report to 
the Stockholders,” 1954, inside back cover, VNB Collection; Hait, 163-164, 176-179; 
Schweikart, A History, 136; Gutowsky, Arizona Banking, 29-30; “Banks’ ‘Relationship’ 
Struck by Government,” Los Angeles Times, December 29, 1962; VNB Press Release, 
December 16, 1966, file 597, VNB Collection; “Justice Department Settles Antitrust Suit 
Against Three Firms,” Wall Street Journal, December 20, 1966; “Mergers: The 
Acquisition Front,” TIME Magazine, May 19, 1967; Jeff Rowe and Kathleen A. Hughes, 
“Security Pacific Agrees to Buy Banking Firm – Los Angeles Based Firm Will Pay $480 
Million For Arizona Bancwest,” Wall Street Journal, August 21, 1985; Tom Furlong, 
“Security Pacific: A History,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 1992. 
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associated income or growing the market share of a direct competitor.392 
As such, the results of subject period mergers, competitor stock 
acquisitions, and de novo expansion clearly demonstrate the value of the 
branching and acquisition component of Valley National’s post-war 
operations strategy. 
  Branching alone expanded the bank’s retail presence from 
nineteen to thirty-two banking centers by the end of the subject period, 
and brought in a total of at least $43,472,508.80 in deposits, an amount 
equal to more than thirty-one percent of study period deposit growth.393 
Furthermore, deposits held at new branches were offset by just 
$12,186,320.74 in outstanding loans, a de novo loan-to-deposit ratio of 
twenty-eight percent. The relatively low volume of loans issued by new 
branches helped the bank to reduce the high loan-to-deposit ratio of its 
Professional Building home office location, which measured nearly fifty-
three percent at the end of 1952. De novo branch lending was of particular 
value to the institution as almost seventy-four percent of loans issued by 
new branches were high-margin, short-term installment loans, thus 
                                            
392 Valley National referred loans to the Bank of Douglas and the Bank of 
Flagstaff when applicants resided in non-competitive areas serviced by those firms. In 
response to Federal Reserve Bank investigators probing the competitiveness of the state 
banking market in 1956, Valley National staff cited the referral of eight loans to the Bank 
of Flagstaff as evidence of its practice of not competing with banks in markets without a 
Valley National presence. However, given the relationship between the institutions and 
the fact that Valley National merged the Bank of Flagstaff into its corporate structure just 
one year later, the referrals did little to demonstrate a desire to foster competition. 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Investigation, 43, 57. 
 
393 Branch List, March 6, 1959, VNB Collection; “Valley National Bank Total 
Deposits,” June 24, 1976, VNB Collection. 
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increasing bank profitability and capital turnover rates.394 Branching to the 
full extent permitted by regulatory authorities also allowed the bank to 
mitigate the impact of competitor institution expansion by ensuring that 
existing and potential new customers in developing areas had easy 
access to Valley National locations. Similar deposit gains and geographic 
expansion benefits were gained through mergers with the First National 
Bank of Nogales and the First National Bank of Winslow, both of which 
helped the institution to grow its footprint and reduce its overall loan-to-
deposit ratio. Finally, acquiring minority ownership stakes in several 
competitor banks allowed Valley National to protect its market share 
relative to competitors such as First National while circumventing 
regulatory challenges with respect to de novo expansion. Acquisition also 
permitted the institution and its shareholders to reap some revenue from 
transactions steered to banks in which it held a minority stake. 
The combined effectiveness of subject period branching and acquisition 
warrants recognition as the most measurable and significant component of 
Valley National post-war strategy. While promotional efforts were 
necessary to draw in customers and maintain or increase brand 
recognition, and market-appropriate product offerings were essential to 
meeting customer banking needs and driving institutional profitability, 
without offices in locations convenient to the growing post-war population, 
                                            
394 As based on 1952 year-end deposit and outstanding loan totals. “Valley 




the bank may have lost revenue and market share to competitors, thereby 
mitigating the effectiveness of promotional efforts and targeted product 
offerings. As such, branching and acquisition served as the most effective 
and quantifiable component of the three-pronged post-war strategy to 






As Valley National leaders such as Walter Bimson, Carl Bimson, 
Herbert Leggett, and others looked toward the post-war period, they 
began a process of “thinking and planning for the future.”395 By 1945, the 
company was not only the largest bank in the state of Arizona, but also the 
largest in the eight-state Rocky Mountain region. While this ranking 
ensured the institution a tremendous advantage in the pursuit of post-war 
business, it did not guarantee ongoing profitability or continued market 
dominance. Despite many rosy predictions relating to a peacetime 
expansion of Arizona’s population and economy, the exact pattern and 
degree of post-war growth in the state remained uncertain. Furthermore, 
the potential growth of existing competitors such as First National, the 
Bank of Douglas, and Southern Arizona Bank posed a threat to the 
company, as did the prospect of new competitors likely to emerge if the 
optimistic predictions regarding post-war opportunity materialized. 
Accordingly, Valley National management worked to craft a post-war 
operation plan to ensure that the bank continued to succeed in the years 
following World War II. The key components of this plan were an 
emphasis on advertising, market-appropriate product offerings, and 
expansion through branching and acquisition.  
                                            
395 Leggett to Walter Bimson, January 10, 1945, VNB Collection. 
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Overall, the business strategies employed by the bank in the 
immediate post-war years proved successful, though some notable 
challenges and failures do color the story of Valley National operations 
during the subject period. Despite aggressive promotional efforts, market-
sensitive product development, and geographic expansion intended to 
place new Valley National locations in areas of residential and commercial 
development, average deposit account balances declined throughout the 
subject period. As this trend was paired with an increasing number of 
active deposit accounts resulting from population-related growth in the 
bank’s customer base and an expansion of the deposit customer market 
as a result of offering low-minimum balance accounts designed for those 
not accustomed to utilizing commercial bank services, it is indicative of an 
ongoing struggle to fulfill reserve requirements and meet loan funding 
demands. Although the shift toward a mass-market deposit account 
clientele did allow the bank to meet these demands and requirements 
while growing its deposit base every year but 1949, the low-minimum-
balance offerings likely served to significantly reduce the level of 
profitability directly associated with bank deposit operations. In addition to 
necessitating low-margin deposit account offerings, if not some accounts 
resulting in a loss, the issue of deposit generation also hampered lending 
capabilities. 
Throughout the subject period, Valley National faced challenges 
related to its lending operations. The institution was plagued by a deposit 
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base insufficient to meet all funding demands, challenged by the relatively 
low yields associated with Federal Housing Administration and Veterans 
Administration-guarantied loans, and constrained in its commercial lending 
efforts by government programs offering large businesses high-dollar 
loans at rates more competitive than those available from commercial 
banks. When paired with the introduction of more efficient business 
models by individuals such as A. B. Robbs, Jr., the bank’s failure to attract 
deposits at a rate sufficient to meet lending demands contributed to a 
surrender of mortgage market share. While the inability to fund large 
business loans stymied commercial lending operations, the 1950 defeat of 
the Bimson Plan ensured that the bank would remain a relatively minor 
player in the high-dollar business loan market for years to come. 
Branching and acquisition decisions also impacted the bank and its growth 
into the following chapter of its history. 
During the immediate post-war years, the bank encountered 
resistance to its branching efforts from Comptroller of the Currency 
Preston Delano and faced growing competition from existing and newly 
established competitors.  In response to these pressures, bank leaders 
pursued a path of protecting market share through acquiring interests in 
other institutions. However, given the bank’s industry ranking, the 
questions of market dominance posed by the Comptroller’s office, and the 
antitrust litigation then embroiling Transamerica, purchasing stakes in 
competitor institutions may be judged as an imprudent course of action. 
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While the immediate impact of such purchases reduced or eliminated the 
possibility of Transamerica acquiring the Bank of Douglas, the Bank of 
Flagstaff, or the First State Bank, and served to expand Valley National’s 
effective market share, the bank’s subject period acquisition activities 
prompted a 1956 Federal Reserve Bank investigation and a 1962 antitrust 
lawsuit. However, the long-term negative impact of these acquisitions was 
partially offset by the strong market ranking and financial position enjoyed 
by the bank as a result of subject period business practices.  
 When measured in terms of market share retention, impact on bank 
revenue and profitability, and shareholder value as determined by stock 
price and the total value of individual stock holdings when factoring in 
subject period stock splits, the bank’s immediate post-war operational 
strategy featuring a three-pronged focus on advertising, market-
appropriate product offerings, and expansion through branching and 
acquisition proved to be a success.  
Prior to the end of the war, Herbert Leggett advised that “any 
initiative and ingenuity… must be directed to the selling end of the 
business,” and informed Walter Bimson that marketing teams would be 
“the most important department” in any post-war business.396 In the years 
immediately following World War II, Valley National leaders heeded 
Leggett’s suggestions by fully embracing both traditional and innovative 
advertising techniques and public relations strategies to promote the bank, 
                                            
396 Leggett to Walter Bimson, January 10, 1945, VNB Collection; Leggett to 
Walter Bimson, June 26, 1944, VNB Collection. 
 197 
 
announce its offerings and growth, and highlight, if not amplify, its 
accomplishments. The numerous press releases of G. E. Arnold, the 
clever ad copy penned by Mert Reade, the valuable information compiled 
and presented by Herbert Leggett, and the boastful speeches of Walter 
and Carl Bimson resulted in numerous newspaper and magazine articles 
featuring the bank and won the company widespread attention.  
Arizona Progress and Arizona Statistical Review were well-
circulated and served to associate the bank with Arizona’s growth and 
prosperity in the minds of business leaders and other readers throughout 
the state and nation. Stories highlighting the bank’s frontier origins, its 
successful installment lending program, its wartime “300 Club” program, 
and its rapid growth and advancement in nationwide size rankings 
reinforced the perception of Valley National as a powerhouse in the 
banking industry. Finally, the post-war branch architecture championed by 
Walter Bimson served to garner additional attention from the media and 
general public, whether as a result of its nostalgic tribute to idealized 
notions of the Old West, as was the case with the Wickenburg branch, or 
in response to details such as lobby art or the use of professional color 
consultants such as Gustave Plochere. Combined, the varied aspects of 
bank promotional strategy won recognition from the press and public 
notice, thereby maintaining the attention of potential customers.  
This audience, whether existing clients or potential new customers, 
was further lured by the development of market-appropriate deposit and 
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loan products. In mid-1944, Leggett predicted that post-war savings rates 
would drop to near zero percent, which, in turn, would complicate Valley 
National lending efforts.397 In an attempt to drive deposit growth, the bank 
offered deposit accounts such as the “Special Checking Account,” and the 
“Baby’s Bank Book” and “Christmas Club” savings plans, all of which were 
low-balance products designed increase deposit totals by making banking 
accessible to mass-market consumers. In turn, many of the deposit dollars 
held in these accounts were lent out to customers seeking to borrow 
funds.  
During the war, Leggett characterized the post-war consumer 
borrowing predictions issued by many experts as “grossly 
underestimated,” and reminded bank leaders that “When people can 
borrow, they do borrow.”398 His assertions regarding consumer loan 
demand proved correct. When paired with the declining savings rates of 
the period, increased loan demand severely strained Valley National 
lending operations. In response, bank leaders shifted lending priorities 
away from low-margin, government-insured real estate loans to high-
margin, short-term, relatively low-dollar installment loans, thereby 
increasing profitability while alleviating capital demands. The bank 
expanded the market for these deposit and loan products through an 
                                            





aggressive branching and acquisition program, which also allowed the 
company to grow its effective market share. 
Walter Bimson strongly believed that large banks with broad 
geographic footprints were inherently more stable than their smaller 
competitors. When discussing branching with others, he highlighted the 
“diversification and flexibility of operation” allowed by branching, and 
emphasized that “a small local bank can seldom provide the variety of 
services, the specialized information or the loaning capacity that a larger 
organization like [Valley National did].”399 Accordingly, while Valley 
National entered the subject period with nineteen branches, it ended the 
immediate post-war years with thirty-four branches and minority ownership 
stakes in three competitors.  
The thirteen de novo branches established during the period 
generated substantial deposit volume and more limited, albeit highly 
lucrative, lending volume. The acquisition of the First National Bank of 
Nogales and the First National Bank of Winslow resulted in an immediate 
increase in the firm’s deposit base and a geographic expansion into new 
markets deemed strategically valuable by Valley National executives. 
While mergers and de novo expansion bolstered deposit totals, presented 
opportunities for installment lending, and helped to retain market share, 
the purchase of minority interests in the Bank of Douglas, the Bank of 
Flagstaff, and the First State Bank at Mesa allowed Valley National to 
                                            
399 “President’s Annual Report to the Stockholders,” 1951, 9, VNB Collection. 
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indirectly increase its overall market share while preventing Transamerica 
from expanding its influence in the state banking market. The combined 
successes resulting from bank efforts in the areas of advertising, product 
development, and geographic expansion translated to an effective 
increase in state market share, an increase in annual revenues and 
profits, and an marked increase in share value over the course of the 
subject period. 
From the beginning of 1944 to the end of 1952, Valley National 
experienced a decrease in actual market share, as measured by the 
percentage of total Arizona deposit dollars held by the bank. Holding 49.4 
percent of total deposits at the end of the period versus the 51.3 percent 
of total deposits it held at the beginning of 1944, the bank experienced a 
percentage decline similar to that of First National, its largest competitor. 
First National held 21.2 percent of Arizona bank deposits at the end of the 
subject period, compared to the 23.2 percent held by the institution at the 
beginning of 1944. Only two Arizona banks in existence at the beginning 
of the subject period increased their directly-held share of deposit holdings 
by the end of the immediate post-war years; Southern Arizona Bank and 
the Bank of Douglas, which increased from 10.4 percent to 11.5 percent 
and 3 percent to 8.4 percent, respectively. Farmers and Stockmens, the 
Bank of Flagstaff, and the First State Bank at Mesa, all institutions 
established during the period of study, held 2.6 percent of state deposits 
by the end of the immediate post-war years. However, while Valley 
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National lost direct control of a small percentage of the state banking 
market, its non-majority ownership stakes in the Bank of Douglas, the 
Bank of Flagstaff, and the First State Bank allowed control, albeit indirect, 
of 58.9 percent of Arizona deposits by the end of the subject period. This 
amount equaled nearly three times the total deposit holdings of First 
National, which controlled 21.2 percent of the state deposit market by the 
end of the period of study.400 Furthermore, though the percentage of 
deposits held by the bank declined, the dollar amount of deposits held by 
Valley National increased substantially, jumping from $117,735,053.21 to 
$305,104,124.85 over the course of the subject period.401 The significant 
increase in the bank’s deposit base funded its lending operations, which 
contributed greatly to revenue generation and institutional profitability. 
Valley National gross income increased every year of the subject 
period, while the bank’s net earnings increased every year with the 
exception of 1949. Although the bank’s customer base increased 
substantially during this period, presumably aiding in revenue growth 
trends, factors such as tax rates, employee costs, branch construction 
expenses, and reduced deposit account margins associated with the drive 
to increase deposits through low-dollar account offerings exerted 
downward pressure on bank profitability. Over the course of the subject 
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period, employee salary costs rose by 491 percent, climbing from 
$875,388 at the beginning of 1944 to $4,298,475 by the end of the study 
period.402 Tax obligations also increased significantly during this period. 
While taxes accounted for just 36.3 percent of 1944 earnings, by the end 
of the subject period, the bank’s tax burden had increased to 55.1 percent 
of earnings.403 However, the shrewd focus on high-margin, low-dollar, 
short-term installment lending helped to counteract rising costs and the 
reduced margins associated with low-balance deposit accounts. 
Throughout the subject period, loan income accounted for approximately 
two-thirds of Valley National revenue. As such, increasing the margins 
realized from lending operations significantly impacted bank profitability.  
Over the course of the period of study, the average rate of return 
recorded on Valley National loans increased from 5.29 percent to 6.07 
percent.404 The 6.07 percent rate of return on loans received by the bank 
at the end of the subject period exceeded the prevailing average mortgage 
rate of 5.03 percent by more than a full point, underscoring the importance 
of higher-margin installment lending. Furthermore, while ending the period 
with a average rate of return on loans greater than six percent, the 
institution paid no interest on checking deposits, one percent interest on 
savings deposits, and a rate ranging from fifty basis points to two percent 
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on funds borrowed from the Federal Reserve.405 When measured within 
the context of rate spreads on funds costing the bank up to two percent 
interest, yielding a full point or more of return above prevailing mortgage 
rates on funds lent to consumers translated to significant earnings for the 
company. This favorable rate spread, as well as other actions such as the 
implementation of a limited slate of service charges and the establishment 
of a foreign department to capture revenue related to cross-border trade, 
greatly impacted bank revenues and profitability.  
During the first year of the subject period, the bank generated 
revenues of $3,103,208, while the institution grossed $12,417,258 in the 
final full year of the subject period. Net earnings recorded by the bank also 
increased, though not to the same degree as gross income. In 1944, the 
bank netted $755,411. By the end of the period, net earnings increased to 
$1,560,663.406 Overall, the percentage of net earnings to gross income 
declined throughout the subject period, likely owing primarily to the 
aforementioned increases in tax obligations, employee costs, and branch 
construction expenditures. Nonetheless, Valley National management did 
achieve revenue growth each year of the subject period, and recorded 
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increasing net earnings every year but 1949. The general upward trends 
in bank gross income and net earnings were also reflected in Valley 
National share prices, which increased in value significantly over the 
course of the subject period.  
At the beginning of the subject period, Valley National stock traded 
at $4.25 per share. By the end of the period, despite a vast increase in the 
number of shares outstanding resulting from efforts to raise capital 
through stock offerings and the use of shares as dividends, bank stock 
sold for $19 per share. An individual holding a round lot of one-hundred 
shares valued at $425 at the beginning of the subject period would have 
ended the study period with 312.5 shares valued at $5,937.50 if he or she 
did not participate in any of the stock offerings of the immediate post-war 
years.407 Thus, when measured in terms of effective market share, as 
determined by deposits controlled directly by the bank and those 
controlled indirectly in an effort to prevent their acquisition by competitors, 
increasing revenue and net earnings, and share price and overall subject 
period investment appreciation, the three-pronged business strategy 
                                            
407 The stated values take into account the increase of holdings resulting from the 
use of bank stock as dividend payments, but not shares accumulated during the several 
subscriptions offered to shareholders between 1944 and 1953. Determining the total 
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difficult as annual reports do not list a purchase limit for the 1944 or 1945 offerings. 
Therefore, it is impossible to calculate the number of shares one may have purchased, 
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utilized by Valley National leaders in the immediate post-war period must 
be judged as successful. 
Valley National Bank Historical Overview, January 1953 to 1992 
Carl Bimson succeeded his brother Walter as president of the bank 
on January 20, 1953.408 That year brought a mild nationwide economic 
recession and the incorporation of the Arizona Bancorporation, a holding 
company created by bank leadership to assume ownership of the Bank of 
Douglas.409 Throughout the remainder of the 1950s, Valley National 
continued to acquire competitor institutions and open de novo facilities to 
the extent allowed by regulators. However, the size and structure of the 
company attracted federal attention after the passage of the federal Bank 
Holding Company Act of 1956. A 1956 Federal Reserve investigation into 
the level of competition present in the Arizona banking market was 
followed by a 1962 federal antitrust suit that lingered on until 1966.410 
During this period of litigation, new competitors emerged, and bank 
leaders focused much of their attention on the federal lawsuit, causing the 
bank to enter a “lethargic period.”411 
Thus, the final chapter of Valley National history begins with the 
settlement of the federal antitrust suit and the exit of both Walter and Carl 
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Bimson from active management roles.412 During this period, the bank 
continued to expand, albeit in more measured terms than it had in past 
decades.413 Slowed growth and the challenging economic environment of 
the mid-to-late 1970s further contributed to the more measured growth 
patterns experienced by the bank. By the 1980s, growing competition from 
in-state and out-of-state financial institutions created additional challenges 
for the company.  Though Valley National remained the largest bank in the 
state throughout the 1980s, it was no longer the most profitable.414 In 
1985, Arizona lawmakers passed legislation allowing interstate banking, 
prompting the sale of numerous Arizona banks to out-of-state 
competitors.415 As other local institutions were purchased by out-of-state 
entities, Valley National remained independent, being “too big and 
expensive to buy, but not big enough to compete in the event of full 
interstate banking.”416 Suffering from ever-growing competition and losses 
resulting from the struggling local real estate market, Valley National was 
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acquired by Ohio-based Banc One Corporation in 1992, thus closing the 
books on the last large Arizona-based bank.417 
Study Limitations 
 This study relied primarily upon information found in the Valley 
National Bank Collection, subject period newspaper and magazine 
articles, and secondary sources. While the information available in these 
sources proved sufficient for the purposes of this project, some resources 
that may have been of use were unavailable for review. Notably, the 
Valley National Bank Collection does not include minutes from bank board 
meetings. This source would have been of great value in determining the 
rationale behind the business practices of the study period. Also, the 
passage of nearly six decades since the end of the subject period has 
ensured that most or all bank executives that served during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s have passed away, thus precluding oral interviews. While 
the Phoenix History Project did interview Walter and Carl Bimson in the 
1970s, the transcripts of these conversations proved to be of little value 
while conducting this study as the topics discussed were of little relation to 
the subject period operations of the bank. Other resources relating 
specifically to the bank or more generally to the banking industry were not 
consulted for this study due to financial limitations or time constraints. 
Such sources include the Preston Delano Collection at the Truman Library 
                                            
417 JPMorgan Chase acquired Bank One in 2004. Schweikart, “A Record of 
Revitalization,” 135; Michael Quint, “Norwest Acquiring Citibank-Arizona,” The New York 
Times, February 4, 1993; Andrew Ross Sorkin and Landon Thomas, Jr., “J. P. Morgan 
Chase to Acquire Bank One in $58 Billion Deal,” New York Times, January 14, 2004.   
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in Independence, Missouri, National Archives records covering the subject 
period policies and operations of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the 
holdings of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco research library.  
Future Study Opportunities 
 This study has focused on the business strategies employed by 
Valley National during the immediate post-war years in an attempt to 
determine how the institution built upon its pre-war successes in the 
immediate post-war period. Market share, revenue and profitability, and 
share price were used as metrics to gauge the effectiveness of the bank’s 
subject period business practices. With the exception of Financing the 
Frontier and Transformation in the Desert, both of which lack 
independence and the benefit of long-range hindsight, no study focusing 
exclusively on Valley National has been undertaken prior to this effort. 
Larry Schweikart’s A History of Banking in Arizona provides extensive 
coverage of the bank, but does so within the context of the larger state 
banking markets. Books such as Bradford Luckingham’s Phoenix, Bill 
Collin’s The Emerging Metropolis, and Philip VanderMeer’s Desert Visions 
mention the bank and its leaders in larger discussions relating to the 
economic and cultural growth of the Phoenix area, but do not focus on its 
operational strategies and their associated outcomes. As such, this thesis 
fills a void in the literature relating to Valley National Bank. However, much 
work remains to be done.  
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 While the immediate post-war business practices of the institution 
have been examined in this study, questions relating to many associated 
topics provide opportunities for future scholarship. Potential studies that 
may build upon the work presented in this thesis and other literature 
relating to the bank and its market include an examination of the impact of 
Valley National promotional efforts on Arizona’s post-war growth, the 
impact of the bank and its leaders on the civic development of Phoenix 
and the state of Arizona, or the business practices of the institution in the 
years following this study. There is also a need for biographies of bank 
leaders such as Walter Bimson, Carl Bimson, and Herbert Leggett, as no 
such works yet exist. Finally, opportunities exist for projects examining the 
legal and social implications of subject period Valley National actions. 
Such studies might seek to answer the question of whether the bank or 
individual employees of the institution engaged in discriminatory lending 
practices, and if so, what impact such practices had on individual 
applicants or the larger community. The question of market dominance 
and the impact of the 1962 antitrust lawsuit on both the bank and the 
banking industry might prove of value to scholars as many banking 
industry antitrust studies focus solely on the 1948 Transamerica case, 
thus leaving the Valley National litigation available as a topic for further 
inquiry. 
 Given the size of the bank and its impact on the state economy, 
many other potential study questions may also be examined. Future 
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inquiries relating to Valley National, whether addressing topics outlined 
above or focusing on questions not listed, will serve to bolster the body of 
literature relating to the institution, thereby providing a valuable pool of 
contextual resources for scholars studying the history of the bank, the 
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